calamity.” In his frenetic enthusiasmnRuskin waged war against social and artisticnapathy as well as irresponsible individualism;nhe championed unpopularncauses, helped to found the WorkingnMen’s College, and endlessly expoundednhis ideas in print and from the lectern.nNevertheless he was his own man whontried to deliver a message which everynsociety must hear if it is to survive. Hisnpersonal eccentricities in no way invalidatednwhat he had to say.nThe Debate on StrategynCommon Security: A Blueprint for Survival;nIndependent Commission onnDisarmament and Security Issues;nSimon & Schuster; New York.nThomas H. Safifer and Orville E. Kelly:nCountdown Zero; G. P. Putnam’snSons; New York.nby William R. Hawkinsnr*or those concerned about the nationalnsecurity of the United States, thenlast two years have been most disturbing.nIn 1980, a President widely perceived asnweak and indecisive, with a record of oppositionnto military preparedness, wasndefeated by a candidate who proposed ton”make America great again.” The CarternAdministration had canceled the B-1nbomber, stalled the production of aircraftncarriers and cruise missiles, agreednto the SALT II and Panama Canalntreaties, and watched passively as thenSoviets invaded Afghanistan and thenAyatollah Khomeini seized Iran. WhennPresident Reagan entered office henlaunched a rearmament program thatnconcentrated on naval and nuclearnweapons, pledged support for allies, andndeclared terrorism and Soviet aggressionnthe central foreign-policy concerns.nThere was great optimism that the poli-nMr. Hawkins is assistant professor of economicsnat Radford University in Virginia.nIn an age such as our own, when intellectualsnhave lost their bearings, whennreligion has too often degenerated intoncultism and success-worship, when educationnseems to be the province of thenmediocre, and when political debatenfinds the single-issue demagogues toonoften overwhelming the rational andnhumane citizen, we, too, can wondernwith Gibbon (and Ruskin) if indeed “anslow and secret poison” is seeping intonthe vitals of our civilization. Dncies which had paralyzed U.S. policynduring the 1970’s would be reversed innthe 1980’s. The very specter of thenReagan Presidency was enough to endnthe Iranian hostage crisis on the day ofnhis inauguration.nYet, in 1982 the central issue hasnslipped from a desire to make Americana power “second to none” to a discussionnabout which form of disarmament tonadopt. The members of the Committeenon the Present Danger seem to have hadnmore influence on public opinion whennthey were writing articles as privatencitizens than they have had as officials ofnthe new administration. The explosivengrowth of the peace movement givesntestimony to the power of the left tondominate the media and to appeal to thenmost naive segments of Western society:nthe students and the clergy. This is not tonsay that there is no grain of truth onnwhich the left builds. There is a feelingnthat a major war, with a high possibilitynof the use of nuclear weapons, is morenprobable now than in the past. This isntme: the risk of war has increased as thenbalance of power has shifted from thenUnited States, a status quo commercialnrepublic, to the Soviet Union, an expansionistnmilitary empire. It was to reversenthis shift that Reagan embarked on hisnrearmament program. The concernnabout war is valid; it is the proper responsento it that is at issue.nThe left has attempted to deflect con­nnncern from the Soviet threat while stillnplaying on the fear of Soviet power inncampaigns such as Ground Zero Week.nInstead of the U.S.S.R., the danger is anneutered “arms race” which apparentlynexists outside of the realm of politics,nideology, or strategy. Thus the authors ofnCommon Security can call themselves ann”independent” commission. The prologuenis by Cyrus Vance, Carter’s firstnSecretary of State (the man who resignednhis position over the Iranian rescue mission,nnot because it failed but becausenafter six months Carter had dared to actnat all). Vance argues that “On this issuen[disarmament] there should be no divisionnbetween right and left.”nHowever, the commission is anythingnbut independent or nonaligned. Itsnmembership reads like a roll call of thenSocialist International. Its chairman isnOlof Palme, newly reinstated as thensocialist premier of Sweden, a man whonused to take time out from his assaults onnthe Swedish economy to march besidenrepresentatives of North Vietnam in antiwarnprotests. Palme pays tribute to WillynBrandt’s independent commission onneconomic development for its help.nPalme’s commission was headquarterednin Vienna, courtesy of the Austriannsocialist leader Bruno Kreisky. Presumablynto balance Vance, who is merelyna liberal, Giorgi Arbatov of the SovietnUnion’s Institute of the U.S.A. andnCanada also served. It is sad that no onenon the commission knew the U.S.S.R. asnwell as Arbatov knows the West andnits weaknesses.nxVs socialists, they focus much of theirnattention on economics. And, as withnmost socialists, their perspective of it isnoften bizarre. At one point, Rosa Luxemburgnis quoted to refute Keynes, who isnportrayed as a reactionary. The mainnthrust of Common Security is that defensenspending diverts money from socialnprograms. Repeatedly the commissionncalls for the transfer of defense money tonthe Third World for development, orntoward welfare programs or environmentalnprotection. This argument has an117nFebruary1983n