American policy toward EasternnEurope was a mixture of naivete and resignation.nRoosevelt was sincerely opposed,nin the Wilsonian tradition, to settingnup spheres of influence—^British ornSoviet—in the Balkans. His hopes restednwith the United Nations and democraticnself-determination—a peace whichnwould be stable because it was just.nWhen it became obvious that the RednArmy was going to impose a differentnregime and that nothing short of warncould break Soviet control, Rooseveltnaccepted this without strong protest,nhoping to keep good relations with Moscownso that cooperation could continuenelsewhere. Recognition that the U.S.S.R.nhad valid security interests in EasternnEurope made this policy palatable.nThe delay in realizing the extent ofnSoviet aims appears to stem from thenfact that Roosevelt’s liberal entouragencould not envision the push for democracynin the East being considered a threatnby Moscow. Moscow was naturally afraidnof a renewal of fascism, but was not supposednto be afraid of democracy. Whilenmost of the contributors (especiallynKennan and Richard T. Davies, who wasnin Poland) make the point that the Sovietsnwanted subservient communistnneighbors, the further conclusion thatnMoscow considers democracy itself tonbe an enemy is glanced over. The implicationnof such a conclusion is grave sincenit supports the fear of many that the Sovietsnwill never feel secure until democracynis extinguished everywhere in Europe.nJohn A. Armitage, who watched thenSoviets subvert Czechoslovakia, makesnthe point that Soviet ambitions extendednfer beyond concern for secure Europeannborders. Czechoslovakia is not on thenSoviet border, was not part of the fascistnalliance but a victim of nazi aggression,nand was not occupied by the Red Armynat the time of the communist coup inn1948. The communist insurgency innGreece and the attempted Soviet expansionninto northern Iran are othernexamples.nAs for American use of “atomic diplomacy”nto forcibly restrain Soviet influ­n12 inChronicles of Culturenence, none of the contributors saw anynexamples of it. At most, the atomicnbomb was a backup for the containmentnpolicy. Cyril Black, whose vantage pointnwas Bulgaria, and Kennan are particularlyncritical of the atomic-diplomacynargument, Kennan supporting the opinionnof Robert James Maddox that thenRevisionist argument is based on faultynscholarship. The liberal-radical debatenon “atomic diplomacy” has alwaysnseemed odd. The radicals claim thatnAmerica sinned by using its advantagen(or trying to) against Soviet expansionnwhile the liberals claim that Americanwas virtuous by not using its advantage.nvine of the lessons Stalin is said tonhave learned from his experiences innthe Russo-Polish War is that no one outsidenthe direct control of Moscow couldnbe trusted, not even other communists.nThis was due to the failure of the leftistsnin Poland to rise up in support of the RednArmy in 1920. Stalin had an even strongernexperience in this regard with Tito. Thisndesire for dfrect control has been passednon to Stalin’s hefrs in the Kremlin andnfinds its expression in the BrezhnevnDoctrine, in the Hungarian, Czech, andn111 die Idrtlicoiniiii} issue (>1 ( hnmick’s off uUun:nConservative Wisdom &nModern Culturen>Miliim ^iiiiii ilidi isuiiiiii iiK’«^-im M. IMXInIII iiiiiMhisIn (Hislu Jiiut i>l IIK tiiriTdr. SIIIIL Kisitiiiiinmillsiiiiiiivipulir>-Miiliiils 111(1 Mdiilis VXi liiM pimiitiiinIH |IIIiiit.rsliiinl,tcivil {Misiiii mil Insnn i il imiHr-iuxisniiluri iiiiiUh tliffiiiiiK. Ill upiiil iitci iiiin.iiln inillriLniii<|iiiri isiliiKk J W’liiiiii tvi h>M I s i i,)iiM I’H.nliiiPLii inui iiuiphi II nil.s>lilt lliil will [iiil iLssiiiipliisisniinI .tpiMlisiiis imnis iihl insisi inmi tinnur iluhf innliimiii! Ill I pjiii rn UH .I nu iiiii»;liil LMSII niul tuniHiiii.ninili.ii is I u I lUiju (1 pliiliisi)ph t’A Ilk-n-fn>iii du’ I ditor’s ( oinnifntnIn 1 copt)k11>rinandnMSCRnOpinions & icws—( oninii’tulabks’^ln I (K-USnI’cncplibles—”^iLsteof Monc>—llu.’ incri(.an Pn>S(.cniuninSUist’—StreOn—^.rt—Music—K orrcspoiidtiu cnLiberal CulturLv—SiK.ial Kc^stet*—JtiuntjlisinnIn M> Solitude—Pok’tiiics& pMhaoKesnnn