USAnATOMir. ROMRnHYDROGEN BOMBninRMnARMnMIRVnNFIITRONROMRn1945n1951niQRnniQvnn19B1ntargets for missiles include the enemy’s nuclear deliverynsystems; command, control, and communications; and airndefenses. Secondary targets are politico-administrative centers,nmilitary forces, support facilities, selected industries,nand transportation. All of this is predicated on the nuclearnsuperiority of the USSR.nOfEcial publications endorse Soviet military superiority.nThe goal was advocated in all three editions of Voennaianstrategia by Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii and also in volumentwo of Yoennaia entsiklopedia (1976), edited by MarshalnA.A. Grechko, both ranking officers. The late LeonidnBrezhnev initiated the current practice of denying militarynsuperiority as the USSR’s objective. This policy appeared innvolume three oi Voennaia entsiklopedia (1977), edited bynMarshal N.V. Ogarkov, formerly in charge of the armednforces deception (maskirovka) directorate, who had justnbeen appointed chief-of-staff.nDuring the 1970’s, the Soviets developed three essentialnABM technologies: a small, movable phased-array radar fornlocal defense; two new antiballistic missiles; and the Ryadncomputer. They also achieved the basis for deployment ofnan antisatellite system {National Intelligence Estimate Novembern3-8, 1980). During the current decade, they havendeployed two new ICBM’s, the silo-based and mobilenSS-24, as well as the exclusively mobile SS-25. Follow-onnmodels of the SS-18 and SS-24 are being flight-tested rightnnow. The Delta IV class nuclear-powered submarine carriesna new SS-N-23 MIRVed SLBM, and eight Typhoon classnsubmarines will be operational by the end of 1989. Both thenBackfire bombers (30 produced per year) and the heavynBlackjack, now in advanced development, will be able tonUSSRnATOMIC BOMBnHYDROGEN BOMB.nIGBMnABMnMIRVnNEUTRON BOMB.n1949n1953n1957n.1961n.1968n.1973nstrike at North American targets.nFor all this might, the targeting calculus that has determinednthe size and composition of Soviet strategic nuclearnforces would be upset by any type or degree of ABMndefense deployed by the United States. Even a limited USndefense would undermine the probability of enemy missilenpenetration. Furthermore, the race to develop “exotic”nABM technology is extremely expensive and questionablenfor the USSR. President Reagan’s offer at Reykjavik to sharenmature SDI technology probably was regarded bynGorbachev as deception. The Soviets have a healthy respectnfor US potential and are loath to engage in an all-outntechnological race, even though they have been developingndirected energy weapons systems for many years.nIt is clear that the USSR has never shared the limitationsnset by the United States on strategic program goals. ThenSoviet objective has always been and remains to remove anyneffectiveness from US second strike forces. The steady shiftnin national priorities toward the military since the late 1950’snis proof of Moscow’s war-winning and damage-limitingnobjectives.nHowever, overt military aggression appears to be the leastnlikely course of action. The Soviets have achieved a marginnof military superiority over the West and will attempt tonimprove it. Their objective will not be met by some earlyntimetable for war. The Kremlin perceives three advantagesnin military superiority: it makes the leaders feel more secure,nit strengthens foreign policy in the effort to break up NATO,nand it constitutes a “safe conduct pass” for assisting so-callednnational liberation and other revolutionary movements innthe Third World.nnnOCTOBER 1988/23n