VITAL SIGNSrnCeMM0N;VVEAfL;rn^^ •”Mpjililil’ ‘ ^ ^rnProfessor Burnham,rnMafioso Costello,rnand Mernby Ralph Robert ToledanornA Cold War ReminiscencernNot long after the conviction of AlgerrnHiss, Professor James Burnham,rnKarl Hess, and I met in my apartment onrnRiverside Drive to discuss a matter thatrnhad concerned us for some time. JimrnBurnham was then working on his bookrnThe Web of Subversion. Karl, like me, wasrna Newsweek editor, and he had when itrnwas pertinent used the Press Section tornilluminate some of the darker corners ofrnthe communist assault on our institutions.rnI had written two best-sellers—rnSeeds of Treason and Spies, Dupes, andrnDiplomats, the one dealing with the HessrnCase and the other on the great RichardrnSorge spy ring, whose ramifications extendedrnfrom Germany and Japan to thernAmerican State Department.rnWe all had the background to ask thernquestion: Why was it that the FBI andrnother intelligence agencies always discoveredrnthe identities of the leaders ofrnthe Soviet espionage apparat only afterrnthey had returned to Moscow? Andrnwhat could be done about it? The revelationsrnand disclosures of important witnessesrnlike Whittaker Chambers dealtrnwith past history, and what they reported,rnthough of tremendous importancernin reconstructing a sorry era, had onlyrntangential current pertinence. Legalrnrestraints tied the hands of the FBI.rnCould private citizens, acting like anrnanti-Soviet posse at their own risk, dornsomething about it?rnMulling these questions over, werncame up with a plan that perhaps had arnchance at success. After discussion, wernagreed that a process of “triangulation”rn—whereby counterintelligencernagents who pick up a radio signal fromrndifferent points can, by elementaryrntrigonometry, locate the clandestinerntransmitter—might do the trick. In myrnyears of covering what was known as thern”subversive beat” and of talking at lengthrnwith secret and public defectors fromrnthe apparat, I knew of those who workedrnon the outer fringes of Soviet espionagernrings. If those people could be picked uprnand made to talk, we would step by steprnapproach the center, turning over therntapes of our activities to the FBI andrnother agencies.rnThe details worked themselves out asrnBurnham, Hess, and I discussed the possibilities.rnThe plan, we agreed, would requirernthe purchase of a house in GreenwichrnVillage, where strange comings andrngoings would cause no comment, arnsound-proofed panel truck, and the servicesrnof a young doctor or medical studentrnwho could administer the dosage ofrnsodium Pentothal that would loosen therntongues of our “subjects.” The peripheralrnfigures, forced into the panel truck,rndrugged slightly, and delivered to thernGreenwich Village house, would bernquestioned, with a doctor in attendancernto see that there was no over-dosage ofrnPentothal, and would lead us to the nextrnand closer group. The converging linesrnof our information would take us wherernthey met, in the person of the spymaster.rnIt would have to be a quick operation,rnsince our threat to each agent that wernwould announce his voluntary complicityrnshould he report what had happenedrnto him might still lead to eventual confession.rnWe estimated that the entire operationrnwould cost no more than $50,000,rnwhich even in the 1950’s was not thatrnvast a sum of money. And Jim Burnhamrnfelt that he would have little trouble raisingrnit from some of the men of wealth hernknew who professed their undying devotionrnto the anticommunist cause and tornthe war on Soviet subversion. He was, asrnwe should have known, mistaken. Afterrna few weeks of trying to raise the moneyrnwe needed, he had gotten only praisernfor the project and respect for putting hisrndistinguished career and reputation atrnrisk over so dangerous an operation.rnThey themselves, they said, could notrnpossibly get involved.rnIt was at this point that I recalled arnsmall bit of recent Cold War history—rnone of the many episodes that never getrninto the history books. In 1948, thernUnited States was fighting to stem therngrowth of Europe’s communist parties.rnKey to Truman’s policy was Italy, wherernthe Christian Democrats were seriouslyrnthreatened by one of the most powerfulrnof these parties. To give aid, James Forrestalrn(who later died under mysteriousrncircumstances) had organized OperationrnBrook Club—perhaps the most exclusivernclub in New York and so named becausernmany secret meetings took placernon its premises—to collect and funnelrnmoney to the Christian Democrats, whornhad been unable to match the resourcesrnof the Moscow-financed communists.rnMillions of dollars were transmitted tornItaly through Cardinal Francis Spellmanrnand the Catholic Church.rnAt a critical point, however, there wasrna sudden and immediate need for arnstrong financial infusion—I have beenrntold that it ran to about $1 million—rnand Cardinal Spellman suggested thatrnthe most likely source would be FrankrnCostello, then one of the most powerfulrnmembers of the mob. Costello wasrncalled in to the Powerhouse—the Cardinal’srnhome and offices abutting St.rnPatrick’s Cathedral, and according to thernaccounts I have heard, the conversationrnwent like this:rnSpellman: Frankie, do you believernin the free-enterprise system?rnCostello: Of course.rnSpellman: Are you a patrioticrnAmerican?rn44/CHRONICLESrnrnrn