lege admissions is outlawed). Our institutesrnof higher educahon are the engineroomsrnof the multicultural enterprise.rnFour years at the average university is, asrna survey by National Review has found, arnmost effective way to turn young Americansrnagainst their country, its history, andrntraditions. Is it unreasonable to supposernthat for some proportion of these peoplern—five percent? twenty? —racial loyaltyrnwill trump national allegiance?rn(Once you start thinking about thisrnstuff, even stranger and more dauntingrndilemmas present themselves. Suppose,rnfor example, that a great power were torncome up in black Africa. There is nothingrnver’ improbable about such a development.rnThat continent has the highestrnrates of population growth in the world,rnby far the lowest labor costs, and morernthan its share of natural resources. Allrnthat is missing is an organizing principle;rnbut organizing principles have often appearedrnsuddenly out of nowhere, turningrnthe most unlikely places into centers ofrnhistorical dynamism—think of the rise ofrnIslam. A militant and vigorous Africanrnpower is not more unlikely now than thernrise of Japan was in 1850, or that of Chinarnin 1950. Suppose, then, that such arnpower came into being, and suppose itsrninterests clashed violently with those ofrnthe United States. Where would blackrnAmericans stand in such a conflict? Therndoctrines of—to borrow a useful phrasernfrom Peter Salins’ Assimilation, AmericanrnSh’/e—”ethnic federalism” that are nowuniversalrnamong our policy elites mayrnseem like an interesting experiment inrnpeacetime. In time of war, they mayrnprove fatal.)rnHowever shocking the things I am sayingrnhere may seem in this long tranquilrntime, I guarantee that, when the first U.S.rncarrier is sunk by Chinese action or thernfirst American city is erased by a ChinesernICBM, Chinese nationals, includingrnthose who are U.S. citizens, will be hustledrninto camps faster than you can sayrn”execuhve order” and will stay there forrnthe duration, whatever the ACLU —orrneven the Supreme Court—thinks aboutrnit. I hope the camps will not be very uncomfortable,rnfor I shall be there, too—wernDerbyshires travel as a family. I also hopernthat I shall be able to maintain sufficientrndetachment to understand that a responsiblernU.S. government really has nornchoice in the matter.rn]ohn Derbyshire is the author of the novelrnSeeing Calvin Coolidge in a Dream.rnThe Constitution:rnHate Crimes’rnLatest Victimrnby William ]. Watkins, Jr.rnNew federal hate-crimes legislationrnis on the way. Never one to miss anrnopportunity to expands its powers, the nationalrngovernment has capitalized on arnperceived rash of hate crimes in order tornincrease federal jurisdiction, and thernHate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999rn(HCPA) will probably become law in thernnear future.rnWhen confronted with such legislationrnin the past, the federal courts mindlesslyrndeclared that Congress had a rationalrnbasis for enacting the law pursuant tornthe power to regulate commerce. But inrnlight of United States v. Lopez, whichrnstruck down a federal law (based on thernCommerce Clause) that criminalizedrnpossession of a firearm near schools,rncourts are paying more attention to thernforgotten concept of federalism. }ust beforernthe new hate-crimes act was introduced,rnthe United States Court of Appealsrnfor the Fourth Circuit struck down,rnin Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute,rna portion of the Violence AgainstrnWomen Act (VAWA), which greatly resemblesrnthe HCPA, as an unconstitutionalrnexercise of Congress’s power to regulaterncommerce and enforce the 14thrnAmendment. The VAWA, in part, declaredrnthat “[a]ll persons within the UnitedrnStates shall have the right to be freernfrom crimes of violence motivated byrngender,” and created a private cause ofrnaction against individuals committingrnsuch a crime.rnIn Brzonkala, a female student at VirginiarnTech brought suit against two footballrnplayers who allegedly gang-raped herrnbecause of “gender animus.” The UnitedrnStates intervened in the suit to defendrnthe constitutionality of the VAWA. Therngovernment argued that the statute wasrnconstitutional based on two grounds: thernenforcement clause of the 14th Amendmentrnand the Commerce Clause. Thern14th Amendment provides, in perfinentrnpart, that “[n]o State s h a l l . . . deny to anyrnperson within its jurisdiction the equalrnprotection of the laws.” Because thernamendment refers only to state action, itrnis a well-settled principle of Americanrnconstitutional law that Congress cannotrnreach private conduct by using the 14thrnAmendment. As the Fourth Circuit observed,rnthe VAWA “unmistakably regulatesrnprivate action; it creates a cause ofrnaction against private individuals whorncommit acts of gender-motivated violence.”rnMoreover, the court found thernVAWA—drafted in broad and sweepingrnterms—was not closely tailored to remedyrnthe supposed violation of the 14thrnAmendment. Not wishing to “confer uponrnCongress a general police power,” therncourt declared that the VAWA’s privaterncause of action exceeded Congress’srnpower to enforce the amendment.rnThe Fourth Circuit’s CommercernClause analysis is especially interestingrnsince it supplies Lopez with the bite trulyrnto limit Congress’s use of the commercernpower. Though Lopez’s analysis was heraldedrnby many as revolutionary, others realizedrnthat the landmark decision left thernSupreme Court’s most expansive interpretationsrnof the Commerce Clause inrnplace. Justice Clarence Thomas, in hisrnconcurring opinion in Lopez, went so farrnas to accuse the majorit}’ of giving Congressrna general police power over all aspectsrnof day-to-day life. Moreover, thernmajority hinted that the Gun-FreernSchool Zones Act might have beenrnviewed more favorably by the Court hadrnCongress merely conducted hearings regardingrnthe effect of gun possession in arnschool zone on interstate commerce.rnIn defending the VAWA, the governmentrnused many of the same argumentsrnthat failed in Lopez. It essentiallyrnclaimed that violence against women is arndevastating social ill which affects the nationalrneconomy—increased medical andrnlegal costs are imposed on victims; womenrnare discouraged from traveling andrntransacting business in public places; andrnwomen become less productive becausernof their constant fear of violence. ThernFourth Circuit began by noting the obvious:rnThe VAWA is a criminal statute andrndoes not regulate economic activity. Therncourt recognized that to adopt the federalrngovernment’s understanding of the powerrnto regulate commerce:rnwould be to extend federal contiolrnto a vast range of problems fallingrnwithin even the most tiaditional areasrnof state concern—problemsrnsuch as violent crime generally, educationalrnshortcomings, and evenrndivorce, all of which are significantrnand as a result unquestionably affectrnthe economy and ultimatelyrninterstate commerce.rn44/CHRONICLESrnrnrn