26 I CHRONICLESnthought strategy was merely “common sense appHed to thenart of war,” but it is clear that today’s political leaders andnthe journalists who set the parameters of public debate knownlittle of these men or their work. Thus Moltke’s “commonnsense” is anything but common.nSince change is a vital lesson of history, skepticismnshould meet any notion like Mutual Assured Destructionnbased on a static force of permanently invulnerable ICBM’snof set number and design. That the Soviet Union is workingnto counter U.S. nuclear forces and to fight and win the nextnwar should not be the least surprising. Moscow is behavingnnormally. It is the U.S. that is open to Thucydides’ncriticism for following “the habit of mankind to entrust toncareless hope what they long for, and to use sovereignnreason to thrust aside what they do not fancy.”nAnother example is the obsession with arms controlnnegotiations. There is nothing in history, from the 1139nVatican Edict against using the crossbow against Christiansnthrough the Hague Conferences before World War I andnthe Washington-London naval conferences before WorldnWar II on to SALT, that provides any evidence that armsncontrol has either prevented or limited war. It is a particularlynfutile effort in an era of rapid technological change andnunresolved international rivalries.nDeterrence itself is open to question as the basis fornnational security. Military history is primarily a record ofnthe failure of deterrence and would be a far shorter record ifndeterrence played any consistent role in international affairs.nBasing the nation’s survival wholly on the expectationnthat deterrence makes war “unthinkable” is suicidal.nA 1974 study. Military Deterrence in History by Raoulnand Frada NaroU and V. L. BuUough, is most interesting. Ancrosscultural study of 20 major confrontations running fromnthe border struggle between the Han dynasty and the Hunsn(125-116 B.C.) to the renewed English-Bourbon strugglenduring the American War for Independence (1775-1785),nit examines the rivalries between the Egyptian, Hebrew,nIslamic, Greco-Roman, Western European, Russian,nHindu, and Chinese states, concentrating on the mostnactive power (the Conspicuous State) in each time period.nThe study also took into account factors of geography,ntrade, military preparation, type of government, andnwhether the Conspicuous State was in a defensive stancenvis-a-vis its rival. The conclusion:nOur study indicated that there is no real support fornthe belief that either military or diplomatic effortsnhave tended in the long run to make peace muchnmore likely among the defensively orientednConspicuous States we studied. . . . The worldnarena of power politics has been a bloody one.nProminent states cannot avoid involvement innwar. … In the absence of a world order, we mustncontinue to live with the waste and slaughter ofnwar.nThe study also found that the most important variable innnational success was the age and experience of its leader.nThis is nothing new to military historians. When Napoleonnsaid that “there are no bad regiments, only bad colonels,”nhe was speaking a truth about leadership that applies fromnthe smallest scouting party to the greatest empire. Biogra­nnnphy is thus often recommended as the best starting place fornthe study of military history. As Field Marshal Sir ArchibaldnPercival Wavell advised:nStudy the human side of history … to learn thatnNapoleon in 1796 with 20,000 beat combinednforces of 30,000 by something called economy ofnforce or operating on interior lines is a mere wastenof time. If you can understand how a youngnunknown man inspired a half-starved ragged rathernBolshie crowd; how he filled their bellies; how henoutmarched, outwitted, outbluffed and defeatednmen who had studied war all their lives . . . younwill have learnt something worth knowing.nAs Arthur Ferrill has recently written, “Strategic decisionsnproduce successful or unsuccessful results. … Angood general or political leader will bear the burden andnsolve his strategic problems.” But a poor or unlucky leadernwill fail and condemn his society to defeat and disaster.nNational leadership is a weak point in the Westernndemocracies. It is not just that Lyndon Johnson, choosingnbombing targets in Vietnam, or Jimmy Carter, decidingnhow many helicopters to send on the Iranian rescuenmission, suffer in comparison to Gustavus Adolphus ornFrederick the Great. The West’s salvation does not dependnon a return to “soldier-kings”; nor is democracy incapable ofnproducing competent war leaders (the elder Pitt andnChurchill come readily to mind). What is lacking arenleaders with sufficient background and interest in strategicnthought to be able to set priorities and weigh the advicengiven by their military advisors. Yet this should be anprerequisite for high office, particularly that of Presidentnwith its primary responsibility as Commander in ChiefnUnfortunately, the political system is not geared to producensuch men.nThe negative impact of the Welfare State on the budgetsnavailable to the military is well-known. But even morendamaging than the shift of funds has been the shift of timenand attention of national leaders away from issues ofndefense and foreign policy to the overwhelming details ofnadministering thousands of domestic programs and regulations.nWhat politician today can follow Machiavelli’s advicenthat “A prince should have no other aim or thought, norntake up any other thing for his study, but war and itsnorganization and discipline.” Yet, it cannot be expected thatnPresidents and members of Congress who win election bynmanipulating the immediate demands of special interestngroups will suddenly become great statesmen and worldnleaders on assuming office.nThe economic benefits of a new federalism that wouldnshift domestic policy back to state and local government willnbe less important in the long-run than the benefits derivednfrom relieving national leaders of the burden of managingnthe Welfare State. A division of labor should allow thennational government to concentrate on long-term nationalnstrategy. This will only come about if concern for militarynsecurity can be reestablished as the first priority of thenfederal government. The study of military history can be anninvaluable support for that effort by providing myriadnexamples of why one nation succeeded and another failednover time.n