PERSPECTIVErnWhy Monkeys Get Fat in Banana Republicsrnby Thomas FlemingrnMuch to no one’s surprise, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leonrnwas elected President of Mexico this past August. Therernwere the usual cries of foul both from the opposition partiesrnand from citizens’ groups monitoring the election: insufficientrnballots were provided to certain polling places where the oppositionrnwas strong, so it was said, and government employeesrnwere brought in early to exhaust the supply; secrecy was inadequate,rna serious problem in a country where a majority of thernpopulation receives its income from the government. Therernwere, in addition, the usual reports of intimidation and ballotstuffing,rnbut these were mild and scattered cases that did littlernto dim the luster of the ruling party’s victory. Zedillo’s handsomernlead in the preelection polls was conhrmed by the results,rnand that was enough to convince the New York Times that thernelection—”the cleanest on record for Mexico”—was anotherrnstep in that nation’s progress toward North American democracy.rnA prudent man with any knowledge of politics would concludernjust the opposite. That a party in power for 65 years, andrnone so manifestly corrupt as the Institutional RevolutionaryrnParty, should win another landslide victory is evidence of nothingrnmore than the plain fact that most Mexicans are still notrnready for self-government. Mexico is, as much as the oldrnU.S.S.R., a party state, and the fact that there are oppositionrnparties means exactly nothing. In communist Poland, the communistsrntolerated, even encouraged opposition parties becausern—as one of the leaders of the Liberals once told me—rnsuch parties were useful window-dressing for the regime. But,rnlike dummies in the window, they could only wear the uniformrnor strike the proper attitude. They could do nothing.rnWhat a curious name, the Institutional RevolutionaryrnParty. On the logic of the cliche that a successful revolutionrnis betraved the moment it succeeds, one would have thoughtrnthat to institutionalize a revolution was to betray it. Revolutionsrnare meant to break up the logjam of decadent institutions,rnand the moment that revolutionary leaders begin to consolidaterntheir principles, they have created a regime as corrupt orrneven more corrupt than its predecessor. Mao knew this veryrnwell and called in the unlettered students and peasants tornwage unceasing war upon the intellectuals and technocratsrnwho enjoyed all their privileges in the name of the people.rn(Zedillo was trained in economics at Yale.) As frightening andrndestructive as Mao’s cultural revolution must have been, it wasrna very sensible, even necessary device to prevent the revolutionrnfrom becoming institutionalized.rnThe enemies of the revolution always come from the ranksrnof its leadership. Robespierre knew this, in putting down thernonly slightly less sanguinary Girondists, who seemed more disposedrnto exercise power by governing than by stoking thernflames of revolution; so did Hitler, when he rounded up ErnstrnRohm and his squads of jackbooted Ganymedes. (Hitler’s puritanismrnobviously contributed to his distaste for Rohm, but therneffect of his coup was to eliminate an entrenched source of potentialrnopposition.)rnStalin, among the most Machiavellian of modern politicians,rnsystematically executed or interned nearly every majorrnBolshevik leader he could lay his hands on. Like Hitler,rnStalin had complex motives; his personal hatred of Jews andrnforeigners obviously rang a bell with the Russian people, and itrnwould be a mistake to minimize Stalin’s (or Hitler’s) megalomania.rnBut the effect of the purges and the terrors was to delayrnthe bureaucratic ossification that set in after Stalin’s death.rnI remember reading a Russian defector’s explanation of Gorbachev.rnHere was a man who had failed at everything, but onrnthe strength of personal charm and the party’s old-boy networkrnhe made his way to the top, where he proceeded to bungle thern14/CHRONICLESrnrnrn