lersev on a grand scale. of institutionalized corruption—NewrnWhen Ronald Reagan received his S2 million honorarium,rnJapanese journalists and businessmen bragged openly that itrnwas a paoff for services rendered. An open society, trying torndeal fairU- with Japan, is in the position of an honest bridgernplaer lured into a game of three-card monte.rn”It is dangerous for constitutional states to have too manyrndealings with tyrants.” The danger, according to Demosthenes,rnlav in the contrast between the settled will of the disciplinedrnruler—in this case Philip of Macedon—and the instabilitvrnand corruption that characterize the foreign policy ofrnconstitutional states like democratic Athens.rnDemosthenes knew whereof he spoke. Late in his career,rnhe described the statesman as the man who could detect importantrnmoxements and events in the earliest stages of de-rn’elopment, and he had been warning the Athenians againstrnPhilip’s designs as cadv as 350, when the king was busily annexingrnterritories in northern Greece. Ifnfortunately, as hernpointed out, a popular democracy is “the most unstable andrnmost unreliable of all things, like a variable wind at sea thatrnblows in any direction.” Athens was unreliable, because thernpeople were fickle, easily led astray by empty promises ofrnpeace and prosperity and easily tricked bv leaders who hadrnbeen paid off by the Macedonian king.rnAesehines, the most eloquent leader of the peace party,rnwhich Demosthenes regarded as the Macedonian party, narrowKrnescaped conietion, but Philocrates, the chief promoterrnof the peace trcat of 346, was eonvietcd. The formal chargernwas aimed at orators (that is, prominent political figures whornattempted to influence the course of affairs) “who spoke whatrnis not best for the people, taking money and gifts from thosernwho are yorking against them.” Philocrates’ crime wasrntwofold: he had deliberately arranged a treaty contrary tornAthenian interests, and he had received money from a foreignrnpower. It did not seem to matter that Athens and Macedonrnwere not actually fighting at the time of the treaty, orrnthat the king had been persistent in declaring his friendly intentionsrntoward the city.rnIn their osn defense, the Macedonian part argued thatrntheir |)eace polic was the only prudent course for Athens torntake. Besides, Athenian politicians are specialists in the art ofrnthe bribe, and Demosthenes himself was not above receivingrngifts. With the benefit of our hindsight, Philocrates andrnhis friends could make an even better ease. The Roman systemrnof politics was rooted in friendship and gift-giving, asrnItalian politics is today, and it is only a few Northern Europeanrnpeoples who have nrade a fetish out of honest governnrent—rna government of laws not men, in Burke’s hopeful phrase. Itrndid not take long for the honest Anglo-Saxons of the UnitedrnStates to realize that government was simpK one more commoditrnto Ijc bought and sold on the not-so-open market.rnThe Yiizoo scandal revealed that something like the entirernpolitical class of Georgia yvas corrupt, and more recent scandalsrnin Arizona and South Carolina make it clear that nothingrnhas improved in the course of nearh two centuries.rnBut if American politics are deeply rooted in bribery andrncorruption, wc have not vet learned to accept this as anrninevitable condition of doing business. The American publicrnexpressed outrage over the sih’cr swindle of the 1870’s, TeapotrnDome in the I920’s, and the S&L scandal of more recentrnyears. Wc arc still naive enough to cling to Burke’s prescription,rnand we do not like to be reminded that the vox popidi expressedrnin the ballot box is frec[ucntly drowned out by therndin of ringing cash registers.rnE en supposing that we must live under a system of institutionalizedrnbribery, as the Athenian traitors would argue, werndo customarily draw the line at the border. It is easy to findrnexamples of bribery and corruption in the history of the eadyrnRepublic but not so easy to cite cases of political leaders whornaccepted payments from foreign governments. GeneralrnWilkinson is tlie only exanrple that comes readily to mind.rnThroughout our history, an American caught acceptingrnmoney from foreign enemies in time of war would quite propedyrnbe regarded as a traitor, whether he was convicted of treason,rnespionage, or trading with the enemy. Although thernGonstitution of the I’nited States restricts treason to “le yingrnWir against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giv ingrnthem Aid and Gomfort,” our moral conception of treasonrnderives from a longer legal tradition that can include actsrntending to subvert or libel the government of the nation.rnBefore turning to military solutions, thernUnited States might consider defending itsrneconomic interests by the legal and politicalrnmeans they have at their disposal. In therncurrent atmosphere of wholesale bribery,rnhowever, it is impossible to put Americanrninterests ahead of the foreign businesses andrngovernments that are buying up our land, ourrnbusinesses, our institutions, and our leaders.rnLaws on treason in Western countries are complicated, derivingrnfrom different legal and political systems. In Romanrnlaw, bv the time of the Empire, the general rubric is crimenrnmaeatatis laesae, that is, the charge that someone has injuredrnthe “majesty” (the greatness, the authority, the vitality) ofrnthe Roman state. In time, the charge was typieallv applied tornanyone who diminished the glory of the cnrperor, for examplernby wearing the imperial color, but the essence of maestas isrngrander, and more metaphysical, summing up the safety, welfare,rnand dignity of the nation itself.rnOur barbarian ancestors had more personal conceptions ofrnpower, and the essence of treason was, for them, infidelity,rnbreaking faith w ith one’s lord or king. In the course of time,rnthe two traditions so intertwined and interpenetrated eachrnother that only the subtlest of legal minds can accurately distinguishrnthe Roman and German elements in French andrnEnglish treason statutes. In England the great statute of EdwardrnIII has something like the status of Magna Carta, becausernit is regarded as rationalizing and restricting the king’srnability to attaint his enemies for treason. The terms are stillrnquite broad, and they include: compassing the death of thernking, his queen, or his son and heir; sexual relations with variousrnof his female relatives; coining false money; killing thernchancellor, treasurer, or one of the king’s justices; lev ving warrnMAY 19 9.VIIrnrnrn