popularity of his approach in thenacademic journals must be due to fectorsnother than the overwhelmingnweight of evidence behind it.nOn the most mundane level, one suspectsnthat most economics professorsnand graduate students were becomingnintolerably bored with profits-concentrationnstudies. Every university librarynin the country must have several unreadntheses studying profits and industrialnconcentration interred in a remote andnunfrequented section of a dusty basement.nAny new direction for researchnwould doubtless have been welcomed.nMore to the point, the great mass of researchncriticizing government regulationnin areas such as transportation, publicnutilities, properly rights, and safety overnthe past 20 years may be producing anspillover effect on attitudes in othernareas of economics. Continued exposurento the stream of studies presenting carefullynanalyzed examples of inefficientngovernment intervention in economicnactivity may be creating a predisposi­nr LlHKKAl CM II Ki: In7/M’ lii’vil mill R.K. Mtulv Mc I)t> IInIn till- ihi> wlu-n Cotlon .1;I1IKT inslriK’U’ilnoildiii.il .NI.AV I’.n^ihind in “llu-nWDnili-rs ol (111′ iiiisihlf «i)i”M.” il w;isniKil unconinuin lo :iilriliiiti’ di-siruclivi-nJIKI MntisiK’ijI Ixhavior ti> iiulwcllin^Jiriiiin.s.nIn .1 riiotk-rn .Xniiika .M-rmniii/ftlnh l):ui K.IIIH’I- li M. on llu- hdrrors nl’nKi-piihlkan I’tiindniic.s. t;i.suisii”v .ippiMi’snlo hiiM- .slijfu-d its h:l.si.s siiiiiiwhiil. .ilordin};nIn :i ri.-siaiir’:inl manaficr ivivntivnrohlu-d in l)i’iri)il. (.iilliirallx orlhddoxn};Mnnii.’n now i|iii)li- ihi- i-vinini; rii-wsnwliiii piTlorrnin^ lu-i.sls;nI k- liikl nil-111-w.i.ssorrv….’nini In- li>iilnMR’ hi’ iic)rni.illy woiikln’l ilii jiiuliiii};nliki’ iliis. I>iit Ki’ii)^ini)iiiii’s liml tiiricilnhull iiilii il.nDuring; rhi’ .MalliiT ilynasl. I>iirit.in iiin-ntion among economists to accept thenwrongheadedness of government policynas a standard, rebuttable presumptionnwhen considering other areas—such asnantitrust policy. If this is the case, Mr.nBrozen may be in the forefi-ont of a longoverduenrevision of basic attitudes towardnbusiness power among academicneconomists. One hopes that he will notnbe too occupied with leading the wavenof the luture to estimate a few more costnfunctions for the next edition of hisnbook.nlurning from the academic controversiesnof Concentration, Mergers,nand Public Policy to Joel Seligman’s historynof the practical regulation of businessnby the Securities and ExchangenCommission, one is struck by the contrastnbetween the effectiveness ofneconomists and that of securitiesnlawyers in influencing public policy.nThe economists reviewed by Brozennpresented, and believed they hadnproved, a long list of charges showingnj”ri-j;;ili()n.s Mipporlixl tliiir ilisincs In-caiisi-ntlii-y irii.sii’il in their ability id lii-lpntlu’iii (rtiTCdiiif the- Di’vil. but in llicnKathi-r dynasty il i.s tin- diiiidniacs. iidintill’ I’.xdiviMs. wild lakf cdllivtiiiii.sn( syoi) in this liiM-) and wild inspiiv I’ailhnand worship, “lie sdiiniU’d sintvri’. and 1nIx-lii-vid him. Ildiu’st to (rod.” ti>liliidniht IVlroit viiiiiu. Linnnthat high industrial concentration inflictednmajor costs on the public. Yetnthey were never able to introduce intonpublic policy more than a tiny portion ofnthe policies su^ested by their theories.nThere was never any serious prospectnthat the government would beginnbreaking up great numbers of largenfirms. The securities lawyers involved inndesigning and operating the SEC, on thenother hand, had fairly limited goals, andnby and large they achieved them. AsnSeligman recounts in his book, the SECndecided to promote the full disclosurenof relevant financial information to investors,nand to leave detailed regulationnof stock exchanges and dealings to variousnprivate business organizations. Inndoing so they seem to have avoided thentwin pitfalls of regulatory agencies—nneither working so closely with the regulatednindustries as to become entirely anservant of private interests, nor attemptingnto supersede management in controllingndetailed business decisions.nIn contrast to the continuing controversiesnover the most basic elementsnof industrial-organization theory, thenbasic principles of securities regulationnhave long been settled. Few nownquestion the desirability of governmentnstandards governing the disclosure andnreliability of financial data required bynpotential investors. The academic criticsnof other regulatory agencies havengenerally found little fault with the SEC.nOne point stressed by Seligman is thencentral role of the personalities of thenSEC commissioners, particularly thenchairman, in determining the basicndirection and vigor of commission activities.nThe perennial complaint of oldnanalyses of economic regulation, thatnmost problems could be solved simplynby appointing better-qualified commissioners,nhas generally been discountednby more recent approaches emphasizingnthe inherent institutional characteristicsnof regulatory bodies. Seligman’snenormously detailed history of the SECnunderlines the continuing importancenof individuals in determining the performancenof organizations. Dn^^S3nMay 1983n