all the killers that are turned loose by the legal system. The resultsrnwould be, in sheer quantity, thousands of times more successfulrnthan their rescue missions.rnIt goes without saying that I am opposed to all of the abovernand all for the same reason. It is no part of Christian doctrinernor of the older ethics that a man should undertake the problemsrnof strangers. VVe are obliged to take care of our childrenrnand our aged parents; to cherish our wives (or husbands) andrnbe faithful to them; to take care of the widows and orphans inrnour community; and to care for the poor, the hungry, and thernsick that come to our attention. Of course we can in good faithrncommit trespass to save our neighbor’s life, precisely because hernis our neighbor, and because we would be doing what he actuallyrnwants us to do. But we should not be justified in breakingrndown his door to preach the gospel to his children or in goingrnabout the world as “house-breakers for Christ.” Jesusrnpraised the Samaritan who took care of a robbery victim as arngood neighbor, but he did not tell us to abandon our primaryrnresponsibilities in a quest for victims all over the world.rnMost of us, as individuals, are barely able to live up to thernobligations of everyday life, and the attempt to shoulder responsibilitiesrnfor the entire world, while it may on rare occasionsrnraise a man to sainthood, will more often make him descend tornsomething lower than the merely human. The practitioner ofrnwhat Dickens called “telescopic philanthropy” devotes her energiesrnto the natives of Borrioboola Gha, while neglecting herrnown children. Who is minding the children, I wonder, of allrnthose right-to-lifcrs who devote themselves to protesting therndeaths of other people’s children? Some of them are demonstratingrnwith their parents; others are rotting their brains inrnpublic schools. In either ease, mother might better occupy herrntime in taking care of them and attending to their education.rnWe are not called upon to lead other people’s lives for them, tornmake their choices, to keep them from follv, and it would be arnvain religion or a merely academic philosophy that preachedrnsuch a doctrine.rnBefore the 20th century, the concept of universal obligationrnwas embraced by only a handful of visionaries, and a good partrnof the whole duty of man consisted of minding one’s business.rnIn that land of “once upon a time,” the duties of ordinary peoplernwere restricted to the tinv sphere of everyday life. It wasrnenough to take care of our own, to be as fair as we knew how inrnall our dealings, and to be loyal to our country and to therngods. In his usual platitudinous manner, Plutarch said that thernobject of teaching moral philosophy to children was to enablernthem to learn basic responsibilities:rnwhat is good and what is base, what is just and what unjust,rnwhat generally is to be chosen and what avoided;rnhow one ought to deal with the gods, with his parents,rnwith his elders, with the laws, with strangers, with rulers,rnwith friends, with women, with children, with servants;rnthat one must revere the gods, honor one’s parents, respectrnone’s elders, obey the laws, give way to rulers, lovernone’s friends, exercise restraint toward women, be affectionaternwith children, and not mistreat slaves.rnIt was the common opinion of ancient peoples that there arernspecific duties, arising out of one’s station in life, owed tornneighbors, relatives, friends, and political allies. Greeks and Romans,rnJews and Assyrians all made the obvious distinctions betweenrnneighbors and strangers, kin and nonkin, compatriotsrnand aliens, noble and base-born, and—most sweeping—betweenrnfriends and enemies. Prohibitions on theft and killingrnapplied to friends and compatriots within a society and not,rnnecessarily, to strangers. Piracy and brigandage were honorablernoccupations among early Greeks, and it is not rude whenrnstrangers ask the wandering Odysseus if he is a pirate.rnGreek poetry and proverbs make it clear that universalrnbenevolence was not the Greek ideal. Friends were expected tornassist each other in a variety of ways, but as a famous line ofrnArchilochus put it, “I know one thing but it’s important, tornpunish terribly the one who has done me wrong,” and this attitudernwas prevalent enough in Athens during Plato’s time thatrnone of the speakers in ihe Republic interprets “giving everyrnman his due” as owing good to friends and evil to enemies.rnA Greek was not supposed to go to law against family membersrnand friends, if he could avoid it, but was obliged to seek rev’cngcrnfrom enemies. In Athens homicide remained a family affairrnas it was for ancient Jews, and it was up to a victim’s familyrnmembers to prosecute his murderer. (It was, however, legal forrnan Athenian to kill a thief in the night or his wife’s lover, if herncaught them in adultery.)rnJustice, in most parts of the ancient world, depended on thernefforts of a man’s friends. The old conservative Theognis praysrnfor powerful friends to avenge him, “Thus would I seem to berna god among men.” In his book Greek Popular Morality, K.J.rnDover sums up the moral perspective of the average Athenianrnof Plato’s time:rnIt may be said in broad terms. . . that an Athenian feltrnhis first duty was to his parents… his second to hisrnkinsmen, and his third to his friends and benefactors;rnafter that, in descending order, to his fellow-citizens, torncitizens of other Greek states, to barbaroi, and to slaves.rnEven so systematic a philosopher as Aristotle makes all thernroutine distinctions and regarded at least some foreign races asrnfit for slavcr’. Universalism was introduced by an Oriental immigrantrnnamed Zeno, who founded the philosophical schoolrnlater known as Stoicism. Inspired, so it is said, by Alexander’srndream of universal empire, Zeno preached a doctrine thatrn”men should not live divided into different states and peoples,rneach under its own law, but in a world state, of which all menrnare to be citizens. ..”rnThe early Stoics advanced such novel doctrines as the brotherhoodrnof men, the equality of slaves, and cosmopolitanism,rne.g., world citizenship. “Never say,” says the ex-slave Epictetus,rn”when you answer the question what country do you belong to,rnthat you are an Athenian or a Corinthian, but that you are a citizenrnof the world.” In their Utopian moments, the Stoics advocatedrna community of property and wives, but even thernfounders of the sect insisted upon the fulfillment of primaryrnobligations to family and country, and in Roman hands, stoicismrnbecame an unofficial doctrine of the empire—whichrnclaimed, after all, to be the world. The stoic emperor MarcusrnAntoninus was more ambivalent. Dividing his nature into a socialrnand a rational being, he acknowledged that insofar as hernwas Antoninus, his country was Rome, but as a man, his countryrnwas the world.rnThe Stoics’ insistence on the brotherhood of man has muchrnin common with St. Paul’s declaration that “there is neither Jewrnnor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither malernnor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.” But it is easy torn16/CHRONICLESrnrnrn