dividualism and further social decay.rnAgainst this background, it is hardly surprising that the Lawrnon Religion was passed, even though many of the DumarndepuHes who voted for it had doubts about certain aspects ofrnthe legislation, fearing that the law could once again turn thernOrthodox Church into an arm of the state. The present patriarch,rnAleksey, is probably the best that could be hoped for underrnthe circumstances. Having disavowed any intention ofrnmaking Orthodoxy the state religion, he is attempting to combatrnstatist forces within the Church and has repented of past cooperationrnwith the authorities. Moreover, Aleksey backedrnYeltsin in the 1991 standoff with the coup plotters and attemptedrnto mediate during the 1993 confrontation between Yeltsinrnand the Supreme Soviet. Aleksey appears a reasonable and tolerantrnman, but he has had to resist—as did Yeltsin and the Dumarn—the hypocritical interference of the West (the UnitedrnStates in particular) in Russian internal affairs: The U.S. grantsrnChristian-persecuting China, which traffics in human bodyrnparts and forces women to have abortions, Most Favored Nationrnstatus, says nothing about harsh restrictions on Christianrnevangelists in Israel, and defends Saudi Arabia, a country thatrnalso suppresses Chrishanity. Germany legally blocks cults likernScientology and forces taxpayers to subsidize officially recognizedrnchurches; Spain, among others, grants the CatholicrnChurch special status. Nevertheless, the United States and itsrnallies have responded to the Law on Religion by threateningrnRussia with economic and political sanctions if she does notrnshape up—often after prompting from Protestant groups whornare eager to claim Russia’s lost souls for their own. Aleksey mayrnbe flexible enough to accept a generous interpretation of thernlaw at some point, but he can hardlv be blamed for pursuingrnwhat appears to be a moderate—by world standards—policy ofrnreligious protectionism.rnWe ask that the Russians exercise tolerance and patience; wernshould ask no less of ourselves. We outsiders should attempt tornsee things as they see them. The Russian Orthodox Church hasrnsuffered much since 1917, and those who called themselves believersrnduring the Soviet period, mostK’ Orthodox Christians,rnare among the most devout believers I have ever known. Somernrespect is due from our side, especially from Western Protestants,rna respect Russians do not feel they are receiving. A Baptistrnacquaintance once asked me what religion the Russiansrnwere. When I replied “Orthodox,” she asked, “Is that Christian?”rnAnother once flatiy asserted that all Russians are atheists.rnMany see Russia as a blank (read: heathen) slate that enlightenedrnWestern evangelists can exploit. Combating such ignorancernis a full-time job in the Age of Oprah, but if Christians, assailedrnbv the forces of secular humanism on one side andrnmilitant Islam on the other, are to survive —much less overcomern—their enemies’ attacks, a measured ecumenism, withrnrespect for doctrinal differences and a recognition that the workrnof the Lord can be done in any orthodox Christian setting, is arnnecessity.rnAvisit to an Orthodox church is not a bad place to start forrnthose whose vocabulary does not (yet?) include the wordrn”Christendom.” On any Sunday morning in Moscow, for instance,rna Western guest at the pre-revolutionary National Hotelrnacross from the Kremlin can exit the restored splendor of thernold hotel (where once Lenin himself stayed), turn to his rightrnand immediately catch sight of the golden dome of the resurrectedrn—the church had been demolished under Stalin —rnCathedral of Christ the Savior, some distance from the old centerrnof the medieval czarist empire on the heights of the MoscowrnRiver. As he nears the gray walls of the reconstructed church,rnthe modern world gradually melts away. The sidewalks andrnempty streets are occupied bv strange people, the inhabitants ofrnDostoyevsky’s “strange nation,” priests with flowing blackrnbeards and long black cassocks, old women cloaked in thernbrightly colored scarves characteristic of the busybodyrnbabushky (“grandmothers”) who really run Russia, and a surprisingrnnumber, considering the atheist past many were raisedrnin, of young people. Inside, the worshippers gather in a large,rncircular enclosure, where a choir sings to the Almight}’ in gloriousrnvoice and an old woman sells candles for a pittance. Thernworshippers, candles in hand, stand throughout the liturgy,rnwhich is chanted by a priest in richly colored garb. The scenernis so moving, even sublime, that the visitor may feel compelledrnto offer a little money toward the church’s completion in one ofrnthe boxes in the foyer, resplendent with drawings of the cathedralrnas envisioned in its full, glorious reincarnation.rnBoth the liturgy and the church are a far cry from the relativelyrnaustere Protestant services many Americans were raisedrnwith, and even Catholics may wonder if they have just had arnglimpse into their own past, into the Age of Faith, when Christianityrnwas an integral part of the daily lives of ordinary people.rnThe Russians—despite the fact that the number who are selfidentifiedrnbelievers will never match that of Americans—are anrnalmost medieval people by comparison with Westerners, closerrnin some ways to the Islamic militants of the Caucasus than tornthe godless Lutherans and Anglicans who preach self-help inrnliberal congregations from Bonn to Cornwall to Portiand. Thernreason for this phenomenon —the survival of at least a hint ofrnthe Russians as a “strange,” spiritually haunted nation—are elusive.rnThe philosopher-polemicist and lay theologian NikolayrnBelyayev viewed the Russians as a nation marked by a highlyrndeveloped messianic streak; for Belyayev, the Bolshevik Revolutionrnand the communist version of the “Russian Idea” werernbut manifestations of the messianic impulse gone astray. Perhapsrnthe vacuum left by the “god that failed” is being filled oncernmore by Orthodoxy. Whatever the reason, many Russiansrnseem more rooted somehow than Westerners, perhaps morernwilling to contemplate the tragic fate of the “god” that has failedrnboth them and us: modernit)’ itselfrnI claim no special expertise in theolog’ and cannot rationalizernawav what are, for serious Christians, important doctrinalrndisputes among Protestants, Catholics, and Orthodox. Nevertheless,rnif an ounce of Christian charity can be musteredrnamong thinking believers of all the Christian confessions, thenrnsome doubts about our abilih’ to judge the complexities of therncreated world and of Christians coping with its fallen state arernin order. Perhaps Russian believers, with their emphasis on —rnno, expectation of, perhaps even longing for—suffering andrntheir universalist bent, the hope of many of them for the universalrnsalvation of a universally depraved mankind, can teach usrnas much as we can teach them. If we view each Christian confessionrnas one side of a many-sided prism through which thernHoly Ghost shines and God’s light reaches the world, each confessionrndeveloping and reflecting a particular aspect of revelationrnas the Word of God encounters human experience in variousrntimes and places, then perhaps the much desired mutualrnrespect among the confessions can become a reality.rn•Phe Western Christian should follow up his visit to an Orthodoxrnchurch with a cultural sojourn to the strange nation ofrn22/CHRONlCLESrnrnrn