before the French Revolution, the wordnhad no political definition. Revolutionndenoted circularity and was frequentlynapplied to the movement of celestialnbodies. In the 17th century revolutionnacquired a political meaning but retainednthe element of circularity. HencenSamuel Johnson in his celebrated dictionaryndefined revolution in one sensenas “a change in the state of government,”nfor the example he clearly hadnin mind was the Glorious Revolutionnand the return of legitimate governmentnin England under William of Orange.nFrance’s revolution, as Edmund Burkensaw to his horror early on, was a “compleatnrevolution” or “innovation,” qualitativelyndifl-erent in its conscious use ofncollective violence to remake society,nroot and branch, and he contrasted itnunfavorably not only with the GloriousnRevolution but the American Revolutionnas well. From the time of Burke’snreflections to that of Davis’s many keennobservers, and not exclusively conservatives,nhave found the contrasts so strikingnthat they have questioned whethernthe American Revolution was a revolutionnat all. Indeed, some have gone sonfar as to argue that what began in 1776nwas essentially a conservative movement.nDavis quickly raises the question andneventually relates it to various waysnspecific individuals and social groups innthe United States have had their valuesnconfirmed or denied by foreign revolutions,nespecially the great French Revolution.nThe Founding Fathers, as Davisnacknowledges, lacked Burke’s perspicacity.nEven after regicide and the Rednterror, most of them continued to looknwith affinity on what was happening innFrance. Not until the fierce debates inn1795 over Jay’s Treaty had passed didnconspicuous defections from the prevailingnview begin to mount.nWhy this ovedong embrace? In partsnone and two Davis argues that religiousnmillennialism and the language ofnequality conspired to cloud public judgment.nReligious millennialism fosterednwhat Davis calls the “illusion of anninevitable and predictable sequence ofnevents,” the naive hope that despite itsnbloody excesses and betrayed promises,nthe French Revolution would eventuallynconform to the American trajectory.nWith its inherent ability to relocatenquickly sources of evil, millennialismnprovided justification for the extremesnof destruction and carnage. To make hisnpoint Davis retells John Adams’nstory — a wonderful allegory for ournown times — about the famed chemistnand French hotspur Joseph’ Priestley.nWhen after the execution of LouisnXVI, Adams challenged him point bynpoint to provide the empirical evidencenthat the French Revolution was fightingnfor the cause of all mankind, Priestleyncould not readily do so. To save himselfnfrom further strikes, he fell back onnrevelation and prophecy. Similarly,nThomas Jefferson, in a letter to Madamend’Enville, reassured her that despitenthe “horrors” that were attendingnthe onset of the French Revolution, thennew government “would approximatenus more to one another. . . . But thenway to heaven, you know, has alwaysnbeen said to be strewed with thorns.”nBelatedly, in 1816, Jefferson wouldnconcede to Adams that Adams’ “prophecies”nabout the French Revolution hadnbeen truer than his own.nAt the end of the 18th centurynequality, while a staple part of a shared,ntrans-Atlantic revolutionary vocabulary,npossessed multiple and ambiguousnmeanings. Davis convincingly arguesnthat while some overlap in meaningnexisted, enough to delude revolutionariesnon both sides and to present futurenslaveholders with intractable problems,ngeneral usage of equality in revolutionarynAmerica and France grew apartnbecause each revolution germinated innquite different soils. The overthrow ofnFrance’s feudal system necessarilynequated liberty and equality for somentime. In a strongly seigneurial society,nfreedom would entail an immediatenleveling of status between the lower andnupper ranks of society. America’s revolutionaries,nwithout this ponderous feudalnbaggage, wanted to preserve’ fromnarbitrary power what French commonersnhad yet to attain. In this sense thenAmerican Revolution was conservative.nFrom the start Americans generallynproved far better positioned in theirnsociety to “intuit” natural equality andnthen move quickly beyond to claimnother meanings, such as equality ofnopportunity. Consequently, the excessesnof the French Revolution might benexplained by the effort required tonbreach a still formidable, if decaying,nsocial order to which Americans werenlargely unaccustomed. As one acutenFrench observer told Thomas Jeffersonnin 1790, “the characteristic diflFerencenr REVOLUTION DERAILEDnREGULATIinTHE (NDBFENDENT lNSTiTUT8nThe^ INDEPENDENTnINSTITUTEnAvailable a I better bookstores or order bynmail and receive the complete catalog:nIn 1980, there was popular belief thatnthe size of govemment would be cut. •nHowever, the growth of the federalnbudget has continued and no agenciesnhave been phased out. Ranging fromnantitrust and telecommunications tontrade and public lands, this booknanalyzes the incentives in Washingtonnand policies that failed and succeeded.n”The best hook on Reagan’s overall regulatorynrelief ejfon. Regulation and the Reagan Erandescribes what happens when the rubber of thenacademic scribblers hits the road of agencynrecalcitrance.”n—JAMES C. MILLER, IIInFormer DirectornOffice of Management and Budgetn”Regulation and the Reagan Era is not onlynvery sound analysis and good political advice,nbut it is readable.”n—GORDON TULLOCKnProfessor of Economics and PoliticalnScience, University of Arizonan6 Figures • 6 Tables • Index • 304 pages. Paperback, Item #6065n$19.95 plus postage ($2.00 per book; CA residents add Sales Tax)nORDER TOLL FREE 1-800-927-8733nCredit card orders only. 24 hours a day.nThe Independent Institute, Dept. AAl, 134 Ninety-Eighth Avenue, Oakland, CA 94603nnnJULY 1991/33n