not recognize the legitimacy of neutralit)’,rnis fundamentally incompatible with arnforeign policy dedicated to peaceful interactionrnwith all nations.rnRothbard demonstrates that today’s interventionistrnmoralism is a perversion ofrna natural law tradition that once operatedrnin the interest of peace. In contrast tornthe “isolationist” insult flung at modernrncritics of American wars, the early classicalrnliberal Richard Cobden, who advocatedrnfree trade, peace, and neutrality,rnearned the htle “the international man.”rnThe new “internationalism” has gonernhand-in-hand with the modern era’s “advancernto barbarism” (the phrase is F.J.P.rnVeale’s, in reference to the completernabandonment of the civilized code ofrnconduct in warfare in this century, arntrend distinguishable by the targeting ofrncivilians). The code of warfare, operatingrnthrough the 19th century to a certainrndegree, was one of the high points ofrnWestern civilizahon, protecting the individualrnfrom the most obscene manifestationsrnof interstate warfare.rnThe authors, however, hold no briefrnfor pacifism. The chapters concernedrnwith both the morality of war in generalrnand in past conflicts make a clear case forrnthe legitimacy of defensive wars, meaningrnwars to defend one’s family andrnhome against invasion and foreign domination.rnThis is the basis of ThomasrnFleming’s learned contribution defendingrnthe attempt of the Confederate Statesrnof America to repel the invasion of theirrnhomeland.rnBut Fleming greatly broadens his casernby appealing to the literature of ancientrnGreece. The Greeks were ambivalentrnabout war, celebrating the warrior’s heroismrnwhile decrying the attendant slaughterrnand destruction. Euripides’s TrojanrnWomen is a case in point, contrasting therndefenders of a homeland with its imperialrnconquerors. Fleming quotes Hecuba’srndaughter, who said of the Greeksrnthat the “came to the banks of Scamander,rn[and] died, not defending their frontiers.rn. . . Whom Ares killed, they did notrnsee their children and were not laid outrnfor burial by their wives.” Not so the conqueredrnTrojans, vho “died, first of all, forrntheir native land, the best thing that canrnbe said of anyone, and their friendsrnburied them in the bosom of their ancestralrnearth.”rnThe book ends on a theoretical noternwith a detailed paper by Hans-HermannrnHoppe on the essentially warlike naturernof modern democratic states. He analyzesrnthe process by which civilized societyrncomes into being; in particular, hernconsiders the necessit}’ of a steady decreasernin the rate of time-preference (thernwillingness to suspend capital consumptionrnin favor of savings and investment)rnin order to increase production and livingrnstandards across the population.rnThis rate of preference, he argues, tendsrnto decline in a free and stable society.rnYet Hoppe notes that two forms of systematicrnviolation of property rights mayrninterfere with this tendency. These arerncriminal actions and governmental interferencernwith private property: “thernprocess of civilization is permanentlyrnderailed whenever property-rights violationsrntake the form of government interference.”rnProfessor Hoppe’s analysis of the tendenciesrnof democracies to engage in aggressivernand murderous foreign policiesrnis most telling. Democracies, unable tornexpand through peaceful means such asrnmarriage, tend to expand their territoryrnof control by violent means. Where warsrnwere once clearly an exercise of thernmonarch, who had to raise funds to payrnprofessional soldiers, now wars are conflictsrnof peoples. The results includernconscription on a massive scale, violencernagainst whole populations (including thernmilitary assault on civilians), massiverncompulsory taxation, hate propagandarncampaigns, the hidden costs of inflation,rnand radical capital consumption on arnscale unimaginable before the democraticrnage. In contrast to Wilsonian andrnRooseveltian gibberish about peace-lovingrndemocracies, Professor Hoppe assertsrnthat the first step to reducing political violencernis the delegitimization of therndemocratic ideal.rnTwo central problems in the histor’rnof American foreign policy are neglectedrnin The Costs of War. The firstrnconcerns expansionism as an ideologicalrnunderpinning of classical republicanismrnamong the Founders. Although theyrnwere, in fact, cautious with regard to entanglementsrnin European wars, therernwas near universal agreement that continentalrnexpansion was desirable. Whilernthe Hamiltonians may have envisionedrnAmerican imperial growth along thernlines of the European powers, the Jeffersoniansrngenerally adopted the view thatrnAmerica’s destiny lay in the conquest ofrnthe continent. With the exception ofrncertain of the Tertium Quid republicans,rnthe ideology of expansionism wasrnunchallenged in elite political discourse.rnThe extent to which later (and more explicitlyrnimperialistic) exercises werernmanifestations of the same spirit of expansionismrnis not considered in this collection.rnTo the extent that continentalrnexpansionism is mentioned at all—forrnexample in Justin Raimondo’s otherwisernsuperb chapter on the history of antiinterventionismrn— it is treated as a benignrnnonissue.rnThe other oversight—indeed, the onlyrnglaring hole in the volume —is thernabsence of detailed discussion of thernunique costs of the Cold War. Perhapsrnmore than any other factor in Americanrnhistory, the Cold War was responsible forrnthe ascendancy of the contemporary liberalrnhegemony. Ironically, conservativesrnhave more often than not been apologistsrnfor the Cold War. The price of that conflictrnhas been economic control and regulation,rnmilitary socialism, nationalismrnat the expense of states’ rights and regionalism,rnlax immigration laws, and a generalrnrelaxation of controls on the centralrnstate. Outside the context of the ColdrnWar and America’s global engagements,rnthe civil rights revolution and the immigrationrn”reform” of the 60’s would havernbeen unthinkable, as would the permanentrnestablishment of a military-industrialrncomplex. Robert Higgs has pointedrnout that toward the end of the Cold Warrnyears, the United States’ war apparatusrnwas the third largest planned economy inrnthe world, following only the SovietrnUnion and Communist China.rnRight-wing opposition to war andrnmilitarism once included a critiquernof the Cold War. John Flynn, HarryrnElmer Barnes, Caret Garrett, the oldrnFreeman —all remained true to theirrnnoninterventionist principles, even asrnthe conservative movement becamernincreasingly entwined with the warfarernstate. Any contemporary reader ofrnBarnes’ “How ‘Nineteen Eighty Four’rnTrends Threaten American Peace andrnProsperity” will be jarred by the utterrnabhorrence with which many on the OldrnRight regarded the Cold War. Evenrnmore striking is the prescience and accuracyrnof their predictions.rnThese omissions notwithstanding.rnThe Costs of War thoroughly and convincinglyrnmakes a case for a peacefulrnforeign policy, and no other book takesrnsuch a broad look at the terrible consequencesrnof militarism and violence inrnforeign affairs. May it be a harbinger ofrnchanging times. crnAPRIL 1998/25rnrnrn