Kondylis asks whether Kirk and otherrnAmerican traditionalists are not merelyrnechoing European restorationist thoughtrn”as a countcrweiglit to the most recentrndevelopments in a consumer massrndemocracy.” What renders this intendedrncounterweight useless is its detachmentrnfrom any supportive sociopoliticalrnstructure. Without such a framework,rnKondylis contends, values cannot bernturned into a public ethic. By creativelyrnblending Marx and Schmitt, and by givingrnto both his own spin, he explains whyrnthe terms “conservative” and “liberal”rncannot operate as worldviews. Ideologiesrnare distillations of beliefs put forth by politicalrnand social elites, whether rising orrnfalling, and they carry historical weightrnto whatever extent their bearers can controlrnthe lives of others. Once removedrnfrom this relation, they do not prevail—rncertainly not as individually chosenrnvalues formeriy associated with a fallenrnelite.rnIt may be said that Kondylis preachesrnhistorical relativism, and that, like otherrnrelativists, he excepts his own “scientific”rnvalues from the judgments applied tornthe objects of his study. Whether that isrnthe case or not, his observations deservernto be heeded. Ideas become part of thernpolitical conversation when they appealrnto those who exercise, or effectively contendrnfor, power. Kondylis is speakingrnspecifically about principles and socialrnvisions whose bearers seek to implementrnthem as public truths. For this to happen,rnthese truths must dovetail with thernconcerns and interests of those who canrnlead. As Kondylis makes clear, he is analyzingrnnot the ontological status ofrn”timeless beliefs” but the conditions inrnwhich some political ideas win out inrnrelation to others. Kondylis does not denyrnthat failed ideas may hang around forrna time before losing all cultural impact.rnWhen in the late 80’s Russell Kirk lecturedrnon traditionalist themes at thernHeritage Foundation, an institution proclaimingrnits devotion to a “world democraticrnrevolution,” Heritage’s presidentrnEdwin Feulner was allowing representationrnto what he knew was a weakened positionrnon the transformed Americanrnright. Kondylis might have describedrnthis as providing a semblance of continur/rno ,s ti/),rnm – 5459rnity between “a neomedieval renditionrnof the societas civilis” and consumerdemocraticrnboosterism. Needless to say,rnthese two ingredients in the moementrnconservative ragout are not equally perceptible.rnKondylis is skeptical of the claim thatrnpolitical conflicts will cease to occur inrna consumer society, where traditionalrnidentities are diluted and in which anrnimpersonal government hands out generalrnentitlements. Here, too, Schmitt’srnessence of the political, as the drawing ofrnfriend-enemy distinctions, will continuernto operate. A desperate middle class inrnsome situations may turn to authoritarianrnsolutions to forestall an ominous leaprninto radical egalitarian polities. ButrnKondylis relegates this “modern rightist”rnpossibility almost exclusively to Latmrnjunta-prone societies or their equivalentrnelsewhere. He does not see it as anythingrnlikely to occur in the consumer massrndemocracies to which he devotes hisrnmost recent book, and also his frequentrncolumns in the Frankfurter AllgemeinernZeitung. In the Planetarische Politik nachrndem Kalten Krieg, he presents a new scenario,rnin which peoples struggle for bothrnmaterial resources and creature comforts.rnLike Schmitt, Kondylis believesrnthat we have entered a great “neutralizingrnepoch” in which all belief-systemsrnthat are not compatible with material interestrnhave been neutralized and devalued.rnIn his eagerness to generalize aboutrncurrent Western materialism, Kondylisrnmay go too far—for example, in dismissingrnentirely Samuel Huntington’srnthoughtful essay on cultural and religiousrnconflicts in an age of global politics.rnFor Kondylis, all such disputesrncan be traced to the bitterness causedrnb- material disparities. Although thisrnrecurrent judgment in his work recallsrnthe tirades of Third World Marxists,rnKondylis has come to it from a non-rnMarxist perspective. The descendant ofrna distinguished Greek military familyrnwho laments in letters his unheroic existencern”as the author of long books inrnGerman,” he despises the hedonism ofrnpostbourgeois democracy. His own sympathiesrnare most clearly with the landedrnaristocracy, and, after it, with those bourgeoisrnascetics who built up nation-statesrnand middle-class capitalism. One guessesrnfrom his social commentary thatrnwine-sipping yuppies and self-actualizingrnfeminists are less to his liking thanrnthe would-be gravediggers of the contemporaryrnWest.rnIt is possible, in any event, to imaginernsources of conflict that are neither strictlyrnmaterial in motivation nor tied to obsoleternlabels. Besides cultural and racialrnstruggles one may foresee other roadblocksrnto a not-quite-new world order,rnstarting with populist and regional obstacles.rnDespite the American media’s labelingrnof such populist manifestations asrn”right wing,” present-day demands forrnregional, participatory democracy rightfullyrndefy the categorization. ‘Thoughrnregional nationalism in Quebec hasrnflourished throughout the century, it hasrnbeen wed over time to different spouses,rnfrom the francophone clericalism ofrnMaurice Duplessis to the welfare staternsocialism of Rene Levesque. Regionalistrnmovements in Europe have allied themselvesrnwith both left and right, as the occasionrnpresents itself. In the British electionsrnin April, Scottish nationalists,rnvoting overwhelmingly for Labour, didrnso because Ton’ Blair promised the Scotsrnhome rule. In Italy the Lega Nord has attractedrnto its brand of regionalism thosernprotesting federal control of welfare andrnimmigration. But the appeal made byrnleghisti to citizen involvement in governmentalrndecisions need not entail a marketrneconomy. The league only insistsrnthat democracy should involve authenticrnself-rule.rnThe populist, regionally based challengernto central administration has not,rnhowever, caught on equally everywhere.rnUnlike in Italy, Austria, and GreatrnBritain, it has remained relatively weak inrnthe United States, where the federal administrationrnand federal courts have hadrntheir way with lower levels of government.rnHere regionalist opposition lacksrnthe firm ethnic base or the memory of arnprenational state—both of which arernpresent in Europe—and so the challengernmounted to the central state, if occasionallyrnviolent, has been dispersed. In thernUnited States, moreover, the respectablernand well-heeled “right” consists of whatrnFred Barnes styles “big-government conservatives”rn—advocates of a pro-businessrnwelfare state combined with a vigorousrnforeign policy based on the promotion ofrn”human rights.” In point of fact, there isrnno critical confrontation between thisrnposition and the underlying assumptionsrnof the Clinton administration. Real confrontationrnlies elsewhere, beyond thernreprising of antiquated right-left distinctions,rnand here the struggle unfolding isrnabout nothing less than the meaning ofrndemocracy. ^rn30/CHRONlCLESrnrnrn