furter, because they were always tryingnto convince others on the Court to gonalong with them. Apparently Frankfurternbelieved that the purpose of judicialnpositions was to elicit the truth ofnthe law rather than to affirm the prejudicesnof the judges. Douglas used hisnopinions to assert his reading of thenConstitution and the laws, and carednlittle about discussing how his readingnrelated to any contrary views. Frequentlynhe stood alone, and few scholars defendneither the historical or philosophicnsoundness of the positions that resulted.nDouglas’s admirers approve of his policynstands more than his jurisprudence.nHis autobiography (one suspects alln31 of his books) assume the same tone.nHe makes no effort to persuade thosenwho might doubt his assertions. Evennin high public office, Justice Douglasnremained essentially a private man.nWne searches both of these books innvain for a larger perspective on Douglas’snjudicial career. Simon makes littleneffort to disguise his admiration amongnthe accounts of Douglas’s activities.nYes, he concedes the character flawsnthat Douglas, like any other mortal, had.nYes, he acknowledges that many ofnDouglas’s opinions might have stood onnfirmer constitutional ground or thatnthey might have been assisted by somendecent historical research. He admitsnthat they are not respected by scholarsnor lawyers (except by those who sharenhis prejudices). Simon’s main defect isnthat he attempts to reduce Douglas,ntrying to explain his character throughnpsychobabble, or attempting to describenthe conflict between Frankfurter andnDouglas as a product of different academicnaffiliations. Sadly, the snide referencesnto “Harvards” strung throughoutnDouglas’s text indicate that Simonnmay be seeing the quarrel in the samenlight that Douglas did. Nonetheless, suchnreductions avoid the serious differencesnbetween Douglas and Frankfurter, andnthey evade discussion of the seriousnproblem of Douglas’s judicial methods.nThroughout his judicial career.n10 ^ ^ ^ ^ H M ^nChronicles of CulturenWilliam O. Douglas was most noted fornhis support of positions embraced bynthe American Civil Liberties Union andnother civil liberties. He speaks glowinglynof “freedom of expression,” and manynof his opinions would have extendednthe First Amendment to cover manynforms of activity. Ultimately, however,nDouglas’s position on the First Amendmentnmust degrade political speech. An”society of the Dialogue” is possiblenonly where people are engaged in thenresponsible pursuit of truth. The rightnto speak carries with it a duty to listen,nto explain and defend one’s positionsnand to attempt to refute conflictingnpositions. Douglas never spoke of thenduties associated with responsible politicalnspeech; he was content simply tonassert his own positions rather than tonengage in the discussion that mightnconvince his fellow justices that hisnreading of the Constitution was betternthan their readings. Douglas did notnIn the rejection of all competing opinionsnthat characterizes Douglas’s stance,nphilosophy is impossible.nUouglas’s rejection of the writtennConstitution extends beyond the amendmentsnthat he praised. Beyond Douglas’snparadoxical claim to admire dialoguenand expression, the other animatingnimpulse of his life appears to have beennan admiration for the “little guy.” Douglasnand the sociological reductionistsnamong his admirers would have one believenthat this impulse originated in hisnyouthful experiences growing up on then”wrong side of the tracks” in Yakima,nWashington. Certainly the impulse tonside with the little fellow, the downtroddennand the underprivileged is pervasivenin any democratic society. It alsonaccords well with the populist and progressivensentiments that dominatednDouglas’s time. But this impulse isnsupposed to be disciplined in a societyn•”X’iitually no OIK-, trluiul or foi-. ilisputi’s lliiU Doiijjlas wa.s a j;tnius.”n— The Sutionn••Doiii;hi.s was . . . rhe tirsl anvl pi.rhiips ihv only triii- n-pivifiiiarivf of . . . auiht’iiticnami rojiiist pliasi- ot AiiKiicaii ii’Hal rlicorv to reach Ihi- Supriini- Court.”n— i’w Yiirk Kei’ieiv of Honksn” Jiistia” Ooujilas | uavt- us a reason for ln)pt-.’nparticipate in the discussions availablento him, and he rarely defended suchnspeech in his opinions. Most commonly,nthe people he was defending were assertersnmuch like himself, i.e. peoplenspeaking independently of any notionnof responsibiUty for their words. Suchnbabbling is not properly political speech,nfor it has nothing to do with the commonnconcerns of citizens. Douglas readnthe First Amendment to defend “freedomnof expression”: what he in fact advocatednwas the right to prattle. In thencacophony of many independent peoplenasserting their own positions, the pursuitnof truth that is essential to truendialogue becomes impossible. Simonnfrequently writes of Douglas’s “philosophy,”nbut clearly he means ideology.nnn-Biiihicss Week (!?)nthat believes that people are all creatednequal and are therefore equal in theneyes of the law. Both Douglas andnSimon attest to Douglas’s passionnagainst the “rich,” the “well-to-do” and,nespecially, the large corporations thatnhave come to play an important role innour economic and social lives.nWhatever passion a citizen mightnfeel against these prominent portionsnof society, a judge should realize thatnthe validity of claims before the courtndepends upon the propriety of the argument,nnot the socioeconomic status ofnthe claimant making the argument. ButnDouglas was a judge who did not believenthat his mind should control hisnpassions, and he did not stop to considernthat, on occasion, his passionsn