liarity of the American situation is thatrnthe distinctive logic of American religiosityrnjustifies this fragmentation of beliefrnand behavior. Hitchcock claims evangelicalrnChristianity as a second —andrncountervailing—force to secularism inrnAmerica’s founding. But he overlooksrnthe way in which these two strains —rnEnlightenment secularism and evangelicalrn(i.e., Puritan) Christianity—reinforcerneach other in American history.rnHitchcock says that as a philosopher Irnappear to believe that “he who says Arnmust say B, whereas a historian would replyrnthat he who says A can then say justrnabout anything he pleases.” Thus, thern”problem with the first Amendment isrnnot its implicit ideology,” for “whateverrnthe intention of the Founding Fathers,rnthe present civil-libertarian understandingrnof the Religion Clause was not simplyrndetermined from the beginning.”rnHitchcock’s point is that history is ratherrnmore contingent than my emphasis onrn”logic” seems to allow. However, my argumentrnis not that an implied theologyrnor philosophy determines social and culturalrnhistory but that it inclines historyrnin a definite direction. In the words ofrnRichard M. Weaver, “ideas have consequences.”rnAs far as I can tell, it is a nearlyrnuniversal belief that one’s assumptionsrnabout the nature of man and God inrnsome significant sense guide one’s behavior.rnI claim that an insufficiently contemplativerndisposition toward God andrnneighbor, a disproportionate emphasisrnon “creativity” as distinct from “receptivity”rnin the basic structure of the humanrnbeing, lies at the heart of America’s culturalrnproblems. (Mary’s fiat expresses thernontological attitude of prayer, obedience,rnand love that is archetypical for humanrncreatureliness.) This absence of arntrue sense of creatiireliness takes exbemernform in what John Paul II has termed ourrngrowing “culture of death.” The primaryrnquestion regarding America’s “logic,”rntherefore, is whether the Americanrnfounding reveals a theological anthropologyrnwhich grounds creatureliness as requiredrnby this communzo-inspired vision.rnI don’t believe it does. Hitchcock, ofrncourse, is welcome to answer differentiy,rnbut he should first recognize the argument.rnInstead, Hitchcock says that arnmore obvious explanation for our presentrntroubles is sin. Of course sin is the basicrnexplanation, but I insist, as does PopernJohn Paul II, that we must distinguish sinrnin its subjective dimension from sin in itsrnobjective or external dimension, whichrn”takes concrete form as the content ofrnculture and civilization, as a philosophicalrnsystem, an ideology, a programme forrnaction and for the shaping of human behavior”rn(Dominum et Vivificantem).rnThis “objective” dimension of sin lies atrnthe heart of what the Pope calls a “stiucturernof sin.” In my book, I concentiaternon liberalism’s stiuctural sin: namely, itsrninadequate notion of creatureliness.rnHitchcock also finds my criticism ofrnthe “neoconservatives” premature. Ourrnquarrel, he says, should be first with thern”leaders of American Catholicism, includingrnmost of its bishops, [who] are notrnneoconservatives but liberals.” But asrnHitchcock knows, I argue in my bookrnthat we need to redefine the meaning ofrnliberalism in light of Vatican II. Fromrnthis perspective, most all of the recentrndominant Catholic approaches to Americanrnculture embody an unacceptablernliberalism.rnTurning to my discussion of FatherrnTheodore Hesburgh, Hitchcock is perplexedrnbecause “the American politicalrntradition has littie to do with the presentrnstate of academia.” Presumably, Hitchcockrnis confused by my comparison ofrnHesburgh’s approach to the “logic” ofrnthe academy with Murray’s approach tornthe “logic” of the First Amendment. ButrnI simply point out the common theological-rnanthropological assumptions of Hesburghrnand Murray. Hesburgh’s conceptionrnof a Catholic university precludesrngenuine integration of sanctity into thern”logic” of intelligence, or of the academicrndisciplines. The substance of his universityrndoes not emerge ex corde ecclesiae.rnHitchcock’s review reveals how fullyrnhe shares the assumptions of the conservativernliberalism of the dominantrnCatholic approaches in recent decades.rn(For example, like the conservative liberals,rnHitchcock puts too much emphasisrnon the Supreme Court decisions of thernlast 50 years as the source of our currentrnproblems.) His criticisms illustrate thernvery confusion about postconciliarrnCatholicism and American liberalismrnthat first prompted me to write myrnbook.rn—David L. SchindlerrnEditor, Communio, Washington, D.C.rn^^DABLE co^ Aeschylus, Oresteia. A powerful drama ofrnblood-revenge that threatens the social order untilrnit is incorporated into law.rnEuripides, Hecuba. An embittered mother withrnright on her side goes off the deep end while seekingrnvengeance.rnNjal’s Saga. Avengers go out of contiol and riprnapart the fabric of Icelandic society by burningrndown a homestead with women and children.rnJohn Webster, The White Devil. A wonderfullyrnsinister Jacobean revenge tiagedy.rnWilliam Faulkner, The Vnvanquished. In Faulkner’s most readable novel, arnyoung man lives up to the Code by facing death without shooting his enemy.rnRoger McGrath, Gunfighters, Highwaymen, and Vigilantes. A magnificentrnstudy of the armed and peaceful Old West.rnRichard Maxwell Brown, Strain of Violence and No Duty to Retreat. Thernstarting point for studying American vigilantism and self-defense.rnUnforgiven. Almost universally misinterpreted as Clint Eastwood’s attempt atrn”atoning” for his violent films, this Academy Award-winning movie shows howrnvigilantism often stems fi-om the corruption of authority.rnSouthern Comfort. Often derided by liberal critics, this Walter Hill film paintsrna vibrant picture of a Cajun community defending itself from New Southrnoutsiders.rnJANUARY 1998/5rnrnrn