Principalities & Powersrnby Samuel FrancisrnPaths of GloryrnAs I write this column (in late January),rnthe United States has deployed 30,000rntroops in Somalia, has just launched newrnbombing strikes against Iraq, has announcedrna naval blockade of Haiti, andrnis debating whether it should send combatrnforces into the Balkans. By the timernyou read this column (in late March),rnthere is literally no telling where our militaryrnforces will be engaged, though anyrnnumber of locations are entirely possible:rnSouth Africa, where the “transitionrnfrom apartheid” may or may not proceedrnat a pace and in a fashion that suits thernfriends of global egalitarianism; Sudan,rnwhich endures famine and chaos no lessrnsevere than Somalia; Germany, wherernriots against immigrants have taken arnnumber of lives in the last few monthsrnand suggest the incipient revival of a militantrncounterrevolutionary nationalism;rnor any of several other countries and regionsrnwhere internal disorders, unsavoryrnpolitical conditions, or social and economicrnproblems that Americans findrndisgusting may sound the bugles for therncavalry to mount and administer mercyrnat the point of American bayonets. Butrnwhat droppeth as the gentle rain fromrnheaven these days is less likely to bernmercy than the payloads of Americanrnbombers.rnThere is no way to tell where Americanrntroops will be sent a few monthsrnfrom now because, quite simply, virtuallyrnno one in the policymaking positionsrnin our government nor in the opinionmakingrnclasses of American society anyrnlonger considers “national interest” tornbe the operative principle by which foreignrnmilitary intervention should berndetermined. When President-elect Clintonrnannounced just before his inaugurationrnthat he would retain PresidentrnBush’s policy of turning back boatloadsrnof Haitian immigrants, his stated reasonrnfor violating his own campaign promisernand not welcoming an armada of unskilled,rnilliterate, and disease-ridden invadersrnto our sliores had nothing to dornwith our national interest, nor even withrnenforcing long-standing and popularlyrnsupported laws against illegal immigration.rnHis decision, he proclaimed, wasrnbased on the welfare of the Haitiansrnthemselves. Reversing the policy, yournsee, would encourage the pilgrims tornembark on the high seas in quest of thernhappy harbors of Miami, and many ofrnthem might drown or expire from exhaustionrnand exposure before the CoastrnGuard could save them from the consequencesrnof their ill-conceived expedition.rnPresumably, if Genghis Khan andrnthe Golden Horde returned to life andrnheaded across the Bering Straits for Seattle,rnany resistance they met from thernUnited States government would bernpredicated on the need to spare thernMongols the risk of catching pneumoniarnin their journey through Alaska’s arcticrnwilderness.rnThe extinction of the concept of “nationalrninterest” as the governing guidelinernof our foreign policy betrays therncoming extinction of the nation-state itself,rnor what our governing elite wouldrnlike to be its extinction. Hardly any discussionrnof “post-Cold War foreign policy,”rnfrom high-school commencementrnaddresses to highly classified memorandarnexchanged among the munchkins ofrnthe national security labyrinth, fails tornrehearse all the cliches of a “global economy,”rnthe “meaninglessness” of nationalrnborders, and the evolution of the planetrntoward political, cultural, economic,rnand demographic “interdependence.”rnSuch platitudes are not simply rhetoricalrncommonplaces replacing salutations ofrnthe Founding Fathers and biblical allusionsrnas staples of public oratory. Theyrnestablish and are intended to establishrnthe conceptual framework within whichrnactual policies are designed and byrnwhich the choice of actions available tornpolicymakers is delimited. The generalrnconsequence of such language is notrnmerely neglect of the national interestrnbut its obliteration and the removal fromrnthe national consciousness of any inklingrnthat there are some things that arc important,rnand others that are unimportantrnor actually harmful, for the nationrnto do. The more specific result will bernthe eventual evaporation of any conceptrnof the nation itself as a distinct politicalrnand cultural unit. An institution thatrnhas no interests of its own to pursue orrnthat perennially fails to pursue them andrnwhose leaders and members are profoundlyrnoblivious to such interests cannotrnbe said to exist in any but the mostrnvacuous and abstruse sense.rnThe disappearance of the concept ofrn”national interest” is not, then, an accident,rnnor the result of sloppy thinkingrnand careless expression. It correspondsrnto and reflects one of the major socialrntrends of our times, the formation of arngenuinely supranational apparatus ofrnglobal management administered andrngoverned by an emerging supranationalrnelite. Given the global reach of modernrnorganizations and the homogenizationrnthat their operations demand, a unifiedrnglobal government able to enforcernsuch homogeneity is consistent with therninterests of the groups that manage thesernorganizations, and the building of a globalrngovernment necessarily involves thernerosion of national units as politicallyrnsovereign and culturally distinctive organisms.rnNor is it an accident that thernelaboration of the basic concepts and institutionsrnof this “New World Order” isrnnow more or less explicitly voiced by thernhired mouthpieces of the emergingrnregime.rnLast year, at a meeting of the Grouprnof Seven in Paris, the big enchiladas ofrnthe “global economy” assigned somernhomework to U. N. Secretary-GeneralrnBoutros Boutros-Ghali. They instructedrnhim to design plans for a standing armyrnof the United Nations able to undertakernmissions “for preventive diplomacy, forrnpeacemaking and for peacekeeping.” ByrnJune, the secretary-general had completedrnhis work and turned in his paper.rnWhat he proposed, and what his instructorsrnwanted, is nothing less than anrnindependent armed force that wouldrnempower the llnited Nations itself as arnnew global power in its own right.rnMr. Boutros-Ghali’s proposal is torn”bring into being, through negotiations,rnthe special agreements . . . wherebyrnmember states undertake to makernarmed forces, assistance and facilitiesrnavailable to the Security Council. . . notrnonly on an ad hoc basis but on a permanentrnbasis.” In the past, you see, U. N.rn”peacekeeping forces” were limited.rnThey were sent into a region onl)’ after arnceasefire among the combatants hadrnbeen worked out, not into combat situations,rnand their own combat was con-rn8/CHRONICLESrnrnrn