country.nAmong the debates within the right are the use ofnmihtary conscription, troop commitments to NATO, theneffectiveness of anti-Communist guerrilla movements, theneffectiveness of a “world democratic-capitalist revolution,”nand the play of the “China card.” Like the debates betweennright and left over such topics as the use of covert operationsnand assassination, the Strategic Defense Initiative, supportnfor authoritarian allies, and the war powers of the President,nmost of these discussions are influenced far too much bynsubjective value judgments and romantic notions. What isnneeded is a deeper study of military history to provide anmore objective basis for evaluating policy alternatives withnan eye to obtaining successful outcomes, or to use oldfashionednterminology, to obtain victories. Not that militarynhistory always provides clear and ready answers. Analogiesnare always debatable. But military history can provide anframework for discussion that avoids the flights of fancy thatnusually characterize arguments made without the benefit ofnhistorical perspective.nWe must remember that wars do change things. Nothingnequals the difference between winning and losing a war.nThat the Greeks stopped the Persians at Marathon andnSalamis, that Rome destroyed Carthage, that the ChristiannTheodoric defeated the pagan Attila at Chalons, that Chinanfailed to conquer Japan in the 13th century, that thenEnglish drove the French out of North America, that thenNorth won the American Civil War, that the Communistsnwon the civil wars in Russia and China, or that Napoleonnand Hitler were defeated are just a few of history’s manyndecisive conflicts. The way millions have lived for centuriesnhas often been determined by a few hours on the battlefield.nAs Cyril Falls put it in The Place of War in History:nWhat I want to urge is that all men, common andnuncommon, great and small . . . have beennprofoundly and unceasingly influenced by war. Ournliterature, our art and our architecture are stampednwith the vestiges of war. Our very language has anthousand bellicose words and phrases woven into itsnfabric. And our material destinies, our social lifenand habits, our industry and trade, have assumedntheir present forms and characterishcs largely as thenresult of war. . . . We are, all of us, indeed, thenheirs of many wars.nThe idea that the United States developed in “splendidnisolation” from such evil influences and thus should notndescend to the level of its well-armed opponents is false. Tonbuild the country to its present size from a huddle ofncolonial settlements required wars with the British, French,nSpanish, Mexicans, and Indians. Though technicallynmuch of American territory was purchased, foreign statesnwere willing to sell because they knew their claims couldnnot be defended. The U.S. has fought as often as any othernmajor power over the last century and gained superpowernstatus and the leadership of the West in World War II.nFighting a war is a practical matter. It is not a game or annexercise in chivalry. Defeat comes with an unlimitednliability clause. “Being in the right” or having a higherncivilization or standard of living is no guarantee of safety, asnthe survivors of the 476 sack of Rome or the 1940 fall ofnFrance would attest.nSecond, military history assumes that history is cyclicalnrather than linear-progressive. It also assumes that humannnature has not changed substantially over the millennia.nCivilizations can decline and fall as well as rise and expand.nThis point may be the hardest for Americans to accept,nsince their own history has, until recently, been one longnupward spiral. This is why there are no American macrohistoriansnto rival Toynbee or Spengler. Americans need tonnnNOVEMBER 1987123n