ington, D.C.-based public interest group, Consumers forrnWorld Trade (CWT). Since the eady 1980’s, CWT has beenrnone of Washington, D.C.’s most avid advocates of unrestrictedrnfree trade; its arguments focus on the benefits free trade affordsrnthe American consumer. The organization has steadfastlyrnopposed any reciprocal trade law that would threatenrnJapan with restrictions on access to the U.S. market as a way tornpry open the Japanese market. In 1987, CWT organized arngrass-roots campaign against what are labeled the “protectionist”rnfeatures of the pending Omnibus Trade Act of 1988;rnCWT testified in front of congressional committees six times,rneach time arguing the case for American consumers andrnagainst tough trade sanctions aimed at closed foreign markets,rnmost notably of Japan.rnStarting in 1980, the Japanese have taken a deep interest inrnCWT. Subaru, for example, paid the initial dues for 1,500 ofrnits employees to become members; in November of 1980,rnSubaru employees represented more than half of CWT’srn2,700 members. Ibyota and other Japanese companies maderndirect corporate contributions. By staying in the background,rnthey did not jeopardize the American face of CWT.rnBut the most effective lobbying technique reflects the currentrntangle of global politics and economics. It is the high artrnof creating a captive competitor. The Toshiba story illustratesrnhow it works. In 1987, the Toshiba Machine Company, whichrnis half-owned by the Toshiba Corporation, was found to havernsold sensitive technology to the Soviet Union—technologyrnthat would allow Soviet submarines to escape detection byrnthe United States Navy. Congressional reaction was swiftrnand fierce: in June 1987, the Senate voted 92 to 5 to imposernsanctions on Toshiba and the House was prepared to ban thernsale of all Toshiba components in the United States for twornyears.rnThe principal way the Japanese lobby beat these sanctionsrnwas to get American companies that were dependent onrnToshiba for products or sales to lobby on its behalf. Thus,rndozens of U.S. companies used their Washington lobbyistsrnon liehalf of Toshiba—because they, like so many Americanrnhigh-tech companies, simply could not do business withoutrnToshiba’s components. In a textbook example of “leveragernlobbying,” Toshiba, the Japanese supplier, used the leverage ofrnits strategic components to get its American customers tornlobby Congress on its behalf. The American companies hadrnbecome Toshiba’s captive competitors.rnAccording to former House Speaker Tip O’Neill, all politicsrnis local. It is a principle that the Japanese have beenrnquick to grasp, building an extensive coast-to-eoast network ofrnpolitics at the grass-roots level across America. And it is arnprinciple best put into practice by the Electronic IndustriesrnAssociation of Japan (EIAJ) and Sony’s Akio Morita.rnIn a June 1985 presentation to the EIAJ, which is made uprnof Japan’s 600 largest electronics companies, Morita explainedrnthat American criticism of Japan “is not due to a misunderstandingrnof and prejudice against Japan, but rather to certainrnpolitical intentions.” In response, Morita said, Japan neededrnto mount a grass-roots political campaign in the United States,rna campaign that “should not stop with PR within the electronicsrnindustry, but . . . should expand PR activities to thernmass media, consumer groups, and political groups on thernstate level.”rnGoing further, Morita next laid out an extensive list of politicalrnactivities for the EIAJ. The program would consist of:rnmanaging debates and seminars at the state and local levels;rnstaging local events with Japanese plants and factories; publishingrnlocal newsletters and magazines; creating exchangernprograms with state universities and think-tanks; establishingrnlinks with state economic development offices, local chambersrnof commerce, and the local offices of federal elected officials;rnorganizing exchanges with consumer groups at the local level;rnand operating student exchanges. To weld the campaign intorna coherent whole, Morita proposed a unified message thatrnwould be repeated in every locality: Japanese investment createsrnjobs; Japanese companies rebuild America’s depressedrncommunities; Japanese companies satisfy American consumers;rnthe Japanese and American economies are intertwined.rnIn 1988, the Keidanren—Japan’s big-business lobby—withrnMorita again in the lead, formed the Council for Better Investmentrnin the United States, later renamed the Council forrnBetter Corporate Citizenship in the United States, an organizationrnwith the avowed purpose of helping Japanese companiesrnbecome fully integrated “into American society.” The nationwiderneffort aims to win public favor and goodwill throughrna massive program of charitable donations and highly visiblernpublic relations activities. What makes the donations troubling,rnhowever, is the fact that Japanese companies have norntradition of charitable giving, either at home or abroad. Theyrngenerally combine charity and political contributions intornone accounting line on the balance sheet. Now the Japaneserngovernment is pressuring them to make large, public contributionsrnto defuse the mounting hostility in the United Statesrntoward Japan’s predatory practices and growing trade surplus.rnThe mission of Japanese propaganda is simple: to persuadernAmericans to adopt favorable views toward Japan.rnThrough propaganda and the endless repetition of its messages,rnthe Japanese have successfully stifled criticism of theirrnown nationalistic approach to economics and shaped the prevailingrnview of Japan and global economics.rnJapanese propaganda is effective primarily because it is deliveredrnby highly credible spokespersons—most of them Americans.rnSome are long-standing experts on Japan, dubbed thernChrysanthemum Club by their critics; others are academies,rnmembers of think-tanks, and journalists, often with a freetradernideological bent. While most of them hold their viewsrnhonestly, almost all are stroked, supported, and promoted byrnthe Japanese, who recognize the enormous value of havingrnearnest American defenders who will make Japan’s case.rnAlso in the foreign policy category of ChrysanthemumrnClub members are entrenched Defense Department officials,rnunreconstructed Cold War warriors who give little weight torngeoeconomies and continue to place enormous emphasis onrnthe importance of maintaining American military bases inrnJapan. To them, national security is defined only in militaryrnterms; economic friction should not be permitted to jeopardizernthe geopolitics of the American-Japanese relationship.rnOther members of the club are free-trade ideologues andrnAmerican corporate leaders who do not want to see criticismrnof Japan change the existing rules of commerce between therntwo nations.rnA second major instrument for Japanese propaganda disseminationrnis American universities and think-tanks, a majorityrnof which depend on significant Japanese funding andrn22/CHRONICLESrnrnrn