22 / CHRONICLESnon the cross.” But having more moneynthan God means two things: To be richnas Croesus is also to mistake mammonnfor God. The proverbial saw is literallyndouble-edged—to believe in moneynmore than God is to have no god at all.nFinance, meaning the banking thatnconcludes a transaction, comes fromnthe French for end, and when financenbecomes an end in itself the moralnconsequences are devastating.nStarting with less than nothing innthe basement of a Mexican restaurantnin Lajolla, Jerry Dominelli raisedn$200 million from investors in livenyears. Some of his clients got out of J.nDavid with fat profits, but those whondidn’t lost $100 million—includingnthe $10 million claimed by the IRS. Itnis doubtful that anyone believed Dominelli’snphony track record of investmentnsuccess in trading foreign currencynin the unregulated interbanknmarket. His customers were never toldnwhat and when they had traded, nevernreceived confirmations in their ownnname, never received audited statements,nand were told only that theirnaccount was up X percent in a month.nBut the first investors were making 40nor 50 percent a year—because (as isnthe nature of all schemes called afternthe Boston swindler Charles Ponzi)nthey were being paid with the depositsnof later recruits to the scam!nSan Diego financial columnist DonnBauder writes: “For sophisticated investors,nit was a battle between commonnsense and greed, and the latternwon.” For the less sophisticated it wasna disaster built on the greater-foolntheory—smart people went in and gotnout quickly, hoping to leave the lossesnto the next investor. The suckers includedncomedian Joey Bishop, SannDiego Mayor Roger Hedgeeock (laternconvicted of conspiring to funnel $350nthousand from Dominelli sources tonhis campaign fund), and the Preacher’snAid Society of Decatur, Illinois,nwhich manages pensions for 800 retirednMethodist ministers and “keeps anmodest amount of money on the sidento take an occasional run at a highflier.”nHaving “checked out the Dominellinbank thoroughly before depositingnany money,” the executivensecretary sent $681,759.42 to J.nDavid. Cupidity, not stupidity, wasnDominelli’s chief source of success.nThe greed machine requires thenfantasy of a “pathological liar,” asnDominelli’s house lawyer styled him,nand a true believer with the rightnconnections, like socialite divorceenNancy Hoover. Because the liar andnthe believer are not smart enough toncook up the seam, a villain is alsonneeded to complete the cast. DeepnThroat told Woodward and Bernsteinnto “follow the money,” and in the casenof J. David it leads to Mark Yarry, whondid not flee to Montserrat with Dominellinand Hoover but escaped quietlynto France with personal control ofnsome $3 million of J. David funds.nBauder doesn’t know why Yarrynwasn’t prosecuted, but he does suggestnthat Yarry’s 1981 book. The FastestnGame in Town: Commodities, deliberatelynpuffed Dominelli. Yarry alsoncontributed the plan for currency tradingnthrough a Caribbean shell bank.nThe odd trio then bought a team ofnmoney-finders who paid as much as 20npercent of what they brought in: anprestigious law firm, Rogers & Wells,ncost $500 thousand a year more; fornaccountants, J. David used Laventholn& Horwath (who have yet to emptyntheir deep pockets). Finally, a PR mannwas taken on for a six-figure fee so hencan later tell a jury: “I don’t rule outnthe possibility that . . . but I cannotnanswer the question in terms of specifics,nbecause I do not recall. I don’tnthink—I mean, it is altogether possiblenthat I would have said . . . but Incan’t answer the question any morenspecifically than that because I do notnrecall. And I just barely recall thenpossibility that there may have been anluncheon at the Hilton involvingnRoger Hedgeeock and myself “nJ. David bought the mayor, but leftnstate and Federal regulators to confusenthemselves. Since the firm was notnlicensed to sell securities in California,nits lawyers convinced the state that itnwas selling commodities. “We werenunable to determine that [J. David]nwas doing business in the state,” reportednits own local bank, San DiegonFirst National, with a blink. At thenFederal level, the Commodities FuturesnTrading Commission was snookerednbecause the accountants foundnthat “due to a Montserrat statute relevantnto bank confidentiality, the recordsnof J. David banking could not benexamined.” But a Rogers & Wellsnattorney could take a peek at the booksnnnand assure the accountants that all wasnin order. This “scope limitation”nallowed Laventhol & Horwath to issuena clean bill of health. Then J. Davidnwrote to the accounting firm that itnapproved of the altered procedure!nBoth the SEC and the FBI looked J.nDavid over and then looked away.nBauder writes: “The fact that J. Davidnsucceeded as long as it did is a powerfulnargument for strong governmentnregulation. . . . The fact that J. Davidncompletely eluded federal and statenregulators is an equally powerful argumentnthat government regulation is anwaste of time and money.” Morenmoney than God made Dominelli thenepitome oiself-deregulation, but it wasnthe same money that ultimately defeatednhim.nThe evidence suggests “that the successnof the scheme in fact stunnednDominelli. As the money poured in,neven he might have understood thatnthe more that came in, the deeper henwould eventually be buried.” J. Davidnlost money in every foreign currencynaccount people had knowledge of—atnBache, at Merrill Lynch, at Drexel—nbut still the money poured in. CaptainnMoney and his Golden Girlfriendntried to spend their way out of thenproblem by acquiring three jets, dozensnof $100,000 foreign sports cars,nrace horses worth $650,000, a $50nthousand Bulgari emerald, $1 millionnworth of ski eondos in Utah, a RanchonSanta Fe estate and land worth $3.2nmillion, $5 million worth of elegantntownhouses, a posh Italian restaurantnin Del Mar, a Porsche racing team,nand a stake in a gold mine. Ironically,nthe more they spent on conspicuousnconsumption, the more investornmoney rolled in. The weight of moneynand more money brought down thenhouse of J. David because morenmoney than God is a self-fulfillingnprophecy with a bankrupt ending.nMarc Rich’s billions were no lessngreedy than Dominelli’s millions, andnhis daisy-chain operation—while notna Ponzi—no less a crime. As a formernhead of trading at Philipp Brothersnremarked, “The world changed inn1973. . . . Everybody got greedy.”nThe Arab-Israeli war meant OPEC,nand OPEC meant spot-oil trading on anscale never before realized, and “it wasnthe oil money that made everybodyncrazy.” By 1980 the Rich empire wasn