cow him into submission, then hum’ home to hanest your ownrncrops.rnVictor Davis Hanson, a farmer and tlie author of several finernworks on Greek warfare, has argued that tlie idea of agriculturalrndevastation during the Greek hoplite wars has been greatlyrnexaggerated. Wliile fires are easy enough to set, trees and vinesrnnsnalK’ recover quickly. Cutting vines is not unduly difficult,rnbut pulling out rootstoek is. Chopping down trees —especiallyrnthe solid trunks of the mature olive tree —is a backbreaking andrntime-consuming task.rnIf great agricultural destruction was not the norm, why didrnthe Greeks not simply wait out the invading enemy behind thernwalls of dieir ciHes? First of all, a loss of a harvest could causernconsiderable sufl:ering if food storage was inadequate. However,rnfar more important to the Creek hoplite were his honor andrnpride. Gould he huddle behind the safet- of walls while an enennrnwas parading over his fields—the same fields bis father andrnfather’s father had farmed? No, enem hoplites in his fieldsrnwere an invitation to fight that coidd not be refused.rnIn man}’ ways, battle was a kind of ritual: An enemy army ofrnhoplites appeared; the er’ went up for the local forces to organize;rna level, open plain was chosen; and the opposing phalanxesrncollided. The bloodshed usually ended qiuekly. Thernone battle was usually the war. Perhaps this explains why it wasrnea,s to draw a citizen army out of a eit’. Wliatevcr the reason orrncombination of reasons, the Greeks could not seem to resist arncall to battle with an enemy stomping about on their turfrnWhen the hoplite armies clashed, casualfies were not usualhrnas high as you might expect. The warriors’ armor—a bronzernbreast|3late, a helmet, and greaves—kept them fairly well protected.rn1 hey also carried a shield, the hoplon. If the momentiunrnof die battle—and I use die word “momentum” in its mostrnliteral sense—began to go decidedly one way and the losing sidernwas able to maintain unit cohesion and the integrit)’ of each indirnidual [ihalanx, then a fighting withdrawal v’as possible andrncasualties minimized. However, if cohesion disintegrated,rngreat slaughter could result. Because the Greek hoplite armiesrnw ere well disciplined, great carnage was normalK’ the cxcepdonrnrather dian Hie rule.rnMoreover, Greeks generally thought it unseemly to slaughterrndieir fellow Greeks once a battle had been decided: Better tornsa e defeated Greeks for battles against barbarians. Upon learningrnthat his Spartans had not only defeated but annihilated anrnarmy of Corinthians, a fourth-centur)’ king of Sparta remarked,rn”Woe to ou, Greece, diose who now have died were enough tornhave beaten all the barbarians in battle had they lived.”rnr’or more dian two centuries, the hoplite citizen-soldiers ofrndie eit-states fought each other. The rise of Persia and her invasionrnof Greece would change all that. The fights against thernPersians were not ritual clashes between Greek eitv-states butrnwars to sae the Creek world—the Western world —from Orientalrndespotism. The wars left Athens—or the eitv’-state of Atticarn—the preeminent polls in Greece. During ihe last year of thernsecond war with Persia, Adiens formed the Delian League, anrnalliance of several city-states pledged to a united offensive andrndefensiv c action. Athens gradually transfoniied the league intorna maritime trading empire (with herself as die principal benefician)rnand eventually extended Athenian hegemony over mostrnof die cih-states in the league.rnSparta, meanwhile, began to think that Athens, if unchecked,rnwould soon extend Athenian hegemony over all ofrnGreece. In response, she formed her own alliance. War behyeeiirnthe two great powers finally erupted. Aldiough die immediaterncause was a dispute between Corcyra and Corinth, andrnSparta and Athens were brought into the war because of entanglingrnalliances, Athenian imperialism was principally responsible.rnIronically, Adieus had set herself on a course of imperialisticrnexpansion dirough her leadership in successfully stoppingrnPersian imperialism.rnThe Peloponnesian War was not a single clash of hopliternarmies from hvo city-states on an open plain but a protractedrnAmerica, too, once had citizensoldiersrnwho fought to defendrnlibert)’ and kinfolk and to protect hearthrnand home-not to build an empire.rnwar of attrition for an empire fought on plains, in cities, and atrnsea. It ended disastrously for Adieus and marked the beginningrnof the end for die Greek eitv’-state and for Hellenic civilization.rnUntil die Peloponnesian War, the armies of most cih’-states hadrnbeen composed of citizen’s militias called upon onlv occasionall}’rnand only for a single battie. Protracted wars called for professionalrnsoldiers, not farmers or artisans volunteering to serve asrnhoplites. The hoplites willingly fought to preserv e dieir libertiesrnand to defend tiieir kinfolk and land. P’ighting to build empiresrnwas foreign to them, something diat characterized Orientalrnt}’raiiiiies.rnAmerica, too, once had citizen-soldiers who fought to defendrnlibert}’ and kinfolk and to protect hearth and home —not tornbuild an empire. Since World War II, we seem to have forgottenrnthis simple tact, as Athens did following the Persian Wars.rnHer great victories led to empire-building, power, and glon’ butrnended in disaster not onK’ for Athens but for classical Greek civilization.rnI suspect that historians will one da} look back at diernUnited States and conclude that America’s great victory inrnWorld War II led to empire-building, power, and glory but alsornmarked the beginning of the end for the United States —and,rnultimately, for Western civilization. Our reach now exceedsrnour grasp, and long ago we stopped fighting to defend our landrnand people.rnI recall President Lyndon Johnson saying, in 1964, that hernwould “not send American boys 10,000 miles awa}’ to do whatrnAsian boys could and should do for themselves.” I also rememberrnthinking, when Johnson shortiy thereafter reversed himself,rnthat those who voted to go to war in the Greek cit’-states went tornwar diemselves. Those decisionmakers served as hoplites, evenrnif thev were in dieir ?0’s or 40’s—or possiblv older. It was, tornme, the ultimate democratic value: Those who commit us tornwar stand in the van, slioulder-to-shoulder with otiier citizensoldiers,rnfacing the enemy. I alwa}’s reckoned that LBJ wouldrnhave allowed Asian boys to do for diemselves if he would havernbeen required to leave the White House to hump die hills of IrnCorps wirii a baseplate strapped to his back, accompanied byrnDean Rusk packing a mortar tube and bipods, and Robert Me-rnNamara lugging ammo boxes. crnFEBRU.AKY 2001/15rnrnrn