1973, seized control of the pricing ofnoil. With a puckish sense of humor,nKelly notes that back in I960 one ofnOPEC’s earliest demands was for the oilncompanies to “maintain their pricesnsteady and free from all unnecessarynfluctuations.” Many people, understandably,ndo not like the oil companies, andnthey have misbehaved, with governmentnconnivance, in the past. ARAMCO andnits American connections fed the Americanngovernment and public silly propaganda,nand in the 1950’s the U.S.ngovernment winked at ARAMCO arrangementsnthat amounted to systematicnlands and West Germany, the Westernncountries completely lost their headsnwhen the Arab oil embargo hit andnOPEC initiated the really big pricenjumps in 1973. The British and Frenchnregimes—one hesitates to dignify themnwith the term government—made theirnpredecessors at Munich look good. Bothncountries tried to make separate dealsnwith the Arabs at the expense of theirnEuropean allies and Israel, and they unsuccessfullyntried to coerce the oil companiesninto providing their countriesnwith fuel at the expense of their neighbors.nThe results for the West have beenn”iVIr. Kelly’s work is nc’lrhcr u baJana’d .sur.cv iKir an impartial suidc. bul a vcrvnpartisan i-ssay wirli a particular arjjumcnt.”n— Sew Yiirk I’imcsntax evasion. The record, however, showsnthat the interests of the industrial countries—andnfor that matter, those backwardncountries not lucky enough to bensitting on oil—were safer in the hands ofnthose big corporations than with thenOPEC cartel. Indeed, they were safernwith the companies than with Westernndiplomats. In their dealings with OPEC,nKelly shows, the oil companies were notnalways correct, but their conduct comparesnfavorably with that of the Westernngovernments, whose representativesnwere infected by Arabophile delusionsnand an exaggerated respect for the latenShah of Iran. According to Kelly, the behaviornof James Akins (of our State Department,nlater Ambassador to SaudinArabia), in particular, borders on pathological.nThe oil companies received noneffective support from the Western governments.nThe already-inordinate profitsnderived from oil soon became extortionate.nIn 1970 the oil companies operatingnin the Middle. East receivedn$1,685,000,000 in profits, the oil statesn$4,500,000,000. By 1974, the oil companiesnreceived $1,516,000,000, the oilnstates $76,500,000,000nhe price pernbarrel bears no relationship to the costnof production.nWith some partial exceptions in thencases of the United States, the Nether-n1 4 M M H H H M H HnChronicles of Culturenobservable to all—astronomical pricesnfor oil, supplies at the mercy of hostilenor unstable regimes threatened by approachingnSoviet guns. This reviewernhas often had hostile thoughts about thenoil companies, but since 1973 such feelingsnare a bit like denouncing the proprietornof a lemonade stand for overchargingnwhile averting one’s eyes fromnthe Mafia.nvJne of the most interesting featuresnof Kelly’s book is his treatment of thencountries now reaping, or robbing, thisnharvest. Unlike many Westerners, Kellyndoes not praise the boot that kicks him;nhe does not even pretend to be friendly.nWhile perhaps short of facts and figuresn—which, Kelly warns us, are unreliablenin this region—he paints a surprisinglynuniform picture. A large amount of thenwealth streaming to the Persian Gulfnhas disappeared in corruption or beennmisappropriated. The impressive developmentnprograms of these countries almostninvariably hide a disappointingnreality. Investment has been badly balanced,ninvariably ignoring agriculturen(a mistake Kelly believes was fatal tonthe Shah) while too much has been putninto housing, public buildings and armaments.nHeavy or basic industry has beennneglected in favor of consumer goodsnnnand light industry; what heavy industrynhas been installed may well prove uncompetitivenwith that of the advancedncountries. Though Kelly carefullynavoids prophecy, the implication of hisnanalysis is that these countries will notnmodernize themselves successfully innthe foreseeable future. Quite aside fromnthis, he warns, they will remain authoritarian,nif not totalitarian, and are likelynto be fundamentally hostile to and contemptuousnof the Western world. (Onnthe record, they certainly have reason tonbe contemptuous.) The future of thenMiddle East will remain what it hasnbeen, “a tragicomedy of despotism inncountless acts.” Moreover, these regimesnwill be unreliable, unstable andnat each other’s throats. The weaponsnthey have acquired—the sale of whichnKelly considers one of the West’s worstnblunders—will not defend them againstna major power. His prediction that theynwill suffice only to do harm to themselvesnand to the oil installations hasnalready been vindicated by the Iran-nIraq war.nOur government’s response to the deterioratingnsituation has been to rely onnalliances with Iran and Saudi Arabia.nThe fate of the Iranian “pillar” so belovednby both Nixon and Carter is wellnknown, and Kelly deems the Saudi onenjust as shaky. Kelly regards the Shahnas largely to blame for his own downfall,nthough he suggests that Iranian traditionnand attitudes were bound to sabotagenany modernization program. ThenShah’s faults, however, seem to havenbeen those of the other Gulf rulers writnlarge, though Kelly’s account may be anneye-opener for those who naively looknback on the Shah as a reliable friend ofnthe West. In addition to promotingnOPEC, the Shah worked hard to eliminatenthe British from the Gulf. He objectednto our government’s prudentndecision to station a very small forcenin the Gulf. The Shah as a fiend, however,ndid not really exist either. Kellyndeems SAVAK (the Shah’s secret police)na rather mild-mannered bunch,ngiven the traditional approach to suchn