buzzer on his desk.rnBC: Get Hillary, Janet, and George inrnhere on the double.rnVoice from the intercom: Is there arnproblem, Mr. President?rnBC: I have just been talking to a very depressedrnman. I have a horrible premonitionrnthat a valued member of thernUnited States Parks Service is on thernverge of suicide. The President sits backrnpensively in his chair.rnE. Christian Kopffis a professor ofrnGreek and Latin at the Universityrnof Colorado in Boulder.rnPerceptionrnand Truthrnby Robert C. WhittenrnThe Tailhook DebaclernThe September 1991 Tailhook scandalrnhas done more damage to thernUnited States Navy than Admiral SergeirnGorshkov and his Soviet fleet had everrnhoped to do. Although military law appearsrnto have been violated, the escapadernitself was worse than criminal—it wasrnstupid! In this day of radical feminism,rnthe senior officers of the service at thernvery least should have been aware of thernrisks in “letting boys be boys.” Therncharges began with one female lieutenant,rnPaula Coughlin, and escalatedrnuntil the government claimed to havernfound 97 “victims of assault,” includingrnseven males. Following dissatisfactionrnwith the Navy’s careful and constitutionalrnrights-respecting investigations,rnthe Department of Defense InspectorrnGeneral (DODIG) took over. Much ofrnthe Tailhook story revolves around therninvestigators’ methods, the preliminaryrnresults of which are summarized in arngovernment report entitled Tailhook ’91:rnPart 2: Events at the Annual TailhookrnSymposium.rnLet it be clear at the outset that, for arngovernment report, Tailhook ’91: Part 2 isrnan uncommonly readable, clear, andrnwell-organized publication. Indeed, onernwonders if the obviously considerablerncost of producing such a physically andrnlinguistically high-quality report is justifiedrnin this day of drastically decliningrndefense expenditures. It is divided intorn11 chapters and seven appendices. Thern”Part 2″ refers to a revision and not arncontinuation of a previous report. Thernchapters describe the scope and methodologyrnof the investigation and providernbackground on the “Tailhook Association,”rnwitnesses. Navy cooperation,rnsquadron hospitality suites, assaults, “indecentrnexposure,” and other improperrnactivity as well as security and leadershiprnissues. On the face of it, the reportrnappears exhaustive. But does it providernan accurate picture of what really wentrnon at Tailhook ’91? The answer seems tornbe both “yes” and “no.” In other words,rnit appears to tell a considerable amountrnof truth but not the whole truth that wasrnin the possession of the investigators.rnMoreover, parts of it are misleading.rnThe writing is also marred by confusionrnon the part of the authors concerningrnrank structure in the Navy. The authorsrnrepeatedly refer to “field officers,”rnpresumably meaning “command rank,”rnsince the designation appears to referrnto (Navy) captains and commanders.rnCommand rank is not completelyrncomparable to field rank in the otherrnservices. Moreover, students at the U.S.rnNaval Academy are midshipmen, notrncadets.rnThe culture of naval aviation is quiterndifferent from the cultures of surfacernsailors and submariners. Aviators, primarilyrncarrier aviators, have been a pamperedrnlot almost from the beginning ofrnfleet aviation. As far back as 1928, whenrnthe old U.S.S. Saratoga (CV 3) was inrnoverhaul at Bremerton, Washington, arngroup of officers threw a party ending inrnsuch debauchery with local debutantesrnthat the latters’ fathers complained tornthe CO, Captain (later Fleet Admiral)rnE.J. King. King refused to do anythingrnabout it. One of the aviators of thosernyears, Frank Tinker, who later flew forrnboth the Loyalists and Franco during thernSpanish Civil War, was such a hellraiserrnthat even the Navy could not put uprnwith his antics and threw him out.rnFlight operations on a carrier are, ofrncourse, much trickier than on land. Thernheaving deck, especially at night, makesrnlanding a literal nightmare. These difficultiesrnand dangers have been cited as arnpartial (but far from satisfactory) explanationrnfor the lack of discipline amongrnnaval aviators when ashore. A faint odorrnof the antics of the carrier aviators comesrnthrough in the Officers’ Club scenes inrnthe movie Top Gun.rnThe Tailhook Association wasrnlaunched about 1962 as a combinationrnprofessional society and social club forrncarrier aviators. The professional aspectrnof the association grew over the years.rnBut so did the rowdiness. Destruction ofrnhotel property at one symposium evenrnled to the expulsion of the associationrnfrom Mexico (Rosarita Beach). In recentrnyears, at least one flag aviator. Vice AdmiralrnJames Service, reportedly tried, ifrnunsuccessfully, to tone down the rowdiness.rnThe symposium at the Las VegasrnHilton in September 1991 featured somern31 regular Navy flag officers, three reservernflag officers, and one Marine generalrnofficer in addition to representativesrnof aircraft and weapons companies likernMcDonnell Douglas. According to thernprogram published in Tailhook ’91, thernsymposium was as professionally solid asrnone in any engineering society—in therndaytime. Nights were a different story.rnThe “whistleblowing” on Tailhookrn’91 began with the charge from helicopterrnpilot Lieutenant Paula Coughlin,rna participant in at least one previousrn”Tailhook,” that she had been assaultedrnin the “gauntlet” area on the third floor.rnWith coaching from the Department ofrnDefense Inspector General (DODIG)rnstaff, she eventually identified CaptainrnGregory Bonam, USMC, as her assailant.rnThe gauntlet was a corridor area on thernthird floor where women were allegedlyrngrabbed, pinched, or fondled on thernbreasts and crotch as they passedrnthrough. In fact, some claimed to havernbeen bodily raised into the air andrncarried some distance. Most of this activityrnappears to have been consensual,rnalthough some was not. LieutenantrnCoughlin’s complaint, first reported inrnthe press by a young reporter for the SanrnDiego Union-Tribune, Greg Vistica,rnfound its way to sympathetic hands inrnone of the offices of the Secretary of Defense.rnWhen Coughlin (on the basis ofrna photograph) “identified” her assailant,rnit quickly became apparent to her DODrnbackers that she had erred. They warnedrnher of the error, despite the inadmissibilityrnof such action. In a second attempt,rnshe fixed on Bonam, and he wasrncharged.rnAccording to then-Assistant Secretaryrnof the Navy (Manpower and ReservernAffairs) Barbara Pope, at least one flagrnofficer. Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsrn(Air Warfare) Vice AdmiralrnRichard-Dunleavy, may have had knowledgernof the “gauntlet.” According torn44/CHRONICLESrnrnrn