the belief that Frangois Mitterrand’snbark was more impressive than his bite.nIndeed, if Defense Minister Chevenementnhad actually wanted tonsabotage his government’s “tough”nstance, he could hardly have donenbetter than he did by warning hisncompatriots that a war in the PersiannGulf would cost one hundred thousandnlives.nThe case of Jean-Pierre Chevenementnis particularly interesting becausenit points up the French SocialistnParty’s acute ideological dilemma innreacting to the Gulf crisis. An emphaticallynnationalistic and anti-NATO socialistnwho for years headed a radicallynleft-wing “think tank” (a group callingnitself the CERES), Chevenement hasnnever felt much sympathy for reactionarynsheiks and emirs — precisely thosenwhom the left-wing weekly NouvelnObservateur castigated’ in a trenchantncover story (“These Princes Who FinancenIslamic Fundamentalism”) justnsix days before the Iraqis invaded Kuwait.nIndeed, up until the moment ofnthe invasion, Chevenement felt a certainnadmiration for Saddam Hussein,nthe kind of “progressive” Arab leader itnwas possible to live with. For socialistn”purists” like Chevenement nothingncould be more ideologically gallingnthan having to turn against a oncenfriendly and relatively “progressive”ncountry (where women, for example,nare no longer veiled) in order to protectnothers, and above all Saudi Arabia,nwhich they regard as feudal anachronismsnartificially preserved by Westernncapitalists.nOne of the great ironies of thenpresent situation is that it was preciselynsuch capitalists who, by favoring Iraq,nhelped to develop the military musclesnof this Middle Eastern Frankenstein.nFrance’s close ties with Iraq go back anlong way — at least as far back as thenmid-1950’s, when the irascible Iraniannpremier, Mohammed Mossadegh, wasnsending shock waves through the MiddlenEast by nationalizing his country’snpetroleum industry. With the AmericannArabian Oil Company’s virtualnmonopoly on the Arabian peninsula,nand while the Anglo-Iranian Oil Companynwas the big boy in Iran, thendirectors of the relatively small butnambitious Compagnie Frangaise desnPetrolels decided to place their bets onnthe oil fields of Mossul and Basra.n46/CHRONICLESnThus was born a commercial associationnthat grew steadily bigger until,nalmost imperceptibly, it was transformedninto an informal military alliancenin the 1970’s and 1980’s.n^ One of the persons who helped tonstrengthen this Paris-Baghdad axis wasnthe man whom President GeorgesnPompidou picked to head the Servicende Documentation Exterieure et denContre-Espionnage, the French equivalentnof our CIA, in the autumn ofn1970. A burly ex-cavalryman weighingnmore than two hundred pounds —nwhence his nickname of “Porthos” —nCount Alexandre de Marenches wasnand remains one of those freewheelingnand unorthodox aristocrats who, overnthe centuries, have added so muchndash and color to the history of France.nNot long after the German occupationnof Vichy, France, in December 1942,nhe had crossed the Pyrenees in order tonreach North Africa, and had laternserved in Italy and France under GeneralnAlphonse Juin, whose aide-decampnhe became at the young age ofn23. His fluent knowledge of Germannand English (his mother was American),nhis earthy shrewdness and commonnsense, his phenomenal memorynand mordant wit and talent for pithynformulations, and his rugged independencenand stubborn refusal to compromisenon fundamental issues all combinednwith a whimsical sangfroid andnthe courteous urbanity of a grandnseigneur to win him the respect ofnmany influential Allied ofiBcers, beginningnwith Generals George Marshallnand Dwight Eisenhower.nDuring his close to eleven-yearntenure — the CIA during the samen1970-1981 period had no less than sixndiff^erent bosses — Alexandre denMarenches transformed an overpoliticizednand faction-ridden secret serviceninto one of the most efficient intelligencenagencies in the world. (One ofnhis major coups was a warning, sent tonthe Vatican three months prior to thenevent, that an attempt on the life ofnPope John Paul II was being plannednby East European agents.) During thisnperiod he established exceptionallyncordial relations not only with British,nWest German, and other Europeannintelligence chiefs, but also with thenrulers of Saudi Arabia and Iraq.nIt would be grossly unfair to suggestnthat Marenches, in his talks withnnnSadoun Shaker, who then headednIraq’s secret services before becomingnthe country’s minister of the interior,nand with Saddam Hussein himself,nhelped to stimulate the megalomanianthat has since overtaken the “strongnman” of Iraq. But it is nevertheless truenthat in his efforts to persuade the Iraqinleaders to be less dependent on Moscownand to become respectable membersnof the international community bynabandoning their support of terroristngroups in the West, Marenches usednan argument that may well have madentheir heads swell with pride. “Today,”nhe told Sadoun Shaker,nyour country is the only one innthe Arab-Moslem world, andneven beyond it, which has bothnwater and petroleum. Fate — or,nif you prefer. Excellency,nAllah — has seen to it thatncountries that have water havenno oil, and vice versa. It’s ancurious thing, but that’s how itnis. You are the exception.nThanks to the very large riversnthat flow down from thenCaucasus — the Taurus, thenTigris, and the Euphrates — younhave water in abundance andnyou have, so everyone assuresnme, fabulous petroleum andnmineral resources. Some go asnfar as to say that you are ansecond Saudi Arabia. And yet,nwhile this is so, what are youndoing? . . . What are you doing,nbetween this prestigious past ofnyours [a reference to ancientnBabylon and the gloriousnBaghdad of Harun-al-Rashid]nand a future which might yetnbe? You are practising basicnterrorism.nThese words were uttered and doubtlessnrepeated more than fifteen years ago.nThey were later recorded in conversationsnwith the French TV journalistnChristine Ockrent that were publishednin 1986. In the same book, an overnightnbest-seller in France but still unpublishednin the United States, Marenchesnpointed out that Saddam Hussein’s crazynassault on the oil-rich Iranian provincenof Khouzistan in 1980 was due tonfaulty intelligence and to the erroneousnbelief that when the Iraqis invaded, thenlocal inhabitants of “Arabistan” wouldnrise up as one man to welcome theirn