luded with the officials who could pay them off or promoterntheir careers. Upright cidzens could be falsely accused of treason,rnwhile real plotters remained unhindered.rnFor centuries after the Goth “immigrahon,” Rome declinedrnin size and importance. Throughout medieval times, rivalsrnfor the papacy and Roman noble families employed cloakand-rndagger techniques against each other, but the first figure ofrnJames Bond’s caliber is Cardinal Alessandro Albani (1692-rn1779), known as England’s spy in the Vatican.rnA cultivated man whose passion for classical antiquitiesrnmade him one of the outstanding collectors in Europe, iAJbanirnestablished a lifelong friendship with Philip von Stosch, a celebratedrnart collector. Stosch was a spy for the English government,rnwhich was anxious to learn the plots hatched in the courtrnof James III, the “Old Pretender” to the British throne. Jamesrnhad taken refuge in Rome, holding court in exile under papalrnprotection. Stosch recruited .lbani to obtain information onrnthe Old Pretender’s court and the activities of visiting Jacobites.rnAt first, the cardinal was reluctant to betrav Pope Benedictrnand to undermine his allegiance to the Stuarts. Vanity and ambitionrnintenened when Benedict, heeding warnings that Albanirnwas not to be trusted, denied him the post of prefect of thernsignature. Those warnings became a self-fulfilling prophecy:rnAlbani became a willing spy for the English.rnAlbani often met with wealthy English collectors, who furnishedrnhim with an additional source of information on the undergroundrnactivities of the Jacobites. He established a nehvorkrnof spies that, in 1744, reported that James’ son, Bonnie PrincernCharlie, was gathering troops to invade his ancestral land. Therncardinal informed the English, who were ready when thernprince landed in Scotland in 1745. With the Jacobite causernlost, jlbani rose in power and, in concert with the English, wasrnable to persuade the Vatican to revoke its recognition of thernHouse of Stuart.rnThe Vatican has been a major point of interest for foreignrnspies ever since. Nazi Germanv considered the CatholicrnChurch a threat to its domestic securit)’ and its internationalrnambitions. In Cermany, Hitler’s agents successfully recruitedrninformants to provide intelligence on Church finances and thernpolitical views and activities of bishops, priests, and layrnCatholics. In Rome, however, German attempts to penetraternthe papac}’ were less effective, though the German code-breakingrnoperation was successful: The Nazis systematically intercepted,rndecoded, and read secret communications between thernpope and his representatives worldwide.rnOne of the most interesting espionage operations in WorldrnWar Il-era Rome was the so-called “ratiines” network that providedrnforged passports, shelter, money, and transport for thousandsrnof fugitive Nazis and their collaborators fleeing Europe.rnTliis highly secreti’e operation was negotiated between AllenrnDulles —then senior wartime OSS officer in Switzerland, laterrnto become director of the CIA—and SS Gen. Karl Wolff. Thisrnworldly, debonair, and well-connected SS officer—not at allrnyour Hollywood German —commanded the SS and Gestaporncontingents in Italy. By the summer of 1944, he could see thernwriting on the wall. The result was an agreement affordingrnamnesty to SS and related personnel in exchange for theirrnpromised support of the West in the anticipated Cold War.rnAs British and U.S. intelligence officials scoured Europe,rnseeking to apprehend Nazis wanted on war-crimes charges,rntheir colleagues were helping them escape. Some 30,000 menrnfound sanctuary (mostly in South America), including somerndistinctly nasty characters: Klaus Barbie, Eugen Kvaternik,rnFranz Stangl, Ante Pavelic, Adolf Eichmann, Andrija Artukovic,rnand Josef Mengele.rnFunding for this operation came largely from gold and otherrnliquid assets looted by the Nazis’ Croatian collaborators, the Ustashi,rnfrom their hundreds of thousands of Serbian and Jewishrnvictims. The key Roman institution providing logistical supportrnfor the operation was the Croatian-run Institute of St. Jerome —rna hotbed of atavistic ethnic hatred hiding behind the facade ofrna religious institution. It brought discredit and embarrassmentrnto the Vatican with its freelance operations from 1945 to 1947.rnA report released by the U.S. State Department in 1998 providesrnconclusive evidence that Swiss banks were not the only facilitiesrnused to channel looted funds. Relying on recently declassifiedrnU.S. government documents, it identified thernVatican’s financial institutions as a key postwar repository usedrnb}’ the Ustashi.rnThe Vatican denied the accusations when they first surfacedrnin the summer of 1997: “There is no basis in realit)’ to the reports,”rnsaid Vatican spokesman Joaquin Navarro-Vails. Theyrnwere based on anonymous sources “whose reliability is morernthan dubious.” But two weeks later, the Associated Press reportedrnthat this denial was contradicted by an internal U.S.rnTreasur)’ Department memorandum that had been sealed forrn50 years. “Approximately 200 million Swiss francs was originallyrnheld in the Vatican for safekeeping,” says the October 21,rn1946, memo from Treasur’ agent Emerson Bigelow to the directorrnof monetary research. Other documents, declassified onrnthe last day of 1996 (under the 50-year rule), established thatrnBigelow had received confirmation from the OSS that a considerablernportion of the Ustasha money was sent to Spain andrnArgentina through the “pipeline.”rnBut there was one American intelligence operative in Romernwho did not want to let the cat out of the bag. In 1944, JamesrnJesus Angleton, a 26-year-old second lieutenant in the X-2rncounterespionage branch of the OSS, arrived in Italy. He hadrnspent the better part of his adolescence there, spoke the languagernfluently, and understood its culture and instihitions. Angletonrnproved an adept field operative, himting down agents leftrnbehind by the retreating Germans. His rise to the top of allrnAmerican secret activit)’ in Italy paralleled a remarkable expansionrnof U.S. intelligence capabilities.rnBy the end of 1946, Angleton had recruited over 50 informantsrnand penetrated seven foreign intelligence services, includingrnTito’s OZNA, the French Service de DocumentationrnExterieure et de Contreespionage, and the Italian agencies. Thernprofessional skills of the man who would come to dominaternAmerican counterespionage for a generation —for good andrnill—were honed in Italy.rnAngleton’s network was as inexpensive as it was productive.rnHe reported in late 1945 that he did not pay for an^’thing that hernreceived from the Italian Intelligence Service. B’ giving themrnsome cigarettes or other cheap goods, he could gratify his Italianrncounterparts without humiliating them. As Angleton wrote inrnone of his general reports: “A few such items represent thernequivalent of a month’s pay to an Italian Intelligence officer. Inrnpractice, $500 worth of operational supplies has the operationalrnvalue of $50,000 worth or more. This method of payment isrngenerally in use by other intelligence services.”rnAngleton sought key informants not among conser’ative traditionalistsrnbut among anti-monarchist Italian political radicalsrnMAY 2001/21rnrnrn