ski, editor of The Documentary History of the Ratificationnof the Constitution, has written of the July 1788 Federalistnvictory in the Empire State that, despite a more thanntwo-to-one Antifederalist advantage in delegate commitments,n”it was felt that all of the ratifying states could not benwrong, and therefore the Constitution should be given anchance.” In the second volume of Elliot’s Debates in thenSeveral States, we read of the impact in the convention atnPoughkeepsie of word that a ninth state has ratified, and thenassumption that such information would change the patternnof events in New York. There are related statements in thenrecords of the Virginia convention concluded June 23,n1788, in Richmond. And an even more telling remark in thenNorth Carolina convention of later that summer. TherenGovernor Samuel Johnston responded to exaggerated Antifederalistnfears for what the Constitution will do to thenpublic liberty that “states who have been as jealous of theirnliberties as any in the world have adopted it.” Massachusettsnand South Carolina acted because their leaders had beennconvinced during the Revolution that they needed to be anpart of a larger American entity in order to preserve thencherished integrity of their own ways of life. What theyndecided influenced similar decisions made in New Hampshirenand North Carolina. But more importantiy they hadninfluence in Virginia and New York — also states that mightnhave voted “no.” That Massachusetts approved meant thatnNew Hampshire finally (June 21, 1788) ratified. And whennthese were combined with the influence of Virginia, NewnYork also ratified (July 26, 1788). Such events in their turnnbrought pressure on North Carolina (November 21, 1789)nand then —finally —on Rhode Island (May 29, 1790).nSequence, not the power of persuasion or the force ofnpolitical arguments, is the key to this narrative, the kind ofn”bandwagon” psychology about which any practiced politiciannknows a good deal. But the dynamic of these conventionsnmight have been very much otherwise, and withnconsequences we can hardly imagine. Let us think for anmoment about such a hypothetical process, to learn from it antruth about the origins of American politics.nSuppose the struggle over ratification had been governednby a diff^erent strategy among the Antifederalists andnthat New Hampshire and North Carolina had been broughtnto make early decisions on the Constitution — decisions innthe negative. Suppose then further that New York andnVirginia had been rushed to judgment immediately followingnthe votes against ratification in the two other states. It isnreasonable to assume that one or both of the big Antifederalistnstrongholds would, under such circumstances, have alsonrefused to approve the instrument under consideration.nUnder these circumstances Massachusetts would have votedn”no” had it come next in the sequence. Maryland wouldnhave followed after Virginia; and nothing would then havenserved to get Rhode Island to change its mind. In thisnhypothetical scenario of how ratification could have beennprevented, it would signify nothing at all if Delaware, NewnJersey, Georgia, and even Pennsylvania continued to approventhe Constitution as we know it. Political dynamics arennot the same thing as intellectual substance. The bestnconstitution ever devised by the mind of man would bendisapproved within a formula for deliberation such as then20/CHRONICLESnnnone designed to test the United States Constitution if thenopponents of the plan managed to react to it officially beforenits supporters were ready to speak up. For democratic politicsndo not always turn upon judgments of substantive questionsnso much as they do upon procedural strategies, fashions, andntrends. What I say of such politics was almost as true inn1787-1788 as it is today. The difference is in how democraticnthe politics.nFederalists and Antifederalists were not in 1787 organizednpolitical parties in the current sense, but rather 26 differentnstate parties, 13 on each side of the general question, but notnagreed with their allies on much else. In a broad sense, townnmen and commercial men tended to be Federalists throughoutnthe country. But that distinction does not tell us aboutnwhat they thought of the proper relation of religion tongovernment, about slavery, John Jay’s proposed entente withnSpain, navigation acts, sumptuary laws, or the origins ofnliberty in a pre-social state. Some Antifederalists wanted anBill of Rights to protect the individual against untowardnintrusions in his private affairs. Most of them, like PatricknHenry and Rawlins Lowndes, wanted only securities forncorporate liberty: for the independence of the community tonnegotiate within itself those values it would affirm. Almostnall hoped for the best, once the Constitution had beennapproved, speaking of it as Charles Pinckney did on May 14,n1788, when he called it “the temple of our freedom — antemple founded in the affections, and supported by thenvirtue, of the people.”nDuring the various ratifying conventions and in thenrecommended amendments that brought about the Bill ofnRights, the Antifederalists had required their neighbors tonspecify that there was nothing hidden in the silences of thenConstitution, that “everything not granted is reserved.” SaidnColonel Joseph Varnum of Massachusetts, “No right to alternthe internal regulations of the states” exists under the newngovernment. To the same effect, his old counterpart SamuelnAdams (quoting Governor Hancock) added, “All powersnnot expressly delegated to Congress are reserved to thenseveral states, to be by them exercised.” We hear the samenthing from James Wilson of Pennsylvania in his State HousenYard Speech of October 6, 1787; from General William R.nDavie of North Carolina; from Justice Iredell of the samenstate; and from Madison and Pendleton of Virginia and JohnnLansing of New York — which is only a partial listing ofnparticipants in this litany.nThat the powers of the new government are few andnexplicit is in the ratifying conventions both the centralntheme of the Federalist defense of the United StatesnConstitution, and a primary explanation of why the sequencenof ratifications went as it did. If we would understandnthese results and the enthusiasm with which annessentially conservative people looked forward with hope tonlife under the new government they made possible, then wenshould find ground for them in “minimalist” interpretationsnof the authority thus created. They are a measure of howndifferent from what was intended our fundamental law hasnbecome, and of the difficulty we fall into in attempting tonread into it the ideological fashions of our own time. A goodnsense of the politics of ratification is much to our purpose innconstruing the meaning of what transpired as we began thenadventure story that is our nation’s history. <^n