the federal government from the contaminationrnof rehgious establishment.rnTo take away the former leaves the courtsrnand Congress to apply the latter in a farrnmore sweeping and aggressive manner.rnUnder Cantwell, for a state to support religionrnis for the federal government to establishrnreligion.rnTherefore, rather than as incorporatingrnthe states under the First Amendment,rnCantwell ought to be seen as repealingrnthe First Amendment. Throughrnincorporation, the Supreme Court forcesrnCongress to do something that the FirstrnAmendment explicitly forbids, namelyrnto make laws “respecting an establishmentrnof religion” and “prohibiting thernfree exercise thereof.” And Cantwellrntakes rights away from the states that thernFirst Amendment was written explicitlyrnto protect, such as the right to establishrn(or not) religion in any way they chose.rnSo, while Mary Ann Glendon holdsrnout hope that the tradition is not reallyrnas confusing as it seems, nonetheless,rn”the Supreme Court’s religion-clauserncase law has reached the state where it isrndescribed on all sides, and even by thernjudges themselves, as hopelessly confused,rninconsistent and incoherent.”rnGlendon believes that the confusion isrncaused less by the possibility of makingrnsense out of the First Amendment thanrnby the inadequate moral, political, andrnsocial theory that informs the judgmentrnof Supreme Court justices as they decidernreligion-clause cases.rnIn short, whether from the right orrnthe left, the moral anthropology informingrnlegal and political thought in Americarnhas lately been one of extreme individualismrnand moral pluralism, in whichrncommunities such as family, church, andrn”other groups of memory and mutualrnaid” are seen not as instruments of authenticrnfreedom, but impediments to it.rnRather than understanding human personhoodrnin terms of these salutary traditionsrnand contexts—most especially religiousrnones—it is reduced to radicallyrnatomistic individualism.rnGlendon is certainly correct that thisrnis the current state of affairs, butrnshe fails to ask whether its very causernmay be the political and legal institutionsrnthat we in America invest withrnan almost sacred status. She excuses thernFounders, since they had no way ofrnknowing that “the dense texture of 18thcenturyrnAmerican society, with its familyrnfarms and businesses, its tight-knitrncommunities, and its churches firmlyrnwoven in the social fabric” would allrnerode to the extent that they have.rnAgain, this is probably correct, as are herrnreminders that the Founders never “underestimatedrnthe importance of the [religious]rninstitutions whose durabilityrnthey assumed” and that “it seems not tornhave occurred to our early leaders thatrnthere might come a time when the society’srnability to produce virtuous citizensrnand statesmen would falter.” Butrnwhat if the legal and political institutionsrnthey established are the very instrumentsrnof this faltering? While wernmight be able to excuse the Founders’ inabilityrnto prophesy the future moral failurernof America, we might not be able tornexcuse them for erecting the structuresrnthat have caused this decline.rnAmerican history embodies two concepts.rnThe first is that American societyrnis deeply formed by religion—specificallyrnChristianity—^which is seen as the necessaryrncondition of a well-ordered life;rnthe other conscientiously denies thernefficacy of the influence of religionrnupon—and in fact sees it as an impedimentrnto—a well-ordered political society.rnThe concepts that inform thernpolitical institutions of America—andrnthat suggest the nature of our politicalrnculture—may be ones which ineluctablyrnerode the belief we once possessed thatrnwe are not atomistic individuals butrnrather religiously formed, “embedded”rnpersons. Is the mix of liberal individualismrnand a certain form of sympatheticallyrnidiomatic Protestantism perhaps arndeadly one for a well-ordered society?rnThe confusion of which Glendonrnwrites is by no means restricted to judicialrnopinions. Many, if not most, legalrnand political theorists wind up in thernsame sort of confused mess that Americanrncase law is in. For example, whilernStephen Carter’s The Culture of Disbeliefrnis a painstakingly honest book, he hasrntrouble avoiding the same pitfalls thatrnhave led to the incoherence of SupremernCourt adjudication. Though he demonstratesrna sincere effort to preserve somethingrnlike authentic religious liberty,rngrounded in and at the service of religiousrntruth. Carter is too much a part ofrna political culture that disdains such retrogradernconcepts as exclusive religiousrntruth. He does not succumb easily, andrnhis book is admirable for its effort to resist,rnbut The Culture of Disbelief is veryrnmuch a product of the culture it purportsrnto criticize. Carter wants Americanrnlaw and politics to respect faith, but it isrnthe faith of a liberal democrat who happensrnto attend an Episcopal church.rnThe giveaway is that Carter almostrnnever uses the word “religion” in the singular.rnIt is always “the religions do” thisrnand “the religions are” that. This is becausernhis book is a call not to protect religiousrnliberty but to preserve religiousrnpluralism. That is. Carter’s heroes arernnot those who want the state to leavernthem alone so that they can practicerntheir exclusively true religion, but ratherrnthose who want the state to establish andrnmaintain a state of affairs in which suchrnpeople will not offend anyone. As PhiliprnTurner, Dean of the Yale DivinityrnSchool, says in a jacket blurb, “In Carterrnthe American people have a much neededrnadvocate for the rapidly disappearingrnpublic virtues of civility and tolerance.”rnThus, despite his own repeated disclaimers,rnreligious liberty is at the servicernof religious pluralism, not vice versa.rnIt is Carter’s disclaimers that make hisrnbook as confused and confusing as therntangled church-state relationship onrnwhich he is attempting to comment.rnCarter wants to maintain that his own religionrn—Episcopalian Christianity—isrntrue (sort of), but he would never be sornoffensive as to suggest that this impliesrnthat, say. Buddhism is false. Moreover,rnon the one hand he says that “the religions”rnhave a legitimate role in criticizingrnthe political order, while on the otherrnhe denies that religions which might createrndisorder or “division” are legitimate.rnDivision equals hatred, as in: “Christ’srnmessage, after all, is one of love and inclusion,rnnot of hatred and division.” Oh?rnCarter’s understanding of “the religions”rnis informed more by John Lockernthan by Jesus Christ.rnLocke:rnThe Toleration of those that differrnfrom others in Matters of Religion,rnis so agreeable to the Gospelrnof Jesus Christ, and to the genuinernReason of Mankind, that it seemsrnmonstrous for Men to be so blind,rnas not to perceive the Necessityrnand Advantage of it, in so clear arnlight.rnJesus Christ:rnDo not think that I came to bringrnpeace on the earth; I did not comernto bring peace, but a sword. For IrnMARCH 1994/33rnrnrn