downplaying the religious dimension asrnmuch as possible, excising the radicalismrnthat derives from that dimension andrndepicting the movement as simply anotherrnadjunct of the conservative (i.e.,rnneoconservative) apparat. Thus, whilernMr. Bennett, in the June 26 WashingtonrnPost, defended the Christian Right’srnright to take part in politics and the rolernof religion in informing political affairs,rnhe tried to make out that the religiousrnright is concerned with purely secularistrnissues—”Things like safe streets, goodrnschools, strong families, nonintrusiverngovernment and communities wherernpeople care for one another. Goodrnthings all. And not, one would think,rnparticularly controversial or ‘divisive.'”rnMr. Krauthammer’s defense was similar.rnTo him the Christian Right consistsrnof “members of a diverse communityrnsharing a simple if nostalgic agenda returningrnAmerica to the cultural conditionrnand social values of the immediaternpostwar era. For them that means twoparentrnfamilies, schools with authority,rnHmited government, a culture not yetrndrenched in sex and violence,” as well asrn”government policies that encourage intactrnfamilies, the teaching of virtue, thernencouragement of responsibility and thernpunishment of criminality.” Mr. Kristol’srnreflections on the religious right,rnpublished in the Washington Times onrnJune 17 (only two days after the PRFrnroundtable on abortion) struck a similarrntheme, namely that the Christian Rightrnis not much more than a coalition of citizensrnwho simply seek the restoration ofrnthe manners and institutions of thern1950’s and is not at all “out of the mainstream.”rnWhat is striking about these neoconservativerndefenses of the Christian Right,rnhowever, is that the issues Mr. Bennettrnand Mr. Krauthammer mentioned as thernmovement’s characteristic concerns arernin fact hardly even blips on its radarrnscreen. The main specific issues of thernChristian Right include opposition tornabortion, opposition to homosexuality,rnopposition to the exclusive teaching ofrnevolution and of secular humanism generally,rnand support for prayer in schools.rnNone of these, in the America of thern1990’s, can truthfully be called “mainstream”rnissues; all of them are in factrnradical measures, and all of them seriouslyrnchallenge the drift of the UnitedrnStates for the last 50 years in their oppositionrnto the country’s secularism, its materialism,rnits libertarianism, and its moralrnrelativism. By ignoring and even denyingrnthe implicit radicalism of the ChristianrnRight, by trying to make out that it isrnreally just a “mainstream” movementrnworried about good schools and safernstreets, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Krauthammer,rnand Mr. Kristol were essentially seekingrnto strip the Christian Right of its mostrnpromising and refreshing radical aspectsrnand to co-opt the movement, seizernmoral and intellectual leadership of it,rnand absorb it within the well-funded digestiverntract of the neoconservative imperium.rnBy doing so, Mr. Kristol and his cohortsrnwould win for the neoconservativesrnwhat they have never been able tornbuild for themselves—a genuine grassrootsrnfollowing, and one that in the lastrncouple of years has gained considerablerninfluence in the base of the RepublicanrnParty—and at the same time wed thernmoderate, mainstream, establishmentrnsections of the party to that following, allrnunder their own intellectual (and eventuallyrnpolitical) leadership.rnThat is also what Mr. Kristol was tryingrnto do with his new position on abortion,rnand that is why he needed Mr.rnWeigel, who is actually a Christian, tornstand up and testify with him. Had Mr,rnKristol, who happens to be Jewish, proposedrna retreat from the hluman LifernAmendment by himself, his plan wouldrnhave been transparent and would havernelicited no following among ChristianrnRightists. But, as his fellow neoconservativernand effective press agent FredrnBarnes wrote in the New RepubUc, thernKristol-Weigel proposal was receivedrn”warmly” by some leaders of the ChristianrnRight, and the proposal is importantrnbecause “it may allow the GOP to easernits position [on abortion] without an intrapartyrnwar. And it would bring thernparty nearer to the public’s view: reducernthe number of abortions, but no nationalrnban.”rnPrecisely. The effect, if not the actualrnmission, of neoeonscrvatism ever sincernits appearance in the late 1960’s has beenrnto muzzle whatever inclinations to anrnauthentic, popular, grass-roots, rightwingrnradicalism might emerge eitherrnwithin or without the Republican Party.rnIn the eady 1970’s, as just such a radicalrnmovement began to take wing in thernwake of the Wallace campaigns, the firstrngeneration of neoconservative eggheadsrnshowed up and soon ran off with it. Thernresult, when Ronald Reagan entered officernin 1981, was an administration neverrnseriously committed to any of the authenticallyrnpopular and radical issues onrnwhich Mr. Reagan had been elected.rnNow the second generation of neoconservativesrnhas shown up to undertake thernsame mission of co-optation against thernsame kind of radicalism of the right thatrnflourishes today. The neoconservativernobjective is always to “bring the partyrnnearer to the public’s view” and never tornperform the mission of a real radicalism,rnto lead and instruct the public or thernnation in where it may have gone wrong.rnThe neoconservative objective is alwaysrnto avoid “intraparty war,” to evade combatrnon the fundamental cultural conflictsrnthat threaten the nation, and tornmute any tendencies to radicalism inrnhope of gaining political office andrninfluence. Those objectives may safelyrnbe communicated (indeed they need tornbe communicated) in the pages of suchrnperiodicals as the New Republic, but underrnno circumstances is this esoterica tornbe imparted to those at the grass-rootsrnlevel whom it is intended to dazzle.rnHence, even though the positionrnMr. Kristol and Mr. Weigel deposed inrntheir roundtable may, from the abstractrnperspective of Old Right political theory,rnbe the correct position, it is, in the perspectivernof its real meaning, a strategicrnretreat from the more radical posturernthe Christian Right has succeededrnin implanting in the platform of thernRepublican Party. Hence, whatever itsrntheoretical merits or even its practicalrnadvantages, it is not a position the partyrnshould adopt or serious men and womenrnof the right endorse. Its net effect at thisrntime would be the effective compromisingrnor silencing of what is now the onlyrnremaining organized expression of a popularrnradicalism of the right that challengesrnthe dominant regime in anythingrnlike a serious way, the effective emasculationrnof the Christian Right, and therneffective take-over of that movement byrnforces that seek only to thwart ratherrnthan to fulfill its radical tendencies. Mr.rnBarnes may be correct in remarking thatrnsome leaders of the Christian Right embracedrnthe Kristol-Weigel positionrn”warmly,” but it’s doubtful that that hasrnbeen or will be the response of the rankand-rnfile of the movement those leadersrnpurport to lead, and once the chief intellectualrnof the Republican Party perceivesrnthat, he may begin to understandrnwhy it was that his gambit on abortionrnwas a blunder from which he and hisrnallies may not be able to recover. trnOCTOBER 1994/11rnrnrn