to destroy or discredit their rivals. In thernABSCAM case, it was alleged that therndecision to target politicians in this particularrnarea reflected the Carter administration’srndesire to subvert potential supportersrnof rival candidates in thernforthcoming presidential primaries.rnThis charge was apparently without substance,rnbut the opportunity for selectiverninvestigation and prosecution is perilous.rnNor need the political implicationsrninvolve such grand national divisions,rnas is suggested by the case of MichaelrnMatthews, former mayor of AtlanticrnCity, New Jersey. During the 1980’s hernwas regarded as a close friend of the localrnMafia family and thus became the targetrnof an FBI sting operation in which hernwas caught attempting to extort moneyrnfrom a dummy corporation. So far, thisrnappears to be a simple case of detectionrnand punishment, but the next stage ofrnthe case was extraordinary. Governmentrnprosecutors offered Matthews immunityrnfrom punishment if he would agree torncontinue in office as a governmentrninformant and to gather incriminatingrninformation against his mob allies. Inrnorder to encourage him in this venture,rnprosecutors told Matthews of anotherrnNew Jersey officeholder who had made arnsimilar deal. We know about these transactionsrnonly because Matthews declinedrnthe offer and went to trial, but just howrnmany other politicians and officeholdersrnhave been placed in a similar positionrnand accepted the blandishments of arnU.S. Attorney? Are they still “in place”rntoday, serving the interests of the JusticernDepartment while deluding theirrnelectors into thinking that they are fulfillingrntheir proper mandates?rnEqually instructive is the case of thernformer head of the Teamsters union,rnJackie Presser, who from 1977 to 1986rnwas a valued FBI informant. At thisrntime, the Teamsters were a powerfulrnforce in national affairs, as one of thernfew major unions to support the RepublicanrnParty, and a generous source ofrnpolitical donations. The FBI agent inrncharge of this case has said that directrncontact with Presser ended in 1983 whenrnhe formally ascended to the presidencyrnof the union, on the praiseworthyrngrounds that subsequent links would bernpolitically improper. Were there otherrncases in which the controlling agentsrnwere not so fastidious and some or otherrnlaw enforcement agency has in effectrnbeen directing the political fortunes of arnunion or political party, a business orrnchurch? And would we know if this werernthe case? Judges and lawyers constituternanother recurrent target of recent covertrnpolicing endeavors, and compromisedrnjudges and attorneys have been recruitedrnto entrap and incriminate their colleagues,rneven to “wear a wire.” Imaginernsuch a judge, dependent for professionalrnsurvival on government goodwill, andrnask if he or she would be immune fromrngovernment pressure in any case inrnwhich the stakes were sufficiently high.rnApart from the political implications,rnthere are serious dangers implicit inrnthe basic assumptions of clandestinernpolicing, issues that never emerge in thernmedia romanticizations of the heroicrnundercover agent. It takes remarkablernfortitude to maintain a fictitious personarnday in and day out for a period ofrnmonths or years, and the psychologicalrntrauma to the individual agent can bernsevere and lasting. In the early I980’s,rnone of the most significant antiorganizedrncrime infiltrations everrnmounted was uttedy wrecked when thernagent responsible for the MIPORNrn(“Miami Pornography”) investigationrnsuffered a breakdown from his attemptrnto lead such a double life. To quote therntitle of the book on the case, he was LostrnUnder Cover, a common phenomenon.rnFurthermore, to be an infiltrator or arndefector in place requires participationrnor at least acquiescence in illegal activities,rnwhich therefore proceed with thernknowledge and consent of law enforcementrnagencies. Lesser evils are permittedrnby these agencies ostensibly forrngreater public benefits, but the “lesserrnevils” often appear quite substantial inrntheir own right. We know in retrospectrnthat in the late 1960’s, law enforcementrnagencies were effectively controlling arnsubstantial portion of the illegal drugrntraffic in major cities like New York, withrnnarcotics officers distributing drugs onrnthe streets in an attempt to penetraternillegal organizations. Usually, favoredrndealers were employed as intermediaries.rnThey received drugs, which they sold,rnand supplied information to their policerncontrols. Some, but only some, of therndrugs issued were reclaimed on arrest;rnthe remainder often passed to the dealerrnas payment. Unless the natural lawsrnof bureaucratic dynamics have been repealed,rnit is certain that a similar patternrnexists today in the urban cocaine trade.rnThis model is scarcely prepossessing,rneven if we assume that all the police officersrninvolved in the operation are ofrnthe highest integrity; the temptationsrnfor vigorous “meat-eating” corruptionrnare clearly present.rnThe same dangers apply to the wholernsystem of police informants, who are customarilyrnallowed to get away with anythingrnshort of murder so long as theyrndeliver a sufficient quota of less fortunaterncriminals to their handlers. Approvedrninformants, state-licensed gangsters,rnhave been known to set up criminalrnoperations to have them detected andrnbroken by police, so that police and informantsrnwill share benefits in the formrnof official praise and reward money. Anyrnshrewd police officer knows that thernsafest way to secure wealth from office isrnjudicious use of provocation to generaternreward money and not the flagrant andrnrisky drug ventures that make the headlines.rnRecent police scandals in WesternrnFurope have evoked the cynical assessmentrnthat a “good” police departmentrnis one that solves more crimes than itrngenerates.rnIt is all too easy for informants to turnrninto provocateurs and to generate problemsrnat least as serious as those they werernput in place to resolve. There is a classicrnexample of this in the history of thernsecret police of Czarist Russia, thernOkhranka, which so penetrated dissidentrnopposition groups that police agentsrneffectively controlled and directed terroristrncampaigns. Uncontrollable agentsrnreinforced their credibility by undertakingrnever more daring and savage operations,rnincluding the assassination ofrnpoliticians and the widespread destructionrnof property. By 1914, half the staternapparatus was attempting to solve therncrimes perpetrated by the other half.rnThis bizarre double world, this wildernessrnof mirrors, is often found in intelligencernand counterespionage, though it isrnlittle appreciated outside the profession.rnIn the 1970’s, a British newspaper polledrnserving and former intelligence operativesrnabout which fictional work bestrncaptured the spirit of their profession,rnpresumably expecting a chorus of praisernfor Tom Clancy, John le Carre, or evenrnIan Fleming. The answer, however, wasrnG.K. Chesterton’s little-read The ManrnWho Was Thursday, a phantasmagoricrnEdwardian novel that depicts a battlernbetween the British police and the leadershiprnof the Supreme Anarchist Council.rnIt soon becomes apparent that all thernsoi-disant anarchists are in fact policernofficers, and vice versa, and the samernmysterious figure “Sunday” freely ma-rn42/CHRONICLESrnrnrn