between freedom and totalitarianism.nIs this, then, what the shape of modernitynwill be, our government an arterioscleroticnbehemoth standing precariouslynin the middle of a wasteland ofndecay and rubble, across which the hotnwinds of mass movements furiouslynblow, our shores washed by a bitter totalitariannsea? Such a picture is bleak,ndesolate of hope or human features, butnmuch still depends on how supple ourngovernment remains. In a media-dominatednage, with triocracies stubbornlynresistant, the mass of our citizens feelingnpowerless, and our foreign policy determinednby ethical simplisms, the per-nStardust MemoriesnHamilton Jordan: Crisis: The LastnYear of the Carter Presidency; G. P.nPutnam’s Sons; New York.nby Stephen J. SniegoskinIn the not-too-distant past, the UnitednStates bestrode the world like a Colossus.nIts power was respected and otherncountries sought its friendship. Over thenyears this position of power ebbed awaynto the point where the United States wasnutterly impotent in the face of a blatantnact of agression by a thfrd-rate powernlike Iraa While this decline was the resultnof the combined effects of numerousncauses, the nadir to which America sanknduring the last years of the Carter Presidencynmust be related to that Administration’snforeign policy, whose goalnseemed to be the enfeeblement ofnAmerican power.nThe Carter Administration came intonoffice rejecting the basic premises ofnpost-World War II American foreignnpolicy—^i.e., the need to contain Sovietncommunism—^which had served tonjustify America’s military might andnDr. Sniegoski is a historian tvith thenFederal governmentnSOHH^MMaHHnChronicles of Culturenceived responsiveness of the Federalngovernment to the needs and demandsnof its citizens is critically important.nOddly, there is one fact that each bookntouches but neither grasps, namely thatnthe best indication that the Federal governmentncan be made responsive hasnbeen the moderate success (so far) ofnPresident Ronald Reagan. His is the onlynadministration that has even come closento overriding the wishes of at least somentriocracies, slowing entitiements, andnreversing the recent decline in America’snpower. All of which means that for conservativesnto desert Reagan now, asnsome threaten to do, would both bendangerous and foolish. Dnglobal presence. Of course, this rejectionnof “containment” and of Americannpower was not something novel; it simplynconformed to the thinking of thenAmerican liberal establishment, whosenoutlook had been shaped by the traumasnofVietnam.nCarter plec^ed in his May 1977 speechnat Notre Dame that American foreignnpolicy would no longer be predicatednon an “inordinate fear of Communism.”nInstead of perceiving the Soviet Unionnas inherently aggressive and threateningnto the West, the Carter Administrationnsaw it as fundamentally a status quonpower, only taking militant measures innresponse to perceived threats. Thus, noneffort was made to match the acceleratingnSoviet arms buildup, nor was any attemptnmade to counter Soviet expansionistnactivities in Africa, where itsnproxy Cuban troops were described as an”force for stability” by Andrew Young,nCarter’s Ambassador to the UnitednNations. The Carter Administrationnseemed to believe that self-emasculationnwas America’s best defense. To replacenthe traditional containment policy, thenCarter Administration promised devotionnto the transcendent goals of socialnjustice and human rights. No longernnnwould the United States back unsavorynallies on the wrong side of the “forces ofnchange.” Thus, the Carter Administrationnjettisoned pro-American governmentsnin Iran and Nicaragua, and attempted tonbefriend leftist, anti-American, and evennpro-Soviet regimes in Africa.nThe validity of this liberal foreignpolicynperspective ^ras severely dampednand—^in the eyes of many Americans—nutterly discredited by the twin shocks ofn1979: the Iranian seizure of Americannhostages and the massive Soviet invasionnof AJ^anistan. The hostage issue dramaticallynillustrated the importance ofnmilitary power and the dire consequencesnstemming from a lack of it. ThenSoviet invasion of Afghanistan was hardlynin keeping with the im^e of a pacificnstatus quo power, and, by threateningnthe Persian Gulf oil lifeline of the West,nshowed that, unless checked by countervailingnAmerican power, Soviet dominancenof the West was a possibility, ifnnot a likelihood.nIn response to these shocks and to thenAmerican public’s reaction to them, thenCarter Administration began to takenmeasures out of tune with the liberalnforeign-policy paradigm—the CarternDoctrine, a grain embargo against thenSoviet Union, draft registration, increasesnin military spending—which, in fact,nseemed to be a return to the traditionalnpolicy of containment. The question remained,nhowever, ^^dlether these actionsnrepresented a fundamental shift in PresidentnCarter’s thinking, or were merelyncosmetic, election-year attempts to placatenan aroused American public demandingnassertive measures.nSome light is shed on this question bynHamilton Jordan’s firsthand account ofnthe last year of the Carter Presidency.nAlthough a foreign-policy neophyte witiinthe media image of an arrogant rube,nJordan was in an ideal vantage pointn(Assistant to the President and WhitenHouse Chief of StaflO to record Carter’snthinking, having been a close confidantnsince 1966.nThe book focuses on two issues withnwhich Jordan was intimately involved:n