odd tiiat the Ten Commandments prohibitnjust about everything New Yorkersnconsider essential to the good life. Thenfeet that certain cultures have differentnstandards from ours does not necessarilynvitiate an ethical system whose essentialsncan be found in Aristotle, Confiicius,nand the Old Testament. Some of thendeveloping peoples have differentnsystems of science and mathematics. Arencannibalism and sorcery to be considerednthe equivalent of Christian ethicsnand Newton’s laws? Besides, many of ournmost basic prohibitions—against incest,nadultery, theft, and murder—can benregarded as universal or, at least, convergentnevolutionary norms. It is a superficialnand somewhat snobbish culturalnrelativism that refuses to comprehendnthe parallels between our own ethicalnnorms and those of the most primitivensocieties.nBarzun takes his argument a stepnfurther and insists that antirelativistsn”need to see that without the acceptancenof different ethical norms we shouldnnever have got away from those of thencaveman.” It is difficult to see why thenmoral relativist should look down hisnnose at paleolithic ethics. It is equallyndifficult to see by what presumed right anrelativist can insist that anybody “needs”nto do anything. James’s variety of gentlenskepticism was comparatively harmlessnin the hands of scrupulous nonbelieversnlike Hume, Huxley, or James himself, butnit will not do as the ethical foundation ofna civil order. Most people, not evennintellectuals, are deterred from vice bynthe consideration that it isn’t quite nicenor that it may be harmful. Even HenrynAdams, James’s colleague, was closer tonreality in his inchoate adoration of thenVirgin and the Dynamo. The absolutenimperatives from which pragmatistsnshrink may prove to be the only securitynwe have. In the long run, it is the personalntest that counts.nJames did suggest two possiblensources for a positive morality, or twonmain commandments. The first is “thatnwe should seek incessandy… so as to actnIOHH^HHHHHHHnChronicles of Culturenas to bring about the very largest totalnuniverse of good that we can see.” Innsuch a search, abstract rules can serve asnhelpful guidelines, but since “everyndilemma is… a unique situation,” moralnprogress depends on our attention. Wenmust always keep in mind the tangiblenresults of our actions. The second greatncommandment has to do with obligationsnwhich, James asserts, arise fromnevery personal claim made upon us:n”There is some obligation whenevernthere is a claim. It is incumbent uponneach of us, whenever a claim is made,neither to accept or reject the obligation.”nBarzun believes that James’s secondncommandment can give us a “releasenfrom interminable shilly-shallying.” Itnremoves moral decisions from the realmnof personal likes and dislikes, since wenare to consider the claims made bynanyone, without respect of persons.nUnfortunately, James’s second commandment—^likenall of his ethics—^begsnmore questions than it answers. Whynshould we, adrift in the stream of ournprivate conscious experience, considerneven for a moment the claims made byn”the others”? Besides, it is not alwaysnpossible for some of us to consider ournpossible obligations to every personnwho knocks on the door. Artists, surgeons,nand monks all need at least somentime to be free of the incessant demandsnof other people, and even those of us notnengaged in critical occupations cannotnnecessarily spend our lives in entertainingnalternatives. Much of our character,nmuch of what is most essentially us,ndepends on what we have rejected. Nonone can expect Elie Wiesel, for example,nto consider the possible claims upon hisnhumanity which might be made bynretfred concentration camp guards anynmore than a hard-shell Southern Baptistncan be required to give a fafr hearing tonLarry Flynt. In both cases, grantingnenemies the right to make a claim notnonly gives ground on the battlefield: itnweakens the integrity of their personalnidentify. It will be remembered thatnJesus did pause to consider the case fornthe other side. But that was at thennnbeginning of his ministry. Afterwards,nwhat conceivable purpose would it havenserved to give the tempter a hearing?nFar from providing a basis for action,nJames’s moral principles condemn hisnfollowers to lives of liberal indecision.nHe seems to have conceived of his twonprinciples as replacements for the twongreat commandments, but how weaknand indecisive they appear, when setnbeside the biblical “thou shalt ” Thenscriptural commandments come from ansource claiming absolute authority,nJames’s from a well-intentioned andncultivated professor of psychology.nIJI the end, all of James’s speculationsncome to grief on the same rock—invisible,nbut palpable as the force of anhurricane. James regarded all manifestationsnof the religious spirit asnphenomena to be studied—an acceptablenprocedure if, and only if, he happenednto be right. However, his ownnagnosticism and naive insistence on thenconcrete facts of personal experiencenmay strike many readers as a typical latenVictorian phenomenon. In poetry, finde-sieclenintrospection bore fruit in thendecadent music of Ernest Dowson andnLionel Johnson, but in philosophy thenresults are less obviously positive. Thencynical mysticism of Henry Adams andnthe tawdry utilitarianism of John Deweynhave this in common with pragmatism:neach is built on the shifting sands of thenindividual stream of consciousness. It isnbetter, in the end, to be a thorough-goingnBerkeleyan and take your stand on “essenest percipi.” Such metaphysical rigor cannlead to positive consequences.nWhat are we to make of Barzun’sncurious book? It is an easy way to getnacquainted with William James; it is thenbest sort of literary history: part scholarship,npart personal record of Barzun’snlifelong dialogue with James. It is the sortnof book that no longer gets written.nIndeed, it could only be written by thatnnearly extinct type of person: the man ofnletters. Barzun reminds us what collegenprofessors used to be like, before theynbecame bureaucrats. Dn