pedigree. They were unable to grasp that what they saw as arnperfectly reasonable principle—the right of all constituentrnnations of the former Yugoslavia to self-determination, Serbsrnincluded—could be rejected by the “democratic West” in favorrnof preserving arbitrarily drawn boundaries between thernrepublics. Accordingly, at different ends of the politicalrnspectrum in Serbia there existed a consensus on one point: ifrnWashington were to send a strong public signal that Milosevicrnwas an obstacle to the more balanced treatment of overall Serbrndemands and aspirations, his position would become literallyrnuntenable. The democrats were hoping for such a signal, therncommunists feared it.rnAt that moment, in mid-June 1992, came a remarkable—rnand, as it turned out, shrewd—statement from Milosevic. Hernsaid he would gladly tender his resignation, and leave politicsrnaltogether, if he believed that his departure would improve thernSerb position; but the problem—as he put it—was not himrnpersonally, but the anti-Serb policy of the United States.rnThis moment would have been eagerly exploited by an alertrnFoggy Bottom strategist, had there been any desire to weakenrnMilosevic. It would have been sufficient for James Baker, or hisrnNo. 2, Lawrence Eagleburger, to state that Mr. Milosevic wasrnquite wrong, that the United States in fact regarded the regimernin Serbia as part of the problem. Without any political price, orrnindeed commitment, it was possible to undermine Milosevicrn—possibly fatally so—^by hinting that the change at the toprnin Belgrade could contribute to a reexamination of the overallrnAmerican attitude to the Serbs in general, and to the issue of recentlyrnintroduced U.N. sanctions in particular. The effect ofrnsuch a statement at that time could have been immeasurable.rnAt the very least Milosevic would have been hard pressed to respondrnto such a challenge, and his bluff of “resignation” wouldrnhave been called. He would have been seen for what he is—arnpower-obsessive former apparatchik who is ready and willing tornsacrifice any national interest for the sake of remaining wherernhe still is today.rnWashington’s response was the exact opposite of this. In anrninterview with National Public Radio, two days after Milosevic’srnstatement. Ambassador Zimmerman said that it was “ofrnno consequence” to the United States who was in power in Serbia;rnbut that whoever it be, he would have to observe the will ofrnthe “international community,” which in Zimmerman’srnscheme of things means the United States. In effect, Zimmermanrnconfirmed and endorsed Milosevic’s claim that the problemrnwas not him per se, or his power structure, but the rigid unwillingnessrnto validate any Serb claims in Washington.rnA week later, also in June 1992, this attitude was confirmedrnwhen I attended a meeting in Washington with the assistant tornthe National Security Advisor for European Affairs, JenonernWalker. Referring to the sanctions in the context of Milosevic’srnoffer to resign, she stated that—”quite apart from Milosetheyrnwould stay in force until “all current and potential VICrnsources of conflict in the former Yugoslavia were removed,rnagreements signed and sealed, and respected by the Serbs tornthe satisfaction of the U.S. government.” Game, set, andrnmatch—Milosevic.rnMs. Walker’s boss. Brent Scowcroft, was less arrogant butrnequally frank when he said that the Bush administration “hasrnno view on the political future of Serbia,” but had somerndefinite ideas about the way the conflict should be setded. Itrnboiled down to the demand for the Serbs’ capitulation tornFranjo Tudjman in Zagreb and Alija Izetbegovic in Sarajevo.rnThis attitude provided an enormous boost to Milosevic inrnhis attempts to restabilize his regime in late 1992. At that timernhe was still pretending to be at least implicitly supportive of thernSerbs west of the Drina, in Bosnia and in the Krajina, and hisrnapologists could point to these statements from Washington asrnproof that any radical change at the helm would be detrimentalrnto the Serbs’ national interest. The American governmentrneffectively endorsed the claim of the Belgrade regimernthat “there is no alternative” to the Big Boss, and that any otherrngovernment in Serbia would have to lay prostrate, beg forrnmercy, and sign unconditional surrender—consigning the 2.5rnmillion western Serbs to the tender mercies of their enemies.rnAt the same time, Milosevic’s continued rule in Serbia wasrnused by the American media pack, led by the New York Timesrnand the foreign policy establishment in Washington, as proofrnthat the sanctions were justified and necessary, and that therncollective satanization of the Serb nation could proceed unabated.rn”The Butcher of the Balkans” made the front page ofrnseveral glossy news magazines, with stage-managed photos ofrn”concentration camps” and fact-free stories of “systematicrnrapes” inside the covers. Managed Mass Democracy was gettingrnthe Managed Mass Media it deserved.rnThe proponents of democratic change in Serbia, althoughrnsomewhat demoralized, had nevertheless continued to tryrnto get Western circles interested in a political alternative to Milosevicrn. I was involved in some of these attempts. At the endrnof July 1992,1 accompanied Crown Prince Alexander on a visitrnto Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroncy in Ottawa. Priorrnto the meeting I drafted a detailed proposal, which was presentedrnby the Crown Prince to Mulroncy, that the Canadianrngovernment invite a delegation of prominent opposition figuresrnfrom Belgrade to visit Ottawa. So, when in the course of ourrnconversation the Prime Minister asked what he could do tornhelp the cause of democracy in Serbia, we were able to presentrnhim with a very specific set of ideas.rnMulroncy eagerly endorsed the document. Immediately, inrnour presence, he dictated a memorandum to his chefdu cabinetrnfor the Ministry of External Affairs, suggesting that “representativesrnof the democratic opposition in Serbia” come to testifyrnbefore the foreign affairs committee of the Lower House. Beforernleaving we had agreed that they would be given an opportunityrnto speak not only on the situation in Serbia but also onrnthe war, and put forward the other side of the story. Evenrnthough he did not explicitly endorse our argument that sanctionsrnhit the people rather than the regime, Mulroncy seemedrnprepared to provide a platform for the proponents of democraticrnchange in Serbia who were willing to expose this view in a reasonablernand rational way.rnEncouraged by this meeting, I stayed in touch with Mulroney’srnforeign policy advisor, Paul Heinbecker, who requestedrna list of suggested names of invitees. This I duly prepared, takingrncare to include people with impeccable democratic credentials,rnfluent English and French speakers, some of whom wouldrnconsider themselves patriotic, albeit with a small “p.” All ofrnthem were truly devoid of any hint of chauvinism. It was agreedrnthat the visit should take place six to eight weeks later, in thernsecond half of September 1992.rnAfter that there was a long period of silence. Following myrnrepeated inquires by phone and fax I finally received a call fromrnOttawa in the second half of August, in which I was told thatrnthe visit was called off. The reason? Apparendy some Canadi-rn24/CHRONlCLESrnrnrn