desk and he could pronounce Arabicnnames. He had highly visible assignmentsnin the office of the Secretary ofnDefense, with the Joint Chiefs of Staffnand with the National Security Council.nThe NSC lent him to the CIA and eventuallynprovided his “cover” during hisnsojourn in the Middle East in the 1950’s.nAlong the way he caught the eye ofnAllen Dulles, whose special representativenin the Levant he became. This statusnallowed him to elbow aside career CIAnmen in Washington and in the field.nTheir resentment is a major refrain innthe book. With Damascus and then Beirutnas headquarters, he kept tabs on thenramifications of the Baghdad Pact fornthe CIA director. There were also visitsnto various trouble spots, such as SaudinArabia after Nasser had taken control ofnthe Suez Canal, and other exciting adventures.nxiveland, an outsider in the CIA, wasna freethinker. If not for concern for hisncareer, he might have become an openncynic. He tells us that he was on thenlosing side of every Middle Eastern policyndebate inside the administrationnduring the 50’s. He warned against militarynaid to the Shah in 1953; he didnwhat he could to discredit the idea ofnthe Baghdad Pact, but when it becamena reality he was chagrined that the U.S.nheld aloof from it; he opposed the CIA’snpartnership with Israel’s Mossad intelligencenapparatus; and he criticized thenCIA’s “covert political-action operations”nin Arab countries. But in manyncases his opposition was only cosmetic.nHe never let principle interfere withnhis livelihood. One day, toward thenend of his four-year detail with the CIA,nhe was in Allen Dulles’s office for anpersonal conversation about his futurenwith the agency. In a reflective mood,nthe director outlined to him why thenCIA must rely on Mossad in the strugglenwith the Russians. To Eveland,nDulles’s conclusions were wrongheaded.nHe says, “In my view, relying on Israel’snreports about Soviet activitiesnin the Arab states . . . was remarkablynlike depending on a fox to guard thenhenhouse. As for the CIA’s role in facilitatingnIsrael’s development of advancednweapons, this certainly contravenednthe intent of the Mutual SecuritynAct by sacrificing America’s ability toncontrol Israel’s use of any weapons acquirednor developed with U.S. assistance.”nHe did not mention these misgivingsnto Dulles, though, even in relaxednconversation; he saved his bestnarguments for his memoirs.nIf there is anything in the book tonrepay the reader’s attention, it is thenreminder of the failures and amateurishnessnof the Dulles years, a time thatnmany now look back to as a golden agenof American power. To perceptive observers,nlike James Burnham, it was nonsuch thing. They knew that Foster Dullesnwas only sparring with the Russians,nand the Russian invasion of Hungarynprovides the best example of Americanntimidity. Eveland supplies more melancholynevidence of this. During the hecticndays of the Suez fray, the crew ofna Hungarian ship mutinied and tooknthe vessel to the nearest port, Beirut.nThe Lebanese authorities brought thencase to the American Embassy with thenexpectation that the U.S. would askntheir government to grant the crewmennasylum. Eveland cabled Allen Dullesnthe details. Dulles replied that the sailorsnhad better return to their ship and madenno request to the Lebanese to aid them.nEveland must have felt remorse andndisgust as he “watched the tiny shipndisappear over the horizon with its cargonof Hungarian patriots, now consignednto death or to a lifetime in prison.”nXhere was quite a stir when thisnbook appeared. According to the WashingtonnPost, the CIA “effectively delayed”nits publication by demanding prepublicationnreview. It is certain thatnthe CIA did not hand this tidbit to thenPost. Because Eveland gives us to believenthat it was he who invented thentechnique of judiciously leaking informationnto the press—using such renporters as Sam Brewer and KennettnnnLove to influence official opinion innWashington—it would not be farfetchednto conclude that the source of the Post’snreport was Eveland himself. RecentlynI discussed Ropes of Sand with an “oldnMiddle East hand” who had not yet readnit. “Why did he write the book.'” shenasked, scandalized. “He shouldn’t bentelling those things.” My friend neednhave no worries. Eveland’s paltry secretsnwill not do the country any harm.nThe only really new light he shedsnon American doings in the Arab countriesnrelates to the coup he tried to engineernin Syria, a demarche ordered fromnWashington in 1956. The folly of thisnoperation is beyond imagining. First,nEveland apparently knew next to nothingnof the maelstrom of Syrian politicsnwhen he plunged in with a half-millionnSyrian pounds in bribes. Second, not ansingle person at the embassy in Damascus—notnthe ambassador, not the CIAnstation chief—knew an American-inspiredncoup was in the offing. Third,nthe planning took place at the very timenthe region was ready to ignite over Suez.nFinally, zero hour was set for the precisenday that Israel invaded Egypt, leavingnthe CIA, so to speak, linbriefed.nEvidently, Eveland had only one contactnon the Syrian political scene, a conservativenpolitician named Mikha’il Ilyan.nIlyan was to distribute the half-millionnpounds to the generals, colonels andnbureaucrats who needed buying. WhatnEveland does not mention is thatnMikha’il Ilyan was one of the rii:hestnmen in Syria, with holdings of landnalong the Mediterranean littoral worthnhundreds of millions of dollars. Fornyears he had been financing from hisnown purse politicians whose views werenharmonious with his own. It is understandablenthat he was interested in U.S.nsupport for his coup against a shakyngovernment ready to surrender sovereigntynto Egypt, but it is hard to believenthat he wanted American money anynmore than he wanted American advicenon how to conduct the operation.nIn the end the coup fizzled, and visionsnof betrayal by 1) the Israelis, 2)nNovember/December 1980n