CORRESPONDENCErnLetter From Englandrnby Jeremy BlackrnContinental DriftrnBoth recent and longer-term historyrnthrow hght on British distinctivenessrnwithin the European Community. It isrnapparent that enthusiasm for the EC, letrnalone a federal Europe, is limited inrnBritain, and that much of the history ofrnpolitical convergence over the last 40rnyears is to be sought in the calculationsrnof particular politicians and politicalrngroups, rather than in any moves reflectingrna popular groundswell. Like otherrnmodern “democratic” societies, Britainrnhas a political system and culture that isrnonly partially democratized, and morernheed is paid to popular anxieties andrnxenophobia by the oft-derided popularrnpress than by supposedly democraticrnpoliticians. This was true of the Heathrnministry that negotiated British entry intornthe EC, and it has been true of “Euroenthusiasts”rnever since. Thus, the fullrnimplications of the potential federalismrnto which Britain was committed werernnot explained to the electorate; instead,rnthere was a pragmatic stress on the apparentrnadvantages of membership.rnYet, these were always less for Britainrnthan for other states. The real source ofrnBritish alienation from the EC is the factrnthat the British did not share the interestsrnof other states in joining a multinationalrnbody of that type. The EEC wasrngenerated by particular interpretationsrnof national interest on the Continent.rnFrance wanted the European Coal andrnSteel Community and the EEC to controlrnGermany; she wished to control Germanrnindependence so much that it wasrnworth some loss of sovereignty to achievernthis vital national aim, an aim which thernBritish did not share to the same extent.rnGermany and Italy wanted the EEC tornsafeguard their democracies, again arnneed Britain did not share. In a Europernsuffering from devastation, political dislocation,rnand international divisionsrnstemming from the traumatic events ofrn1940, the EEC offered a means to creaternspace for development. Britain onlyrnsought to join when the EEC became arnthreat to her, and the same might be arguedrnof the ERM.rnIn this light, British alienation is unsurprisingrnand has become stronger asrnthe EC has developed in more ambitiousrndirections. Furthermore, as Britain onlyrnjoined after the EEC system had beenrnde’eloped to suit interests other than herrnown, it is scarcely surprising that transitionrnto membership was not easy. Institutionsrnand policies in the framing ofrnwhich Britain had played no part had tornbe accepted. As a state seeking membership,rnBritain negotiated from weakness.rnA previously cheap-food importingrncountry had to accept the CommonrnAgricultural Policy, with its high prices tornthe consumer and heavy burdens on therntaxpayer. Once a member, successivernBritish governments had only limitedrnsuccess in modifying community policies,rna situation that does not augur wellrnfor the future and that has not made thernEC popular.rnIt is particularly clear in the Britishrncase that the EC has failed to replace thernnation-states of Western Europe as a focusrnfor popular identity and thus loyalty.rnIf this is a measure of its failure, it is alsorna cause of it. The central political problemrnin any community is the elicitingrnof consent. This is not simply a questionrnof defining acceptable policies and selectingrnleaders who will be judged competent,rnbut also reflects the nature ofrnidentification between people and government,rnwhich is a question of history,rnsymbolism, and a sense of place and purpose.rnThese in turn combine to producernan ideology that is more potent than thernmore intellectual and abstract creedsrnusually designated by that term. Despiternall the talk of the failure and redundancyrnof the nation-state and its need for replacementrnby power-sharing, supranationalrnbodies, and “Euro-regions,” it isrnthe nation-state that is most effective atrneliciting and securing consent. It is nornaccident that Euro-federalism is endorsedrnmost strongly in Belgium andrnItaly, where the nation-states are recentrnand weak.rnAnalysts of the British state who detect,rnindeed sometimes welcome, signsrnof weakness are most prone to argue thernneed for a different political framework.rnThis thesis is most relevant to those whornfeel frustrated and thwarted by thernBritish state, most obviously nationalistrnmovements in Scotland, Wales, andrnNorthern Ireland. This process has beenrnaccentuated recently b’ the congruencernof these developments: first, the longevityrnof Conservative government, whichrnhas led some opponents to become disenchantedrnwith the current political situation;rnsecondly, the deepening of the recessionrnof the late 1980’s and early 90’s;rnand thirdly, particular problems affectingrnthe monarchy and the Churchrnof England. However, despite growth inrnthe 1970’s and 80’s, the Scottish and, inrnparticular, Welsh National Parties bothrnremain minority bodies. In the mostrnpopulous regions—South Wales andrnStrathclyde—Labour is a more successfulrnrepresentative of popular consciousnessrnand sense of identity and interest.rnThus, in Britain, a highly self-aware culturalrnnationalism and a strong sense ofrnidentity on the part of the Welsh and thernScots coexists with transnational politicalrnstability. Despite repeated sightingsrnof the demise of the British nationstate.rnGreat Britain has proved a stablerntransnational political community,rnwhich has subsumed other nationalrnidentities.rnAlthough some opponents of thernMaastricht treaty may be self-confessedrn”Little Englanders,” others can quite legitimatelyrnclaim that they are in no wayrn”anti-Ejuropean,” but simply want to seern”Europe” developing along differentrnlines from the ones envisaged by Delorsrnand the “Euro-federalists.” This was certainlyrnthe position of Mrs. Thatcher,rnwho prided herself on the role that Westernrnfirmness played in freeing EasternrnEurope from Soviet hegemony and communism;rnher vision of Europe was farrnfrom restricted to the EC.rnNevertheless, the misleading identificationrnof Europe with the EC has hadrnmuch impact: British politicians talkedrnin the 1960’s and 70’s of “entering Europe,”rnand in the I980’s Mrs. Thatcher’srnviews on the EC led to her being presentedrnas “anti-European.” This view inrnwhich the quintessential definition ofrnEuropeanness is membership in the EC,rnand everything else is falling away, isrnintellectually dishonest.rnFocusing on the difficulties confrontingrnthe attempt to create a plausiblernEuropean public myth helps to explainrnsome of the problems that any attemptrn38/CHRONICLESrnrnrn