ing” of the West was dominated by thenKissingerian notion that the essentialnaim of our diplomacy should be not ton”rock the boat” lest a “provocative”nattitude on our part exacerbate thenpent-up grievances of one or anothern”satellite” country, encouraging newneruptions — like that of Budapest inn1956 or of Prague in 1968. This madenus in effect the diplomatic accomplicesnof the Brezhnevian process of “normalization.”nToday, far from having disappearednin the undertow of recent history,nthis apprehensive attitude stillnlingers on, the current fear being thatnthe ferments of “liberation” now atnwork in Central and Eastern Europenare going to get out of hand andn”destabilize” the continent. At thenheight of the Romanian crisis last December,nJacques Chirac, the formernFrench premier and still the mayor ofnParis, could find nothing better to donthan to berate President Mitterrand fornnot having begged the Soviet Union to .nintervene militarily on behalf of thenanti-Ceausescu “freedom fighters”nwho were batding the hated diehards ofnthe Sicuritate. It is a measure of thendiplomatic miracle Gorbachev hasnbeen able to pull off that in just fivenyears he has transformed the image ofnhis country from that of an aggressivenand invading bully (Afghanistan) intonthat of a champion of the downtroddennand oppressed! As Frangoise Thomnrightly observes, Gorbachev may havenfailed dismally on the domestic front,nbut, like Lenin, to whom he still paysnofficial homage, he has been brilliantlynsuccessful in the field of internationalnrelations.nThere has even recently been pessimisticntalk of a possible “Balkanizahon”nof Eastern Europe, likely to returnnthe continent back to what it wasnin 1919, or even in 1914, on the eve ofnthe First World War. We would donwell to beware of such phony historicalnparallels, which by prolonging thenblackmail threat of “destabilizahon,”njustify the former jailer’s superpowernstatus as — of all things!—the guardiannof peace and security in EasternnEurope. What made the situation sonexplosive from 1890 until 1914 wasnthe imperial rivalry of two, or perhapsnwe should say three, European powersn— Russia, Austria, and Germany — asnOttoman influence and authority receded.nBut today, with Austria reducednto a relatively small “heardand” ofneight million inhabitants, and countriesnlike Hungary, Romania, Poland, andnCzechoslovakia all quietly or defiantlynridding themselves of Soviet influence,nno such great-power confrontation existsnin the Balkans.nAs for the “parallel” with 1919, it isneven less apt. Bolshevism, described bynMarshal Ferdinand Foch as “the diseasenof defeated countries,” was then annew revolutionary force that, afternsweeping over Russia and spreading tonHungary, seemed for several turbulentnyears about to triumph in Germany —nwhere the last “Workers-and-Soldiers”nrepublic was not forcibly subdued byntroops of the Weimar republic untiln1924. But today Bolshevism is clearly anspent ideological force, while the nationalisticnresentments created by thenTreaty of Versailles have been replacednin Germany by a sense of economicnpride that may seem overbearing tonsome, but whose roots — satisfaction innwork well done — go back centuries tonthe industrious Germany of MartinnLuther and Albrecht Diirer.nEven the often expressed dread that,nif Gorbachev goes, the party hardlinersnand even perhaps the Sovietnarmy generals will take over, strikes menas farfetched and one more prolongationnof the Kissingerian mythology. Fornin the absence of a charismatic personalitynable to replace Gorbachev, therenis nobody in the U.S.S.R. today whoncould conceivably hold its diverse componentsntogether, and particulady notnLIBERAL ARTSnfor a campaign of military or ideologicalnreconquest of Europe. Quite asidenfrom the bitter resistance any such effortnwould encounter on the part ofnPoles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians,nRomanians, and even Bulgarians (farnless pro-Russian, according to the late,npoisoned-umbrella-assassinated GeorgiinMarkov, than is generally supposed),nany such attempt to “turn backnthe tide of history” would be furiouslyncontested inside the U.S.S.R. itself,nwhere already in the Baltic states localnpoliticians are insisting that theirnEstonian, Latvian, or Lithuanian fellow-citizensnnot be forced to serve theirncompulsory terms of military servicenoutside of their Balhc homelands.nThis does not mean that we cannnow happily go back to sleep and withdrawnall of our troops from a superannuatednNATO — which is more or lessnwhat Strobe Talbott and other “doves”nare suggesting. Military vigilance innthese turbulent times is more indispensablenthan ever. But it is high time thatnwe stopped wringing our hands overnthe prospects of destabilizing “catastrophes,”nwhich only too often in the pastnhave paralyzed our national will and sonblurred our vision that we no longernknew who our true friends, and indeednour “allies,” in Central and EasternnEurope really were.nHistorian and biographer Curtis Catenwrites from Paris and is the author ofnThe Ides of August, which deals withnthe Berlin Wall crisis of 1961.nLAW AND ETHICS, SWEDISH STYLEnSKOVDE, Sweden—A policeman with a sweet tooth wasnturned in by his partner for shoplifting a 2-cent piece ofncandy, but the state refused to prosecute the case.n. . . Prosecutor Krister Waern said the charge was droppednbecause the candy-store owner previously had offered treatsnto police when they came to his shop late at night to turn offnfalse alarms.nOther police in Skovde, in south-central Sweden, agreednthe officer was wrong to take the candy but said his partnernshould not have reported him.nThe officer was not identified, in keeping with Swedishnlaw.n~AP, January 7, J 990nnnMAY 1990/53n