AfghaQ Interventions, and certainly innthe break with China.nSeveral of the contributors to ThenSino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspectiventrace the split betvi^een the twonlargest conunnnist states to Mao Tsetung’snbelief that he, not Khrushchev,nwas the true heir of the “socialist camp”nafter Stalin’s death. The Soviet Premier,nhowever, took for granted that thenU.S.S.R. was the dominant power. Thisnsplit, which ideologically widened asneach center attempted to prove its claimnin terms of Marxist doctrine, severed thenonly Mnk connecting the two nations. AsnCIA analyst Paul Borsuk points out in hisnessay, there is no historical precedent bynwhich to judge Soviet-Chinese relations.nThe two powers met in a haphazard waynin an undefined borderland at a timenwhen both governments were in decay.nA period of wars and revolutions was followednby a brief period of cooperationnlacking any real cultural, economic, orneven political base. Not until the pastntwo decades did the two powers faceneach other both as unified and independentnstates. The implications of this confl-ontationnare explored in the collectionnof essays.nThe assumption imderlying all of thenessays is that the Soviet-Chinese split isnso serious that a rapprochement is notnlikely. The Soviets see the Chinese as anMongol horde gone nazi, and the Chinesen”social ownership” of the means of productionnas an elitist state ownership innthe service of an overpopulated countrynseeking living space by expansion intonSiberia. Soviet fears are reinforced by anrace hatred. Chiaese leaders believenthat the Soviets wiU never accept annequal relationship with any other nationnand that, if given a chance, Moscownwould use the Brezhnev Doctrine to imposena compliant government on China.nThe movement of 700,000 Soviet troopsnto the Chinese border is deemed a greaternthreat than the Soviet nuclear arsenalnChinese strategists consider the army asnthe only force that can occupy territorynand dictate politics. Indeed, the militarizationnof the dispute, which has lastednfor more than a decade, places the Sino-nSoviet dispute on a level of tension ^hichnhas no equal in Sino-American relations.n(The Chinese do not consider the U.S.nan active military threat.)nNone of the authors see the militaryndimension receding; most of them includensome discussion of open militarynconflict Even the economic essays fiDCusnon the military potential of the Sovietnand Chinese systems. Dwight Perkins ofnHarvard raises the controversial conclusionnthat China will reach somethingnakin to military parity with the U.S.S.R.nby the century’s end. Perkins’s case isnbased, briefly, on compounding. If thenSoviet economy stays at its current threenpercent per year growth while thenChinese manage seven percent, thenChinese GNP will be 86 percent of SovietnGNP by the year 2000. If the Chinesenfollow the Soviet example of pouringnmost of this growth into military forces,nthey should gain superiority at leastnover anything the Soviets could afford tondeploy in Asia. There are problems withnthis scheme. Perkins takes as his frame ofnreference the economic growth rates ofnJapan and South Korea. However, hendoes so without mentioning the fiindamentalndifferences between the capitalistneconomies of Japan and South Koreanand the socialist economy of China.nEven with reforms, China is not likely tonnnfree its economy to the point at whichnthe fijll benefits of entreprenuerial enterprisencan be obtained. Reference to thensuccess of the overseas Chinese in Singaporenor Hong Kong fails on the samenground. Also, if the Chinese do divertnthe fruits of growth to military programsnas the Soviets do, they will suffer thensame negative effects on future growth.nThe effect vsoll probably be worse sincenthe supply of scientists and engineers innChina is smaller and the diversion ofntheir skills more keenly felt. By Perkins’snown calculations, if Chinese growthnaverages only five percent (still twonpoints higher than Soviet growth) thenChinese will have less than 60 percentnof the Soviet GNP by 2000 and the weaponsnthey can build will still be technologicallyninferior to those of the Soviets.nThe Chinese could buy modemnweapons, but that would mean spendingnscarce foreign exchange needed tonimport capital goods and technology forngrowth. Jonathan Pollack of Rand suggestsnanother option: “sit on the mountainnand watch the tigers fight,” meaning,nhope for other diversions of Sovietnefforts, such as heightened tensionsnwith the U.S. or problems in EasternnEurope, or South Asia, or the MiddlenEast, which would provide time fornChinese modernization. Chinese strengthnand reliability are central to the debatenover U.S. policy towards China. Thenview that China is a powerftil asset thatnmight be lost if the U.S. does not makensufficient concessions seems at the heartnof current policy. However, China alsonneeds the U.S. if it is to modernize in thenfece of Soviet pressure. Sino-Soviet antagonismndeveloped long before the normalizationnof U.S.-China relations. Thendiversion of rougjily one-quarter ofnSoviet ground forces and tactical airnpower to Asia is important, but it alsonpredates U.S. normalization with China.nAmerican leaders need to realize thatnthey are in the stronger bargaining positionnThey do not have to sell out an oldnand tested ally like Taiwan in order toncooperate with Peking or to profit fromnthe Sino-Soviet conflict.nil3nJune 1983n