Since tlie- are seeming])- wedded to the support of elitism in allrncircumstances, what are they to do about a left-wing elite? Thernmonstrosih, conceptual as well as political and practical, mayrngo tar to explain the ntter irrelevance of conentional conservatirne thonglit to the crisis of American and Western socich- thatrnthe managerial reolution represents.rnDespite the conxentional depiction ot poprdism as leftwingrnin character, it is difficult to think of any genuinelyrnpopidist movement of the last hundred years that really was ofrnthe left. A Depression f’.ra populist like Huev Long may comernclose, but there arc sufficient right-wing elements in him (letrnalone in Father Coughlin) to question his credentials as a manrnof die left at all. The leftism of the original Populist movementrnin die late 19th centun’ was also quesHonable, which is w hv suchrnestablishment historians as Richard Hofstadter were so .skepticalrnof it. It is now nnixcrsally conceded that Progressivism, NewrnDealism, the New Fronfier, and the Great Societv”, as well as thern”ci il rights” movement, feminism, the antiwar activism of thern1960’s, and similar crusades for homosexuals, innnigrants,rnetc.—die entire histor’ of the left in die last hundred years—rnwere all elite movements, bred in, centered on, and largeh’ financedrnb’ academic, corporate, and bureaucratic structures,rndiougli it is perhaps not vet so universally conceded that suchrnmovements reflected the material interests of diose whornspawned them. It is all but indisputable diat populism, for atrnleast the last half-centur’, has been of the right and not of the left.rnTlic reason for the emergence of a populism of the right is alsornclear enough: F”or every action, there is an ec|ual and oppositernreaction. If the emergent elite invokes liberalism as an ideologicalrnformula to rationalize its managed subversion ofrntraditional social and polifical institutions, then it is logical thatrndie forces resi,shng the elite will invoke an antidiberal ideolog)’.rnSince Burkean conservatism is far too archaic and irrelevant forrndieir purposes, it is also logical that the antidiberalism they willrninvoke v ill be of a non-Burkean kind.rnWhere antidiberal populism departs from the populism ofrndie left is in its vision of the people themselves. Perhaps onernreason for die illusion that populism is, by its nature, of the leftrnis that the left has no problem with enthroning “die people” asrnan nftimatc political authoritv—at least until “the people” actuallvrnstart handing down decisions. Those on the political right,rnless swav ed by the m}’th of “consent” as a source of audiorityrnand more imbued with eonsiderafions of inevitable social andrnpolitical hierarehv’, will have problems with allowing “the people”rnto do whatever they wish, even if they do what the rightrnwants them to do. The left, in other words, invariably finds itselfrnconfronting the dilemma Orwell depicted in AnimalrnFarm — \: may invoke die animals as the source of consent andrnauthorih for jjurposes of displacing the farmers, but when thernanimals do not behave as their new leaders want, die principlernthat “some animals are more equal fiian odiers” has to emerge.rnThe dilemma pops up again and again in the hi.story of the left,rnand if the transition of the regimes of the left from pure populismrnto transparent elitism is not skillfullv handled, it will be arnreef upon which die whole Icgifimacy of the left will founder.rnThe right faces perhaps less of a problem —certainly, sincernno right-wing populist movement has ever come to power, it isrna more theorefical problem than die one faced by the left. I lavingrnnever denied that social and polifical hierarchy is inevitablernif not desirable in itself, the right can “betray” (let us say, “modifi,rn”) its popidist noises a bit more gracefidly than tlie left. That,rnof course, was Burnham’s point in the pas.sage quoted above —rn”since the broad masses cannot govern, and in truth do not wantrnto. If du’refore. die nahiral governors quit, the masses will havernto fishion new ones.” The point of right-wing populism is notrnto let the people rule where elites rule now, which is what leftwingrnpopulism purports to do. The point of right-wing populismrnis to make use of entirely legifimate nonelite resentmentsrnagainst an incumbent elite to discredit and eventually to dislodgernthe eUte — and to create a new elite. In a genuine populismrnof a genuine right, ftiere should be and can be no cantrnabout “letfing die people rule” or quacking about “of the people,rnby the people, for die people.” “The people” probably dornnot even exist as a socially or culturally meaningful unit andrncertainly are incapable of coherent political acfion. As Burnhamrnalso wrote, “it does not make much sense to blame (or tornpraise) ‘the people’ as an undifferentiated entih. ‘A people’ becomesrnhistorically significant through its articulafion into insfitufionsrnand its expression through leaders and an elite.” “Thernpeople,” fiiat is, do not create elites; rather, elites create peoples.rnUndoubtedly, at least some of those who become part of thernnew elite will be former outsiders who were active in challengingrnthe old regime by which the old elite ruled. But it is farrnmore normal lor a rev olufion of any dcscripfion to be led byrn”class traitors” from the old elite itself and for such “traitors” tornwind up enjoying (or enduring) fiic fruits of power in the newrnregime. Cjiomwell, Bonaparte, Lenin, and Franklin Rooseveltrnwere all members of the old elites they and their allies overthrew.rnIll the last centurv’, only Hificr and Mussolini were revolntionan-rnleaders who actually came from nonelite ranks.rnPopulism of die right, as noted, has not been strikingly successful,rnno matter who its leaders or what its causes, and much ofrnthe political (and, indeed, intellectual) history of the last halfrneeiitur)’ in this country- revolved around trying to sc|uelcli it inrnone w^ay or another—to discredit its leaders, to debunk its ideolog),rnto blunt or co-opt its demands, to pathologize its followers,rnand sometimes simply to muzzle and repress its exponents. Inrnlarge part, the fciilurc of the populist right may be due simply tornthe overwhelming power of its enemies and the ruthless efficiencyrnvvidi which they have silenced it. But it mav also be duernin part to the confusion that even todav persists on the riglitrnabout the relationship behveen populism and the theoreticalrncontent of the right itself, a confusion that cannot reconcile invocationsrnof popular will and action with a doctrinal conimitnientrnto elitism and hierarchy. This confusion has tended tornalienate potential supporters from causes of the right if thernspokesmen for ftiose causes wrap diemselves too much in thernrhetoric of populism and appear to deviate too far from Burkeanrnplatitudes about aristocracy and die proper “subordination” to it.rnYet it is difficult to see what alternative course a serious politicalrnmovement of die right today has besides a populist vehicle ofrnone kind or anofiier. There simply is no Burkean aristoeracv today,rnand whatever v irtues such a class ever had are now apparentrn(if at all) onl) in social ranks far removed from am group diat canrnbe called aristocrafic. It is not clear that cv en those ranks of MiddlernAmericans can now be mobilized into a serious populist revoltrnagainst the incumbent ruling class and its regime; if theyrncannot, however, then probably no other social formafion canrneither. Those on die right who find associations with MiddlernAmericans distasteful either need to reeducate their politicalrnpalates or learn to make dieir beds with such paragons of patriotismrnand virtue as Mrs. Van Soanie and her comrades.rnOCTOBER 2001/1;rnrnrn