the iron curtain, the Warsaw Pactnwould collapse. Though new Armyndoctrine talks a great deal about offensivenaction and “deep strikes” into Pactnterritory, neither the U.S. nor NATOnseems willing to expand conventionalnforces enough to defend the West, letnalone push the battlefield eastward.nGiven the material advantages possessednby capitalism, Soviet expansionncan continue only so long as the politicalnwill of the West is paralyzed. Sovietnactive measures weaken Western willnthrough disinformation and propagandanaimed at the general public andnthrough terrorism and assassination ofnopponents. Staar provides a list ofnSoviet front organizations and otherngroups linked to the fronts which arenactive in the propaganda campaign.nHowever, nothing serves Soviet intentionsnquite like the West’s own extensivennews media. The constant andncompehti’e search for “news” providesnthe Soviets with opportunities to plantnforged documents, fabricated incidents,nand twisted perspectives in thenWestern press, where they acquire instantncredibility. The Soviets haventheir own massive publication programnin the noncommunist world,nsome of it in the open like the ProgressnPublishing House in Moscow, whichntranslates works into 40 languages,nsome of it hidden like Ethnos, thenlargest newspaper in Athens, financednby the KGB and filled with pieces fromncorrespondents in the U.S. and Englandnwho are known communists.nThough the Soviets have an elaborate’nnetwork of agents and fellowtravelers,nthere are enough independentnleftists, liberals, and politicalnpartisans in the media to aid Moscownwithout direct ties.nFreedom of the press in thenWest provides the East with anmultitude of printed andnspoken criticism of publicnfigures, organizations, society,nand government policies thatnSoviet propagandists then citenin their own articles andnspeeches.nA Soviet agent is far more persuasivenwhen he can cite the words of annAmerican congressman that the AmericannPresident’s policies are a threat tonworld peace. Staar provides numerousnexamples for all the forms of Sovietnclandestine activity. It makes for readingnwhich is both fascinating andnhorrifying.nJoseph Churba believes that Sovietnpolicy is working all too well and thatnthe Reagan Administration is not copingnwith it much better than did thenCarter Administration. Dr. Ghurba isna founder of the Genter for InternationalnSecurity and served as SeniornPolicy Advisor to the U.S. Arms Gontrolnand Disarmament Agency 1981-n1982. Like Staar, he sees Soviet ambitionsnas global. “The Soviet Union isnnot like other states. It is rather like annorganization—the Gommunist Partyn—that owns a country.” Ghurba believesnpressures are mounting on thenSoviets to move now rather than wait.nThe Soviets already lag behind thenWest in their economic base, makingnup for this by concentrating a largernshare of resources on heavy industrynand armaments. Yet, they risk beingnleft hopelessly behind by the revolutionnin telecommunications, robotics,nand bioengineering now taking placenin the capitalist states. The Sovietsnmust try for global hegemony by thenend of the century before the West cannfully develop these new technologicalnresources.nWorld War III started in 1975 whennthe Soviets airlifted weapons and suppliesnfor 6,000 Guban troops in Angolanto establish a puppet government.nSince then, the Soviets have establishedna network of strongpoints distantnfrom their own borders: Vietnam, Mozambique,nNicaragua, North Yemen,nSyria, Ethiopia. In 1979 they departednfrom the use of proxies and invadednAfghanistan. Soviet gains were “carriednout by ordinary troops, using ordinarynweapons, in what would seem,ncompared with the high technology ofnnuclear arms, a remarkably primitivenprocedure.” Most of these operationsnoccurred in areas near the Persian Gulfnoil fields on which Western Europe,nJapan and, to a lesser extent, the U.S.ndepend. There was never any thoughtnof using nuclear weapons to stop thenSoviets or their allies, but in the wakenof Vietnam there was no seriousnthought of using conventional forcesneither.nGhurba sees the Middle East as thencentral battiefield in the conflict betweennEast and West. Disruption of oilnshipments would collapse the Westernnnneconomies, thus buying the USSRnmore time to develop its own economicnpotential. The threat of disruptionnwould be a powerful diplomatic tool tondrive Europe and Japan into “neutrality.”nThe current energy glut and thenreduced use of Arab oil in the U.S. hasnblinded many people to the fact thatnthe world oil market still depends onnPersian Gulf oil.nFor many, this dependence on Arabnoil has meant a need to court the Arabnstates at the expense of Israel. Ghurbanbelieves this is the major error of bothnthe Garter and Reagan Administrations.nThe Arab oil states will continuento sell to the West for economic reasons.nThe threat does not come fromnthem, but from the USSR and thenradical states and movements it supports.nThe threat is a military one andnmust be countered on those terms.nIsrael—with the strongest militarynpower in the region—has a stablenpro-Western go’ernment and is opposednto Soviet expansion. It is thenonly state in the region which the U.S.ncan count as an ally. In contrast, thenprincipal Arab states, Saudi Arabianand Egypt, are militarily weak, unreliable,nand do not consider Soviet influencento be the main danger. Yet, tonappease Arab opinion, the U.S. opposednIsrael military actions againstnthe Iraqi reactor at Osirak (1981) andnagainst PLO forces in Lebanon (1982),ndespite the fact that both Iraq and thenPLO are tied to the USSR. Reagannheld up deliveries of military aircraft tonIsrael after Osirak and in Lebanonnprovided safe escort for PLO forces outnof Beirut. The U.S. has also opposednTel Aviv’s “annexation” of the GolannHeights.nFavoring this course are the “Arabists”nin the State Department andnthose military planners in the Pentagonnwho want American bases closernto the Gulf than Israel can provide.nGhurba advocates basing two heavynU.S. divisions in Israel to back up thenRapid Deployment Force in the beliefnthat no Arab state can be relied uponnto provide such bases. Yet, Israel hasnnever wanted U.S. troops on its soil,nand it is doubtful that Gongress wouldnapprove the stationing of combat unitsnin such a trouble-spot, even if theynwere available.nBy the same token, Ghurba’s proposalsnfor reinstituting conscription andnFEBRUARY 1986117n