creasingly a conventional battle andnless an insurgency. Because the peoplenof the cities did not rise up againstnthe foreigners and puppets at Tet—nindeed they gave Uttle support to thenattack force—communist claim to anmoral and political authority in SouthnViet Nam suffered a serious blow.nOr consider this quotation, from thenauthoritative Strategic Survey—1969,npublished by the Institute for StrategicnStudies, Ix)ndon:nThe enormous losses incurred bynNorth Vietnamese during their majornoffensives of February and May 1968ndestroyed the elite of North Vietnam’snarmy. That army showed little sign ofnrecovery during 1969. They had beennforced in 1968 to abandon much ofntheir rural power base, in the form ofnterritory under their control, in ordernto launch the assault upon the cities.nThat assault having failed, they foundnin retreat that their rural base … hadnbegun to crumble.nThat must do here for the authoritativelyncertified reality of the Tet offensive andnits outcome. In every important respectn—political and social as weU as militaryn—^it represented a huge success for SouthnVietnamese and American soldiers. Butnlet us now turn to the coverage of thisnvictory in the United States—^at the time,nafterward, and even to this day in manyninstances. Instead of the victory that itnacmally was for us, it was perceived andnbroadcast by the media almost unfailinglynas the “disaster in Vietnam.” AsnBraestrup writes: “The generalized effectnof the news media’s contemporary outputnin February-March 1968 was a distortionnof reality—through sins of omissionnand commission—on a scale thatnhelped shape Tet’s political repercussionsnin Washington and the Administration’snresponse.”nUistortion it was, to say the least.nThere are hundreds of pages in this bookndealing relendessly with just about everynaspect of the distortion and every mediumnin which it flourished. Walter Cron-n10 inChronicles of Cultarenkite, just back from a week in South Vietnamnafter the victory was assured, producedna now-notorious half-hour documentarynin which the “reality” of thenevent was not our victory but our defeat.nCronkite’s “reality” was one in whichnthere were few losses by communist attackers;none in which most official reportsnby the American leaders in Saigon werenderided; one in which Hue was treatednas in total ruins, with refugees everywherenin panic; one in which pacificationnwas seen as a total failure of the UnitednStates; and, finally, a picture of the Tet offensivenso somber overall as to leadnCronkite to conclude pathetically thatnthe best Americans and South Vietnamesencould hope for was somehow to “salvagena measure of victory from defeat’n(emphasis added).nThere was a sxavf ra Newsweek (Februaryn12, 1968) that asserted: “Westmorelandnand his commanders werenNew AtlantisnThe years Shirley Macl.aine has spentnas an ardent leftist and fellow traveler appeiirnto have prepared her well mentallyntor a new role: diat of spiritualist, medium,nand psychic. In a recent inter’iew, Ms.nMacl,aine declared—^with the .same passionnformerly reserv’cd for the communistnworkers’ paradises—^that she was visitednby actor Peter Sellers moments after hendied: “I could/«?/ Peter smile,” she said,nthus inducing a bit of conftision as to thencharacter of the meeting. She also claimednthat in one of her previous lives she livednand died in Atlantis. Averred this Americannbeacon of thespian intellectuality:nI remembered ver’ clearly the feeling ofnliving in Ailantis … I v;is a man, a greatnteacher … I eouldn’l stand the thoughtnof drowning, so 1 killed mysell.nMs. Maclaine’s metaphysical g;unmonnwill .shortly roll oft the presses in a booknLIBERAL CULTUREnnnclearly caught short by the scope and intensitynof the raids… And they insistednon reading the communists’ objectivesnin strictly military—^rather than politicalnor psychological—^terms In Hue andnelsewhere last week the Vietcong showednthat they could still be devastatingly effective”n(emphasis added). Interestingly,nTime early on provided a story in whichnreality prevailed, in which the devastatingnlosses by the communists were emphasized.nBut, as Braestrup observes,nTime did not thereafter publish thatnkind of story. It also joined in the generalnchorus of doom that the media formedn—along with some highly placed Washingtonnofficials.nOne more illustration must suffice,nthis one from the chief guru of Americannliberals, John Kenneth Galbraith. As hisnmemofrs make clear, Galbraith considerednhimself an authority on Vietnam,nindeed on all of Southeast Asia Braestrupnat a time when a troubled publishing industrnis rotjiiiii’b rejecting works ofnschol.irship. inielligence, and talent.nWliii It I .in onlj- rill an that a certain islandnon the New ^”ik li.i) has sunk even lowernthan ihe liibleif isle ol antiquity. Dn