Living Within Our MeansnDavid Kennedy: Over Here: ThenFirst World War and AmericannSociety; Oxford University Press;nNew York.nby Gordon M. Pradlnxhe existential dilemma characteristicnof “modernism” is not so muchnthe disruptive desire immediately tonhave it all, outwardly to experience allnthings simultaneously, gallivantingnthrough yet-unimagined boundaries ofncultural space; rather, it is the fact that,nseemingly, everyone in our “advanced”nsociety has finally reached this depressingnpinnacle of desire. With the entirencultural/economic machinery insistingnthat it is our duty as patriotic citizensnto stand by the pay-later credo, no wondernwe daily feel compelled to grab blindlynat the brass ring, yet all the whilenspinning deeper into an inarticulate discontent.nIronically, in such modernntimes human possibility is severelynshackled, for the power of the futurenerodes proportionate to our need tonswallow its rewards in the present.nThe historian who will help us understandnthe perils of this “modern” dilemmanwill do so in part by locating itsnroots in the past. Any initial attempt atndealing with this problem requires thatnwe gain a perspective on those timesnwhen not just individual Americansnoverstepped their consumptive limits,nbut when the nation as a whole firstnbegan the decline toward living beyondnits means—which is another way ofnsuggesting that we must find that timenwhen American culture lost faith inntomorrow because it no longer wouldnor could delay acting out its interestsntoday.nDavid Kennedy’s Over Here is suchna history. He dissects that earlier timenin American society from which thenDr. Pradl is professor of English educationnat New York University.n32inChronicles of Colturendilemmas of our current selfishnessnare directly descended: America’s begrudgingnyet insistent participation innthe Great War. Clearly our ills today gondeeper than the series of unresolvedndecisions made by both government andnprivate citizens between 1913 and 1920,nbut in understanding the contradictorynresponses of that prior age as enumeratednby Professor Kennedy, we can takenthe first step toward a new commitmentnto restraint.nThe crowning achievement of thenWilson Administration was not itsnvictory in Europe, but rather its creationnof “modernism,” namely the ability tonhide the true cost of things throughnsome sleight of hand, either culturalnor economic. On the economic front,nmuch of the credit for the “innovative”nfinancing of America’s role in WorldnWar I belongs to Treasury SecretarynWilliam McAdoo. Everyone, of course,nwanted the experience of the Europeanncampaign, yet not surprisingly, doorsnclosed when the U.S. Treasury wentnasking citizens to pay their fair share.nHowever, with his various schemes,nespecially his utilization of the newlynformed autocratic Federal Reserve Systemnto print and thus create new money,nMcAdoo “suggested a model for laternadministrations in waging unpopularnwars [both foreign and domestic, innwhich] . . . the true incidence of warncosts could be hidden, at least in thenshort run, by inflation.” Here at last wennnhad, at the highest levels, the federalngovernment legitimizing the philosophynof getting something for nothing. Thenidea of a national banking-credit systemnseemed fine in principle as it wouldncentralize and potentially stabilize thenrather chaotic approach to banking innAmerica, but in practice the uncheckednemployment of the Federal Reserve System’snpower allowed us all to spend toonmany of tomorrow’s dollars today.nFurther, it even led us to expect this asna right, as increasingly we forgot ournresponsibility in actually having to earnnthose same dollars.nThis whole “modern” economicnscene is insightfully surveyed in OvernHere. Besides analyzing the mixednblessing of the Federal Reserve Systemnwith its direct connection to the inflationarynexpansion of our money supply,nKennedy exposes the World War I rootsnof other economic nightmares includingncost overrides in government contracts,nthe compromising intertwining of governmentnand big business in which corporatenexecutives came to expect regulativenprotection from the risks ofnfree markets, and the government’snloss of nerve in initiating legitimatenpublic ventures when the private sectornwas either unwilling or unable to takenadvantage of new economic circumstances,nsuch as the lost opportunitynto underwrite an American MerchantnFleet and thus gain control of the worldnimport-export business at the conclusionnof World War I.nl3ut perhaps the more disturbingnlegacy of Wilson’s age had to do withnthe infrastructure of American life,nboth organizationally and conceptually.nThe guiding myth Americans lived bynincluded a premium on the right ofnindividual freedom, but with the imperativesnof the war effort, this right cameninto direct conflict with the claims ofnnational need. Thus in the not-unreasonablenname of efficiency, personaln