Alliances are part of the old system of power politics rejectedrnb transnationalists. In Bosnia, for example, when NATO niilitar-rncapabilities were needed, it was imperative to give the U.N.rna eto over their use. The Bosnian experience indicates that therndiplomatic cover provided by the UN. comes at a high price. Itrnconfirmed the old adage that “councils of war never fight.” Asrnthe circle of participants widens, the cohesion of any coalitionrnweakens as interests vary and the more timid members set limitsrnon what they will agree to do. At critical moments, when decisivernleadership is required, the U.N. is most likely to berngripped bv paralysis.rnManv proponents of a stronger U.N. understand this inherentrnweakness of collective security among soxereign states. Inrn1992, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued hisrnAgenda for Peace that called for “preventive deployment” ofrnLIN. troops b’ a standing arm of heavilv armed “peace enforcementrnunits.” This army was to be supported by an expandedrnU.N. military staff, permanent bases, and weaponrnstockpiles. As Marrack Goulding, the U.N. Under-SecretaryrnGeneral in charge of political affairs and peacekeeping, stated,rn”The first principle of peacekeeping is that operations shouldrnbe U.N. operations; formed by the U.N., commanded in thernfield bv a II.N.-appointed officer, under the ultimate authorityrnof the Secretary General, and financed bv member states colleeti’rnel.”rnBoutros-Ghali wanted this U.N. army to be financed by assessmentsrnleied from the national defense budgets of thernlargest member-states. He also sugge,sted that the LIN. taxrnarms sales and international air traffic and lew interest paymentsrnon nations whose “assessments” w ere late. Martin Walkerrnof the Wodd Policy Institute argued for placing a tax on internationalrncurrency transactions. This would yield sufficientrnrevenue to fund a LJ.N. army independent of control by majorrnLJ.N. members like the LJnited States.rnTaxation is a sovereign prerogative. For the LJ.N. to claimrnsuch a right, regardless of how implemented, would establish itrnas a superior entity. Walker sympathizes with this notion: “Thernpower to assert one’s own economic and taxation policy hasrnlong been the cardinal characteristic of the nation-state. Thatrnpower is now in question. But so is the continued utilit of thernnation-state as the guarantor of internal order and prime actorrnin international affairs.” Note that the jurisdiction of the LJ.N.rnis to extend to “internal order” within nations and not just servernas a mediator between nations. This would be a violation ofrntraditional so’ereignty, but then, as former LJ.N. Under-Secretar-rnGeneral Sir Brian LJrquhart has said, “The unravelingrnof national sovereignty seems to be a feature of the post-ColdrnWir period.”rnThough Glinton has said he docs not favor a standing U.N.rnarm, the administration’s paper Reforming Multilateral PeacernOperations called for the creation by the LJ.N. of a Plans Division,rnan Information and Research Division, an Operations Division,rna Logistical Division, a Public Affairs Cell, a Civil PolicernCell, and a Professional Peace Operations Training Program.rnThe L’.N. .should also have a “rapidly dcploable headquartersrnteam” and its own “modest airiift capabilities.” The paper alsornpledged the LJnited States to “offer to help design a database ofrnmilitarv forces or capabilities and to notif’ r)PKO [Departmentrnof Peace Keeping Operations] for inclusion in therndatabase, of specific LJ.S. capabilities that could be made availablernfor the full spectrum of peacekeeping or humanitarianrnoperations.”rnRepublicans and conservative Democrats in Congress haverndone much to derail the Clinton program in the wake of LJ.N.rndebacles in Somalia and Bosnia. American troops are not to berncommitted under U.N. command unless the President first certifiesrnthat the arrangement protects our national security andrnretains our right to take independent action to protect ourrnforces. And LJ.N. peacekeeping operations are not to be paidrnfor from the Pentagon budget. The President must seek fundsrnin advance for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, notrnmerely raid other accounts.rnIt is one thing to debate wherernand when the country shouldrnact; it is another to weaken thernabihty to act so much that it is nornlonger an option.rnAdvocates of expanded American involvement in LJ.N. operationsrnallege that any failure to act means that our country isrnlapsing into isolationism. Yet the LJnited States has repeatedlyrndemonstrated its ability to act forcefully when its real interestsrnarc at stake. The danger comes if the LJnited States is draggedrninto a series of fruitless conflicts unrelated to the country’s security.rnThis is when public opinion could become disenchantedrnand turn isolationist, thus undermining the ability of therncountry to act when its interests are actually in danger.rnWhat liberals really mean when they talk of isolationismrnis that the’ do not approve of foreign policies that arernbased on power politics, traditional alliances, or national security.rnTo them, it is collective seeuritv under the sanction ofrnsome transnational authority—or nothing. This was evident inrnthe recent congressional debates over cuts in foreign aid andrnin contributions to the U.N., which showed the liberal desire torntransfer money to agencies and regimes that are not tiedrnto American interests (or are even openly hostile to our interests)rnwhile objecting to spending money on America’s ownrndefenses.rnIt is one thing to debate where and when the country shouldrnact; it is another to weaken the ability to act so much that it isrnno longer an option. Since 1990, military force levels have beenrncut by over a third, readiness has declined, and many vital modernizationrnprograms have been delayed or canceled. Plannedrnforce leels do not provide the credible capabilit- to fight “twornnead} simultaneous regional wars,” which is the declared policyrnand prudent standard for safeguarding American security inrna turbulent uorid. For example, to liberate Kuwait in 1991, thernLJnited States sent eight Army divisions, six Marine brigades,rnsix aircraft carriers, and ten tactical fighter wings to the PersianrnGulf. These units represented about half of the nation’s conventionalrnwar-fighting capability at the time. This commitmentrninvolved roughly the same number of troops as the Kore-rnOCTOBER 1995/19rnrnrn