assertion.nIt was in the crucible of the Civil War that the firstnAmerican nationalism in the strict sense was formed. ThenCivil War has faded in memory and significance to generationsnof Americans who have seen two World Wars, anworldwide empire, and vast social changes. Yet the CivilnWar — in terms of the mobilization and casualties, and innterms of the consequences — is still the largest event in ournhistory.nThe central issue in the Civil War, to which all othernquestions, including slavery and centralization, were subordinate,nwas the movement of American society into modernization.nModernization, among other things, implies economic,npolitical, and cultural centralization and nationalism.nTo modernization the divergent development of the AmericannSouth presented a formidable obstacle. The South wasnvast, politically skilled, increasingly unified as the antebellumnperiod wore on, and firmly opposed to both economicnnationalism (in the form of protective tariffs, federal subsidiesnfor the transportation infrastructure, free public lands,nand a central banking system) and to cultural nationalism innits New England variety. Furthermore, it had the weight ofnprestige and tradition on its side in its appeal to the limitednconstitutional settlement, a tradition that at least latentlyncounted on the allegiance of many Americans outside thenSouth who were dubious about the effects of modernization.nIt was during the Civil War, with the appeals to thenUnion as a mystic indissoluble bond, to unlimited exercise ofnpower by the agents of a putative national majority, to loyaltynoaths and the archetypal image of Uncle Sam, that Americannnationalism came into being. The outcome settledncertain issues forever. The formerly plural United States wasnnow a nation-state with a centralized economic policy undernthe aegis of a federal government restrained by no constitutionalnchecks not internal to itself. Further, the course of thenwar had, if not universalized the concept of Americanncitizenship, immensely broadened it. Contrary to widespreadnbelief, immigration of new peoples into the UnitednStates had been a minor phenomenon in the early days ofnthe Republic. (George Washington was already the fifthngeneration of his family in America.) Not until the 1840’sndid it become substantial. Among the major components ofnthe new nationalism were the Irish and German immigrants,nwho indeed made the outcome of the Civil Warnpossible.nLess important at the time and not originally intended asna consequence, but of immense importance to the future,nwas the emancipation and then enfranchisement of thenAfro-American population, the first as a military measurenand the second as a political necessity for the ruling party.nBefore the war no respectable Northern politician had darednsuggest much more than a restriction of slavery in thenterritories, with a hint of a future gradual elimination of theninstitution, though without any concrete suggestion as tonhow this would be done or what would be the status of thenfreedmen.nYet in the nationalist mythology that was formed in thenstruggle for the Union, next in importance to the Unionnitself and in time more important, was the moral imperativenof equality and universalization of citizenship enshrined innthe Fourteenth Amendment. The success of the newn18/CHRONICLESnnnmythology has been demonstrated by the fact that while it isnpossible to criticize almost anything else in Americannhistory — the Constitution, George Washington, FranklinnD. Roosevelt — it is nearly impossible to criticize, even onnlimited historical grounds, the righteousness of the movementnfor emancipation and equality for the freedmen. Withnthe crusade for equality American nationalism had achievednnot only its political and economic goals but had fashioned anmoral imperative in compelling form.nBut what emerged was a strange form of universalizedndemocracy. Government of, by, and for the people hadncome to mean all people in a new and uniquely Americannway. This universal principle, however, existed in thenquotidian context of an American society that was stillnoverwhelmingly British Protestant not only in its compositionnbut in its values and aspirations. In fact, the verynaspiration of equal liberty and opportunity was itself a formnof idealism that rested upon a peculiarly Anglo-Saxonnheritage.nIn the half century between the Civil War and the FirstnWorld War, American nationalism was subjected to immensenstresses. Regionalism did not disappear. The South,nin some respects, remained obdurate, and the new statesnof the Plains and Rocky Mountains sometimes erupted innquite radical forms of populist revolt. More importantnwere the stresses associated with the creation of a modern industrialnnation-state, which tended to wipe away and recreatenclasses, localities, occupations, and ways of life. These stressesnhave been suffered by every modernizing society and innthemselves are capable of great disruption. But in America,nsimultaneously with these vast social changes came anothernunprecedented dislocation: an immense immigration ofnnew peoples from the east and south of Europe, altering thenethnic and religious composition of the population to annextent no other modern society had ever undergone.nHistory is always seeking new forms of equilibrium. Outnof this social crucible came, uneasily and unevenly, a newnform of American nationalism, which eventually establishednits hegemony. The settlement that emerged was part andnparcel of the Progressive era. Progressivism was not simplynthe clear-cut reform movement of the history textbooks — itnwas a sea change in consciousness, the completion of a stagenof mental modernization with vast and sometimes ambivalentnand contradictory implications with which we are stillnliving and which historians have barely begun to describenadequately.nThe Progressive settlement that emerged, symbolized inndifferent ways by such politicians as Theodore Roosevelt andnWoodrow Wilson and such writers as Herbert Croly andnWalter Lippmann, had two aspects. Externally, it impliednthe emergence of the United States as a world power of thenfirst class, along with Britain, France, and Germany. Therenmight be disagreement about the exact implications of thisnand the policies to be pursued, but it was soon clear thatntraditional American isolation would give way to a determinationnto act aggressively on the world stage. In thisnsituation, which had behind it the seeming force of inevitability,na spokesman for the older America like WilliamnJennings Bryan could only appear as a hopeless archaism.nOne of the more obviously observable internal results ofn