didate.rnWhether or not the self-styled “billionairernpopulist” eonsciously sought thernrole, he has inherited the mantle of leadershiprnfor disaffected Middle Americans.rnThev had first appeared as a powerfulrnforce on the nation’s political landscapernwith the 1968 presidential candidacy ofrnGeorge Wallace, who managed, withoutrnanv formal organizational structure,rnto attain 13.5 percent of the total nationalrnvote.rnIn 1992, Middle Americans reappearedrnon the center stage of Americanrnpolitics. Their role both in 1994 andrn1996 may prove to be a critical one. Asrnan autonomous force whose allegiancernto both major political parties is weakrnor nonexistent, their destiny may be tornact as the catalyst for the major restructuringrnor even the abolition of ourrnpresent partv system.rnIWo decades ago Wallace supportersrnwere described as being irrational working-rnclass authoritarians whose rejectionrnof the Establishment candidates (in thatrninstance George McGovern and RichardrnNixon) v’as greeted with derision by virtuallyrnall of the mainstream political analysts.rnWhen Michigan’s primary sawrnWallace triumph over the opposition ofrnUAW leaders and liberal Democrats, therndevelopment was viewed as a politicalrnanomolv, when it was in fact the beginningrnof a major political realignmentrnacross the nation.rnIn the wake of these events of 20 yearsrnago, I coined the term “Middle AmericanrnRadicals,” or MARs. I’he peculiarrnvolatility of MARs, their adherence tornelements of leftist and rightist ideology,rnled Establishment politicians to definerntheir politics as a passing expression ofrnprotest or “irrational” frustration andrnfear. As a dangerous “other,” they havernbeen regarded as an alien presence withinrnthe normal body politic.rnYet my research has developed a descriptionrnof MAR ideology that suggestsrna cjuite rational belief system: MARsrnview the verv rich and the very poor asrnsimultaneously responsible for theirrnproblems. On some issues, they are likelyrnto take a liberal stand, and on othersrna conservative one. Their behavior mayrntherefore appear irrational to anyone assumingrnthat only the liberal-conservativerndistinction is rational.rnA MAR, then, is essentially anyonernwho views his own well-being as threatenedrnby a combination of economicrnelites on the one liand and governmentalrnfavoritism directed toward ethnic minoritiesrnon the other. While the DemocraticrnParty is the embodiment of thernlatter syndrome. Republicans are seen asrnreflecting the former commitment. Givenrnthis “double squeeze,” MARs becomerna highly volatile political group,rnwhich, when aroused, may provide a criticalrnswing-vote in national elections.rnThere is strong and consistent evidencernthat, in the past two decades, andrnespecially since 1987, a growing proportionrnof the American electorate holdsrnexactly the beliefs enumerated above.rnThe Times-Mirror election surveys,rnwhich employ a typology of voters thatrnmost elosesly resembles MARs, reflectrnthe growth in this constituency: from 7rnpercent in the fall of 1987 to 15 percentrnon the eve of the November 1992 election.rnThis segment of the public, whichrnthe T-M organization describes as “economicallyrnpressured,” indicates they feelrnunrepresented and do not trust politicalrnofficials. Nearly half of this grouprnexpressed a preference for Ross Perotrnwhen he first entered the presidential racernin May of last year. Five months later,rnwhen the Texan had withdrawn fromrnactive campaigning, 15 percent remainedrnsupporters. This figure climbedrnto just under one in three when Perotrnreentered the political fray.rnRoss Perot blasted a path through therndemographic center of American society.rnHis candidacy was nothing short ofrna political revolution. Among the largestrnand fastest-growing segments of thernelectorate—young independent-mindedrnvoters—Perot’s support often equaledrnor exceeded that of the sitting President.rnWhat has become clear from exit-pollrninformation and preelection surveys wasrnthat Ross Perot, not Bill Glinton, heldrncenter-stage for most of the electorate.rnPerot may have lost enormous supportrnwith the Samurai-like stroke of removingrnhimself from active campaigning, butrnhis reentry focused the attention of millionsrnof citizens on the campaign andrneventually prodded them to cast theirrnvotes.rnFollowing Perot’s prodigal return fourrnweeks prior to the November election,rnand up until the last day of polling, therernwas a tendency to underestimate hisrnstrength with the electorate. Yet, a perusalrnof the campaign numbers from today’srnvantage point shows that what occurredrnlast fall was nothing short of arnpolitical disaster for both major politicalrnparties. The 42nd President of thernUnited States gained his office by obtainingrnthe support of barely one-fourthrnof the potential electorate of the nation!rnPerhaps most significant was the impactrnof the Perot candidacy on the nonvoter.rnWhile overall voting rose only arnmodest 4 percent, the evidence gleanedrnfrom state-by-state comparisons showsrnthat of those 25 states where voting wasrnsignificantly above the national averagern(59 percent or higher), in 22 instancesrnthe Perot vote was also markedly abovernhis overall percentage. In those statesrnwith average or below-average votingrnlevels, the Perot total was also averagernor lower. In the state of Maine, whichrnshowed the sharpest rise in voting comparedrnto 1988 (an 11 percent increase),rnPerot had his highest level of support:rn30 percent. In the highly populousrnstates of Galifornia, New York, andrnTexas, voting was not much higher thanrnin 1988. Perot’s figures in these statesrn(21, 16, and 22 percent, respectively)rnprevented what might have indeed beenrna dismal turnout.rnMedia attacks on both the entrancernand exit of Perot from the presidentialrnrace were highly consistent, stressing hisrnlack of sophistication, failure to “playrnby the rules,” and general unpredictability.rnInitially, Bush and Clinton forcesrnoffered resounding criticism of the antidemocraticrnaspects of the billionaire’srncampaign as well as of his allegedly misguidedrnfollowers. Yet with Perot’s departure,rnthey had nothiirg but praise forrnhis volunteers, as the very vanguard ofrntheir own more timid and conventionalrnefforts to mobilize citizens.rnAs an “undeclared” candidate, RossrnPerot’s standing in national polls peakedrnin early June at 36 percent, comparedrnto Bush’s 31 and Glinton’s 27 percent.rnMore importantly, Perot’s support wasrngarnered from precisely the two groupsrnthat had formed the core of the nonvotersrnof the past two decades. Of the “disaffected”rn—as they are referred to byrnTimes-Mirror and who are comparablernto our definition of MARs—49 percentrnreported they were supporters of RossrnPerot, as well as 39 percent of “bystanders”rn(persons who have a history ofrnsitting out elections). Not only was thisrna higher level than that found amongrnthe other sample groupings, but whenrnqueried on a two-way race of Bush andrnClinton, 26 percent of the “disaffected”rnand 19 percent of the “bystanders” reportedrnhaving no choice for President—rnfar more than among the other types ofrnAPRIL 1993/49rnrnrn