24 / CHRONICLESnca. Why? Because Blumenthal’s Reagannis at heart a Social Darwinist,nalbeit a Social Darwinist with anhuman face. He champions not thenself-made man, who would work hisnway to individual greatness by crushingnthose who would stand in his way,nbut the self-indulgent man, whonwould spend his way to societal prosperitynby buying from those whonwould stand in his way.nHistorically, the GOP, with its rootsndeeply embedded in the 19th century,nhas been the party of businessmen,nLincoln reformers, and professionalnpols. Now, it has been captured by andevious counterestablishment, whichnexists apart from the Republican Partynand outside of American history. ButnBlumenthal has discovered a ray ofnhope for traditional Republicans (andnall Americans): There has been nonrealignment of political parties, only anrealignment of politicized elites.nBut can the shift of Norman Podhoretz,nIrving Kristol, and Jeane Kirkpatricknfrom the Democratic to thenRepublican Parties account for thenReagan revolution? Of course not.nCan even the coming of age of annentire generation of youngish conservativenintellectuals explain the resultsnof the 1980 and 1984 elections? Ofncourse not. The rise to power of anconservative President and conservativenideas is an important story, but itnis far from the whole story.nRonald Reagan was swept to powernby middle- and lower-middle-classnvoters who were tired of embarrassingnsetbacks abroad, beset by challenges tontraditional values at home, and anxiousnfor an American economic revival.nMany of these Reagan votes werencast by former Democrats; but, asnKevin Phillips has pointed out in Post-nConservative America, the 1980’s havenproduced neither a party nor an elitenrealignment but a “dealignment” awaynfrom the two major parties.nAccording to a Gallup poll, Reagannin 1980 drew only 86 percent of thentraditional Republican vote, whichnwas the lowest of any party nomineensince Goldwater’s 80 percent in 1964.nPhillips does note that Reagan’s sharenof the vote was 12 points higher thannthat of Goldwater, but only two pointsngreater than Gerald Ford’s showing inn1976. Such figures are not the stuff ofnhistoric party realignments.nFurthermore, no previous party realignmentnproduced a split Congress ornoccurred during a period of decliningnvoter turnout. Writing before the 1984nReagan landslide, Phillips makes a stillnpersuasive case that the Reagan Presidencynmay be only a stepping-stone tona more populist-oriented conservatism.nThe allegiance of those first-timenRepublican voters is tenuous at best.nTheir votes were conditional votes. Anmore permanent attachment to thenRepublican Party would require a revitalizednAmerican presence in thenworld, a growing American economy,nand/or the enactment of the NewnRight’s social agenda. The currentnIran-Contra fiasco threatens the first;nthe jury is still very much out on thensecond; and Reagan has so far failed onnthe third. Such debacles, doubts, andndefeats are not the stuff of permanentnparty realignments.nIf such a realignment should occurnin the 1990’s, it is not likely to benachieved because of Republican adherencento the Laffer curve ornFriedman-inspired monetarism. Nornwill it result from a rush among thenmiddle and lower-middle classes tondevour the latest George Gilder treatisenor add to their collection of FiringnLine videotapes. Party realignmentnwill not come courtesy of a genialnWhite House host but in response to anmajor crisis or the passion of a majoritariannleader.nG.K. Chesterton once observed thatnin America the most democratic mannmay also be the most despotic man.nWhen he wrote those words he wasnthinking of Andrew Jackson—a mannof passion, who identified himself withnordinary people, a President who rodento power on the wings of the firstnmajor party realignment in Americannhistory.nThere are many superficial similaritiesnbetween Jackson and Reagan.nBoth were frustrated in their initialnattempts to capture the White House.nBoth eventually won larger mandatesnfor their second terms. Both held officenas old men. Both preached minimalistngovernment. Both rode out of thenWest to storm the Washington establishment.nBoth attacked corrupt andnlethargic special interests. Here, however,nthe parallel ends.nBefore reaching the White House,nJackson was a genuine American heronnnwho suffered often and always demandednmuch of himself Reagan, onnthe other hand, was a genuine Americanncelebrity who, once he discoverednHollywood, seldom demanded muchnof himself And now, having attainednthe White House, he has failed tondemand very much of his countrymen.nPerhaps the 1990’s will be different.nPerhaps there will then be a partynrealignment to match the elite realignmentnthat Blumenthal outlined. If so,nthe current counterestablishment willnbe as irrelevant as books which attemptednto dissect it. If Kevin Phillipsnis right, a “post-conservative America”nwill have little use for the conservativenintellectuals Sidney Blumenthal findsnso fascinating—and so infuriating.nThe game plan of these conservatives,naccording to Blumenthal, is ton”transcend time” by ushering in anpermanent economic recovery shieldednby an eternally vigilant StrategicnDefense Initiative. Blumenthal thinksnthat the odds are poor for the ultimatensuccess of either goal. Phillips seems tonagree with the former, and he wrotenhis book before the unveiling of thenlatter. However, they disagree when itncomes to predicting what will follownthe Age of Reagan. Blumenthal comfortsnhimself with the thought thatnAmerican conservatives will ‘umblynretire to their more convincing role asn”shadow liberals.” Anti-governmentnnay-saying, so long as it is done fromnthe political sidelines, is Sidney Blumenthal’snidea of a safe and sanenAmerican conservatism.nPerhaps Mr. Blumenthal will benproved right. Perhaps by the 1990’snAmericans will have awakened to thenmorning after Reagan. Perhaps bynthen Americans of all political persuasionsnwill have rediscovered the reassuringnjoy of either hugging or whippingna newly risen — and oddlyncomfortable—liberal establishment.nDon’t bet on it. The liberal establishmentnis not likely to be restored.nAnd the counterestablishment? Is itnlikely to survive? Well it might, butnshould it not, the I980’s could portendna dealignment of elites to match KevinnPhillips’ dealignment of parties. And ifnMr. Phillips proves to be the betternprognosticator, the Sidney Blumenthalsnof the 1990’s will be singing anvery different political tune.n