Mismanaging War & MoralsnWilliam H. McNeill: The Pursuit ofnPower: Technology, Armed Force,nand Society since AD, 1000;l]tuversitynof Chic^o Press; Chicago.nJames F. ChUdrcss-.Moral Responsibilitynin Conflicts: Essays on Nonviolence,nWar, and Conscience;nLouisiana State University Press;nBaton Rouge.nby Thomas FlemingnWar, as much as peace, is among thenarts and blessings of civilization. On thisnpoint Hobbes was mistaken. The state ofnnature may be a state of unremitting violence,nbut it is not a state of war, which isna purposive action, an exercise in restraint.nAs Hobbes’s friend. Sir WilliamnDavenant, expressed it: “To conquerntumult, nature’s sodain force,Avar, art’sndeliberate strength, was first devis’d/ncruel to those whose rage has no remorse/leastncivil pow’r should be bynthrongs surpris’d.” The right to makenwar has always been counted among thenattributes of sovereignty. Among thenmore civilized peoples, this power overnlife and death is extended to includensuch private afiairs as are elsewhere regulatednby duels, feuds, and assassinations.nEven libertarians generally concede thenstate’s exclusive power to make war, althoughnthey typically refuse it the coercivenpower to conscript citizens.nThe exact nature and extent of thenstate’s war-making powers have beenndebated for centuries. Draft registration,narms reduction, nuclear disarmament,nand similar topical issues are footnotesnto the text of the more general discussion.nUnfortunately, debate on the issuesnusually proceeds no further than an exchangenof insults and misinformation,nbecause neither hawks nor doves evernthink about such abstruse subjects asnthe nature of sovereignty. In a pair ofnDr. Fleming is editor ofThc Southerner.nS6inChronicles of Cultarenrecent but quite different works, twonaspects of the state’s war-making powersnare considered: its power over thenwealth of its people and over the life andn”conscience” of its citizens.nWilliam H. McNeill, in The Pursuit ofnPower, does not attempt to elucidateneither of these two principles of statecraft,nbut he does discuss, with considerableninsight and erudition, the relationnbetween political economy and militaryntechnology. His subtitle, “Technology,nArmed Force, and Society since A.D.n1000,” indicates tfie scope of the worknAny such synthesis necessarily relies onnsecondary sources and is inevitably fillednwith mistakes in scholarship and judgment.nMcNeill’s is no exception. Thenwork is nonetheless valuable, if only fornits interpretation of the role of free marketsnin the advancement of military arts.nRulers, so McNeill argues, inevitablyndesfre stability and, therefore, controlnover arms production and distribution.nEven before the development of suchneconomic ideologies as mercantilismnand socialism, governments made fitiulnefforts to control the means of production,nusually with unlucky results. Ofncourse the idea of a controlled or “command”necononiy cannot develop withoutnthe contrasting—^and logically priorn—idea of the free market. Neither ideanseems to have occurred—despitenMcNeill’s claims to the contrary—^to thenancients. McNeill’s own model—^thenChinese from 1000 to 1400—seems tonprove the point: it was the flourishing ofnfree-market production and trade whichnled the authorities to impose constraints.nIf McNeill’s assessment is correct,nthen China underwent a great leap forwardnin the technology and productionnof strategic materials and weapons,nlargely as a result of free competitionnamong iron smelters, arms makers, andnmerchants. Thefr efforts “set humankindnoff on a thousand year exploration ofnwhat could be accomplished by relyingnon prices and personal or small group…nnnperception of private advantage as awaynof orchestrating behavior on a massnscale.” fron production rose sharply andnbefore 1300 the Chinese exceUed in thenmanufacture of crossbows and guns. Innthe early 15th centary Ming Emperorsncould boast a fleet of 3,800 ships, thenlargest of which was five times the sizenof Vasco da Gama’s flagship. EverythingnChinese was on a greater scale than thatnof the later Portuguese, who duplicatednthe Chinese exploits in the Indian Ocean.nAnd yet, by the time the Europeans arrivednon the scene, the Chinese overseasntrade was stagnant, iron production anfraction of former years, and the governmentnunable to defend its interests againstnthe foreigners. Why—or more preciselynhow—did it come about? McNeill believesnit was the Chinese hostility tontrade which caused the decline. Confiicianistnbureaucrats did their best tonstifle “immoral profits.” Successful businessesnwere faced with confiscatory taxationnor with the risk of absorption intona state monopoly. EventuaUy, laws werenpassed to forbid international trade andnthe navy was abandoned.nIhe Chinese achievements werenequaled and then surpassed by the citystatesnof Italy and later by the nationstatesnof Europe. Invariably, free marketsnled to technical advances which led tonhigher profits and greater power. It tooknsome time for rulers to realize the advantagesnof laissez-fafre: e.g., PhiUip II ofnSpain, who, despite the constant supplynof precious metals from the New World,nfound it increasingly necessary to goninto debt to support his adventures innthe Netherlands. The results of his financialntinkerings were catastrophic. Highntaxes caused an exodus of merchantsnand producers from the Spanish Netherlandsninto Holland, and the King’s Murento pay his bills on time—including fournacmal repudiations of debt—meant thatnin the future he had to borrow at muchnhigher interest rates. By 1600 40 per-n