cably dressed, nerveless.. . .”* Hickok’snactual exploits make puffery superfluous.nCharyn can’t leave well enoughnalone. He may be using Hickok to hisnown ends, but what those ends are isnnever made clear, and the means whichnhe employs are childish, pointlessnramblings.nxJarlin’ Bill is a tale told by SallynOvenshine, who meets Hickok in Galveston,nTexas, where he was serving asn*The American Cowboy; The Myth and ThenReality (University of Oklahoma Press, 1955).nPassion’s Paradoxical SlavenWilliam O. Douglas: The CourtnYears: 1939 – 1973: The Autobiographynof William O. Douglas; RandomnHouse; New York.nJames F. Simon: Independent Journey:nThe Life of William O. Douglas;nHarper & Row; New York.nby Edward J. Lynchnliarly during his tenure on thenSupreme Court, Justice William OrvillenDouglas witnessed an exchange in whichnJustice Stanley Reed, undecided on ancase during a judicial conference, indicatednthat his gut instincts inclinednone way, but he was unready to be recordednon the case. Chief Justice CharlesnEvans Hughes responded that he wouldnrecord Reed’s vote, claiming that ifnReed’s gut incHned one way, his mindnwas more than sufficiently capable ofnfinding a rationale to support the inclination.nHughes later elaborated tonDouglas that 907o of judicial decisionsninvolve developing the rationale tonsupport one’s gut instincts. This advicenwould guide Justice Douglas throughn36 years on the Supreme Court.nDr. Lynch is a frequent contributor tonthese pages.na Union scout. The tale ends withnHickok’s death in Deadwood, SouthnDakota in 1876, by the guns of JacknMcCall. Literally and figuratively ancheap shot. And that’s precisely whatnJerome Charyn is. Take a page fromnThomas Berger (Little Big Man), thenstyle of Kurt Vonnegut (simplistic sentencesnand ideas) and characterizationsnfrom Tom Robbins (Sally Ovenshine,nBonanza Jellybean—curiously similar),nremove their originality and mix themntogether. Darlin’ Bill results; it’s notneven a half-baked effort. Kafka, indeed!nDnJustice Douglas learned early andnclung passionately to the belief that thenhuman mind exists to develop explanationsnfor fulfilling one’s appetites.nCasting aside the notion that the mindnexists to discipline the appetites, Douglasnaccumulated one of the most prolificnrecords on the Supreme Court.nThis record is not merely a consequencenof longevity, for he regularly wrote morenopinions (primarily dissenting opinions)nthan his fellow justices. Of course, thisnrationale simplified Douglas’s judicialntask. He did not have to struggle withnthe law, with history or with the competingnclaims that inspired morenthoughtful men to deliberation. Henmerely had to discern his gut instinctsnand assert those prejudices as his readingnof the law of the land. The idolatrynreflected in James Simon’s biography isnan accurate portrayal of the extent tonwhich Justice Douglas’s prejudices werenin tune with the inclinations of thenmore liberal elements of our times. Thisnidolatry and these prejudices also enablenone to understand the ways in whichnthe modern judiciary is undermining thenConstitution that it is sworn to uphold.nSimon would have his reader believenthat his subject was a complex, paradoxicalnman; he recounts many of thenalleged paradoxes, then leaves themnnnstanding, as if they were simply a reflectionnof the Douglas’s complexity,nrather than a consequence of the extremelynsimplistic attitude that he tookntoward his fellow citizens and his work.nDouglas as judge proclaimed his lovenof humanity, yet he was a failure as anfather, a deplorable husband to his firstnthree wives, and an insufferable bossnto his law clerks and others who workednwith him. He loved humanity, yet hendespised people.nDouglas proclaimed that one of hisnleading purposes was to keep governmentnoff the backs of the people. Yetnmuch of his record as a public official,nwhether of the Securities and ExchangenCommission or the Supreme Court, involvednhim in upholding extensions ofngovernmental power. Frequently he extendednthe power of the national governmentnas a means of restricting statenand local governments, an idea of “keepingngovernment off the backs of thenpeople” that differs from the meaningnthat the authors of the Constitutionnwould have associated with the term.nDouglas was glad to keep governmentnoff the backs of some people, but onlynthe ones who lacked an identifiablenaffiliation with any corporation.nDouglas proclaimed loud and long hisnadmiration of the First Amendment, andnhe borrows approvingly from RobertnHutchins’s terminology to suggest thatnthe American founders intended tonestablish a “society of the Dialogue.”nHowever, Douglas himself was neverninterested in doing much discussing.nHe praised Hughes as Chief Justicenlargely because he held the shortest judicialnconferences. He despised HarlannFiske Stone’s conferences because theynoften turned into extended disquisitionsnabout the meaning of odd facts and obscurenclauses. He, apparently alonenamong justices, did not believe that thenworkload of the court has expanded beyondnthe capacity of the sitting judges.nJudges who read cases too closely ornat too great length are merely dawdlers.nHe especially despised what he termedn”proselytizers,” primarily Felix Frank-n9nMay/June 1981n