The systematic and deliberate destructionrnof the Yugoslav democratic revivalrnby the “international community” and itsrnBelgrade minions following the fall ofrnSlobodan Milosevic may not be the mostrnimportant news unfit to print of the year,rnbut it is certainly the biggest untold story.rnAs we approach the anniversary of thisrnevent, the hme has come to tell it as it is.rnhi July 2000, the Democratic Oppositionrnof Serbia {Demokratska opozicija Srbije,rnDOS)—a loose coalition of 18 largelyrninsignificant parties —selected Dr.rnVojislav Kostunica as its presidential candidaternagainst the incumbent, SlobodanrnMilosevic, who had called an election forrnSeptember 24. This decision was a strokernof genius: Unlike the rest of DOS, Kostunicarnand his party {Demokratska strankarnSrhije, DSS) were neither “pro-Western”rnnor tainted by previous dealings with thernMilosevic regime. His blend of legalism,rnunderstated patriotism, and rejection ofrnany compromise with the neocommunistrnestablishment had struck a chordrnwith the majority of voters. During therncampaign, Kostunica’s modesty and integrityrn(his slogan: “I can look you in therneye!”) proved to be his greatest assetrnagainst a corrupt regime that had run outrnof tricks. Kostunica’s victory—disputedrnby Milosevic, and sealed by the wave ofrnstreet protests that soon swept over Serbiarn—also proved to be a meal ticket forrnthe rest of the DOS. Democracy seemedrnto have triumphed yet again.rnThe U.S. administration had clearlyrnhoped for a Milosevic victory. It wouldrnhave provided conhnued justification forrna simplistic yet effechve anti-Serb policyrnin the Balkans—hence, a stream of preelectionrn”leaks” from Washington aboutrnthe millions of dollars given to the oppositionrnin Serbia. This played right intornMilosevic’s hands by ostensibly confirmingrnhis constant theme: The oppositionrnwas in the pay of the NATO powers thatrnhad bombed the country only two yearsrnpreviously. Worse still, those claims wererntrue—but most Serbs, hred of Milosevic’srnlong road to nowhere, either chose not tornbelieve what looked like the regime’s blackrnpropaganda or decided to tnist Kostunicarnto keep the would-be quislings at bay.rnAfter the eleehon, and with Milosevic’srnfall imminent, the United States’rnplan B was to neutralize Kostunica by en-rn^igns of th£ liriiiiesrn”All the News Unfit to Print”rnsuring that the levers of real power wentrnto the recipients of the Western largesse.rnThe key player in this scheme was thernpresent prime minister of Serbia, ZoranrnDjindjic, the leader of the small but influentialrnDemocratic Party {Demokratskarnstranka, DS). Djindjic and his party werernthe Serbian variety of similar politicalrngroupings all over Eastern Europe:rnsharply dressed, technocratic, nouveaurichernyuppie-wannabes, explicitly postnationalrnand committed to “the internahonalrncommunity” —U.N. tribunals, gayrnrights, IMF-dictated privatizations andrnall. In Belgrade, their obedience was tornbe measured primarily by their eagernessrnto comply with the demands of ThernHague’s war-crimes tribunal. The commonrngoal of the Djindjic-led “pro-Westerners”rnand their foreign mentors was tornuse Kostimica to take over the castle, retainingrnhim as its nominal master duringrnthe transition.rnKostunica’s challenge was clear: Hernmust be himself—fair but firm with therndefeated Socialists, flexible in his dealingsrnwith the outside world but uncompromisingrnon the key issues of Serbia’srndignity and sovereignty—amidst a eoali-rnHon of cynical manipulators (Djindjic)rnand lightweights (the rest of DOS) whornhad no credibility with the people andrnwho, therefore, sought to outbid eachrnother in currying the favor of the West.rnDevoid of much eonsfituhonal authorityrnfrom the outset, the president of Yugoslaviarnhad to depend on his savvy andrnon the quality of his immediate team tornturn his huge personal popularity intornthe only currency of politics: power.rnDjindjic’s task was even trickier. Tornbring down Milosevic, he had to risk givingrnKostunica a straight flush; but afterrnthe job was done, he had to try to takernthose cards back, one by one. He neededrnto neutralize the danger of Kostunica discoveringrnhis potential as the undisputedrnnational leader, and to preempt himrnabroad by promising more than Kostunicarn—or, indeed, any self-respectingrnSerb—would ever be willing to deliver.rnWliile never overstepping the mark in hisrndealings with Kostunica in those earlyrndays—and thus preserving the illusion ofrnthe new team’s unity —Djindjic embarkedrnon a short, sharp march throughrnthe institutions. The stiategy was dividedrninto three phases, and it has worked brilliantly.rnThe first phase (October 5, 2000,rnthrough December 23) was that of consolidation.rnDjindjic saw an opening inrnthe fact that, in the chaotic aftermath ofrnMilosevic’s downfall, the only ostensiblyrnfunctional state institLition was the federalrnpresidency. Djindjic shrewdly let Koshinicarnmicromanage dozens of tasks largernand small, absorbing himself in a whirlwindrnof activity. A prominent Belgradernlawyer says that Kostunica’s opponentsrnknew what they were doing:rnDjindjic counted on Kostunica’srnproverbial scruples to inhibit himrnfrom promoting his own friendsrnand supporters—so much so that,rnin the ensuing scramble for positionsrnand favors, it was, paradoxically,rnsomething of a liability to be perceivedrnas “his man.” In the earlyrnweeks, Kostunica stole the limelightrnwith his foreign tiips. He did notrnsee that he was ensnared into a ruinousrn18-hour work schedule whilernDjindjic took contiol over one keyrninstitution after another.rnBy the end of October, Djindjic’s revolutionaryrndevice of ostensibly spontaneousrn”crisis committees” had been usedrnto place his trustees in charge of all keyrnmedia outlets and Serbia’s yet-to-be-privatizedrnpublic corporations. All the majorrnfederal ministerial posts—foreign affairs,rnfinances, telecommunications,rnjustice, interior—went to NGO-linkedrnpro-Westerners or outright Djindjic allies.rnThe next task for Djindjic was to securernan institutional basis for his ever-increasingrnpower, and he set his sights onrnthe premiership of Serbia. In Yugoslavia’srnloose federation, the real powerrnrests with the two constituent republics;rnSerbia accounts for over nine-tenths ofrnthe population and economy. To attainrnhis objective, Djindjic had to cajole Kostimicarninto agreeing to keep the DOS alliancerngoing until Serbia’s parliamentaryrnelections on December 23.rnBy early November 2000, many Serbsrnwanted Kostunica to declare that DOSrnhad fulfilled its role in bringing downrnMilosevic and that it was time for itsrnmany different parties, with their incom-rnSEPTEMBER 2001/39rnrnrn