stockholders and whose managers have definite profit objectivesnfor which they are held strictly accountable, providesnsignificant opportunities for smaller companies. Small companiesnoften rely on substantial investment of donated labornand deferred profit expectations. Simply put, principals innthe firm usually work long hours for which they receive nonmonetary compensation, and often underpay themselves fornthe hours for which they are paid. Such principals rarelynhave to hold themselves accountable to impersonal stockholders,nand any profit can be re-invested in the ongoingnenterprise rather than shared with stockholders concernednabout short-term financial payofi’s. New opportunities cannbe pursued without elaborate justifications to managers whonmay not even be directly involved with operational aspects.nAccountability in small businesses, in short, is generally heldnto a minimum. Primary accountability is to suppliers, whondo have the ability to shut down a business by cutting offngoods or materials for production.nGovernment now recognizes that smaller companies arenthe bedrock of entrepreneurialism in the UnitednStates. For the most part, as a company has increased in size,nit has become more difficult for it to innovate in any areanother than its products. Larger companies, finding it difficultnto increase market share and improve profitability, haventurned to acquisition in lieu of innovation as a means ofndeveloping new businesses and entering new markets.nAgain, the merger mania that resulted in a cascade ofntakeovers in the 1980’s was a reflection of such bottom linenthinking. There is a danger in this sort of growth, whichntakes place in lieu of internal development and creativity.nLarger companies have increasingly attempted to spurninternal innovation by establishing risk venture groupsnwithin the parent company, groups presumably exemptnfrom the normal profit requirements of the company andngiven a specified dme to reach an acceptable level. Thenresults have been mixed, since the specified time frame toninnovate varies so dramatically from firm to firm and,nindeed, even within a single firm as overall conditionsnchange.nGenerally, risk venture is not well handled by a largencompany, which does not like to behave like a bank.nCorporate executives who have been innovative in establishedncontexts are rarely able to come up with new ideas onncommand. Divorced from their ongoing enterprises, fornthem innovation sometimes simply will not happen. Ideasnusually develop out of the imaginative extensions of peoplenin the midst of their ongoing work. But again, bottom linenthinking stimulates cumbersome procedures that preventninnovation or risk.nOne conventional mechanism large companies employ tonencourage new development is sometimes effective; that is,nmanagement simply increases its volume demands on annongoing division and leaves it to the division to decide hownto meet those demands. In certain circumstances, the resultnis innovation. The problem here is that large companies,nespecially in times of radical business fluctuations, arennotoriously impatient when it comes to results. Many timesnan effort that might have worked, given time, is killed earlynin anticipation of failure; sometimes a self-fulfilling prophecynis at work.n30/CHRONICLESnnnAt the commercial level, the problem of the bottom line isnuniquely a problem of large-scale business. At the uppernreaches of industry risk is difficult and failure disastrous. Theninnovating impulse shrivels in direct relationship to thendemand for profitability in excess of inflationary spirals. Butnthe world of the tried-and-true product is invariably crowded,nthus leading to intensified competition for market sharenas a means of protecting profitability rates. Demands fornbottom line thinking are ultimately curbed by the inability ofnconservative policies to spur growth and innovation whilensatisfying profit demands. Innovation involves potential risksnusually far in excess of the prudential philosophy of moneynmanagement. The dialectic of corporate survival andngrowth, profitability and prudence, stability and innovation,nare not so much clarified as disguised by the metaphoricalnuses of the bottom line.nThe bottom line started as a metaphor for prudentnfinancial management and has ended as a myth disguising anzero growth economy—the very outcome the metaphornsought to overcome. In larger terms, it heralds the passing ofnthe swashbuckling entrepreneur, willing to risk all and doubtneverything, in favor of cautious money managers willing tonrisk nothing yet secure in their belief of the wisdom ofncorporate headquarters. It is no accident that the phrasen”bottom line” derives from the language of accountingnrather than the Protestant work ethic. The shift from ownernto professional management indicates the degree to whichnlarge business enterprises have become captive to theirnaccounting departments. Instead of supplying data measuringnhow a business is progressing or regressing, financiallyorientednprofessional managers now supply the myths bynwhich corporations should be run.nThe language of the bottom line signifies the dominancenof a utilitarian ethic that perceives business survival innnarrow terms unconnected to the national commonwealth.nProfit margins are maintained as rates of economic growthnburrow to zero levels, large firms take over smaller firms innan attempt to compensate for their failure to innovateninternally. Competition for investment and consumer dollarsnintensifies. In fact, only when risk is seen as a desirablenconsequence of business dynamism will innovation regainnits rightful place in American industry. At such a point, thenmyth of the bottom line will appropriately yield to the realitynof multiple sources of business creativity or, simply put, tonmultiple bottom lines.nUntil such a revision in business ideology takes place,nreductionism and determinism will rule supreme. There is anstrange sense in which the notion of the bottom line isnactually the commercial adaptation to the vulgar Marxistnidea of economic determinism. It has all the glamour of thentough, utilitarian notion that “ultimately” all things arendetermined by economic forces and relations of production.nAnd yet it does so without the sting of moral turpitude thatnMarx himself conveyed by the cash nexus. But whether asncriticism or celebration, a tenderhearted appeal to revolutionnor a tough-minded faith in the established economic order,nthe hardheaded aims of bottom line thinking has failed in itsnpurpose. Given the fallacies of a blatant reductionism inneconomics and a fatuous utilitarianism in psychology, thisnmight be a good time to retire the bottom line to annaccounting pasture — whence it originally came. <^n