THE AMERICAN PROSCENIUMnEl Salvador or AnalogiesnThe El Salvador story brings backnmemories of Vietnam—so goes thenstereotypical ditty in countless commentsnby the minigurus that are massproducednby the American press. ThenReagan administration vehementlyndenies that either their reminiscencesnor their analogies have any validity. Andnboth sides do what they always do: theynignore the historical perspective andninstead pursue succinct simplificationsnin the belief that the more shallow thenargument is the more convincing it is.nWhich imbues us with a conviction thatnanother exhaustive, acrimonious nationalndebate on the Vietnam War isninevitable. We feel that such a debatenis more than just proper—it is necessary.nThe sooner it reopens and thenbroader its scope the better for us all.nWe would suggest a back-to-basicsnapproach. To our mind, Vietnam andnEl Salvador (and all the other instancesnin between of Soviet rape of internationalndecency which have been meeklynaccepted by the American establishment)nbelong to the same pattern,nwhich future historians will describenas the distinct Soviet plan for long-rangengeopolitics. It originated with Lenin,nwas refined by Trotsky (but not in detail,nwhich cost him his life) and wasnidiosyncratically implemented by Stalinnin his doctrine of global subversion bynway of semantic intrigues and an imperialisticnforeign policy.nLike almost every good, complicatednstory, it begins with an original sin.nThe sin was committed (twice) bynRoosevelt and Churchill—once innTeheran and again in Yalta. It consistednof dividing the world into two spheresnof influence. The two Western gentlemen,nconveniently forgetting their ownnpolitico-moral principles, discreetly re­nfrained from asking what their Easternncounterpart would do with his prerogatives.nThereby FDR and Churchill perpetratednan act of international immoralitynand—as always—the sons werendestined to pay for the sins of the fathers.nBoth Roosevelt and Churchillnassumed that, regardless of its nefariousness,nthey had struck a gentlemen’snagreement. But Stalin had ideology upnhis sleeve and in his holster. This littlendifference absolved him, in his own eyesnand those of his Western left-liberalnsympathizers, from any code of honor,neven a gangster’s honor. So he subjugatednEastern Europe by force, to thendisgust of the two distinguished Wasps,nwho had expected at least a modicum ofndelicacy. He immediately invaded thenterritory which he had promised to respectnas Western, or at least neutral,nturf. And here is where semanticsncome in: whatever gross and blatantnabuse (in Iran, 1946; Greece and Turkey,n1947; and later in Asia and Africa)nwas engineered by special NKVDn(later KGB) teams for “internationalistncooperation,” supported with Sovietnmoney, weapons and organizationalnknow-how, such well-concealed aggressionnwas called “social change,” “newntimes,” “new realities,” “regional massnmovements,” “anticolonialism” and, finally,n”people’s wars of liberation.”nSuch beautiful terms elicited an orgynof adoration from the liberal left allnover the Western world. What Stalinnhimself would not have expected wasnthat even the most perspicacious liberalsnwould fall for the sham of historicalnspontaneity in every uprising of the “exploited.”nNot long ago Professor ArthurnSchlesinger, Jr. elucidated for the WallnStreet Journal (for the 381st time) hisndisbelief in Soviet planning of worldncrises. Any native of Moscow, Warsaw,nSofia, etc. could inform him that therennnare central committees from the Kremlinnto Bulgaria where a “Section of FraternalnMutual Aid” works feverishly onnhow to accomplish subversion—in thenVirgin Islands or Costa Brava or Icelandnor Ohio State University or El Salvadorn—by remote, even surrealistic, proxiesnand calculates how such “help” can advancenthe Soviet Union in fulfilling then”dreams” of the world’s working class.nThe bottom line is that although thenU.S.S.R. does not create revolutionarynconditions in, say, Guatemala, or organizenan upheaval, it is pleasantly “surprised”nwhen one happens. And officialnSoviet rhetoric will always encouragensuch upheavals: they send “fraternal”nammunition to kill the oppressive juntasnwhich, in turn, perform savage retributionnon everyone in sight. The viciousncircle begins, and the U.S.S.R. hasnnothing to lose from its constant motion.nAnd liberals in America ardentlynpin the blame on whomever the Sovietsnwish.nThis perception of events in remotencountries eventually created an awesome,ndestructive and vicious force fornthe Soviets—the suicidal naivete of thenWestern liberal. Within the only countryncapable of thwarting Soviet designs,na power emerged which drew its impetusnfrom the noblest traditions of Americannfreedom, from democratic respect fornsuch sacrosanct ideals as human rightsnand the freedom to dissent—a powernwhich has proved to be essential tonthe Soviet’s imperialistic expansion.nThat which was unthinkable to Rooseveltnand Churchill in their musings innYalta—an open communist bridgeheadnin the Western hemisphere—has materializednin Cuba. Because of that force,nthe gravity of liberal naivete as an objectivenSoviet tool, liberal Presidentsnlike Kennedy and Johnson were powerlessnagainst this anomaly.nRarely have we seen a better examplenof that awesome might than in a recentnessay in The New Yorker—thatnorgan of Courvoisier radicalism of thenAmerican moneyed classes. It was annastonishing article, a paradigm of ex-nJttly/Aagttst 1981n