responds. “I do not know why.”nWe have an answer.nHard-nosed analysts and experiencednpolicy-makers refuse to draw the unavoidablenconclusion from incontrovertiblenevidence because this conclusionnseems incompatible with their assessmentnof current Soviet leaders as rationalnhuman beings. Miss Sterling’s conclusionndoes not appear to make senseneven from the Soviets’ own point ofnview. Are the Soviets backing internationalnterrorism in order to bring aboutnworld revolution.’ Are they seeking tonestablish a communist system encompassingnthe entire world and controllednby them.’ One can only impute this intentionnto them if one assumes that theynhave learnt absolutely nothing fromntheir own experience, from the historynof communism since World War II.nYugoslavia in 1948, Hungary in 1956,nthe Sino-Soviet split, Czechoslovakia inn1968, Afghanistan in 1980-thesenevents all show that only the physicalnpresence of the Soviet Army can ensurenSoviet control, and in Poland even thatndoes not seem to be enough.nIt would be impossible for the Sovietsnto keep the entire world under militaryncontrol. A communist world would benan Orwellian world of three or morencommunist superstates facing eachnother in constant war. Stalin was notnhappy to see communism come to powernin China, because he knew he could notncontrol it, and there is no reason to believenthat the present rulers of the SovietnUnion are less realistic than Stalin.nOf course we do not deny that Sovietnpolicy is expansionist, that the Sovietsnwill move, directly or by proxy, intoncountries where there is a power vacuum—providednthey have a reasonablenchance of maintaining control. But andeliberate policy of expansion is a farncry from a policy of world revolutionnthrough the action of terrorist groups.nEven assuming that the Soviet leadersnmight have the impossible dream ofnworld revolution—would they then regardnthe contemporary terrorist move­n18nChronicles of Culturenment as an appropriate instrument.’^nMoscow has always insisted on rigidnideological orthodoxy and, above all,non unconditional loyalty to the Sovietnflag in the ranks of the world communistnmovement. But terrorists are ideologicallynheterogeneous. Some arenopenly critical of the Soviet system,nsome are Trotskyists, and still others—nthe IRA Provos, many of the Palestiniansnand other Moslems—are indoctrinatedninadequately if at all. An evennmore important argument against thenuse of these groups as an instrument ofnworld revolution is that, however greatntheir nuisance value, few of them havenany chance of seizing power. Most ofnthem have no mass base whatsoever,nothers have only a narrow geographicalnor ethnic base, and the result of theirnterrorist activity is more likely to benthe emergence of a rightist dictatorshipnthan a communist regime.nThe notion that the Soviets are sponsoringninternational terrorism as an instrumentnof world revolution is unrealistic.nIt presupposes that the Sovietnleaders are incapable of learning fromnexperience, or that the conflicts betweenncommunist states are elaboratenruses by which a monolithic world commtonistnleadership seeks to mislead thenWest. In brief, the notion smacks ofnparanoia. That is why it is rejected bynour hard-nosed Soviet analysts and experiencednpolicy-makers—and rightly so.nnnAll the same, there is abundant evidencenthat the Soviets are sponsoringninternational terrorism. They mustnhave some reason for this other than thenpromotion of world revolution. Whatncan this other reason be.-*nThe case of Spain provides a clue. ThenSpanish government recently accusednthe Soviets of fomenting the terrorismnof the Basque ETA and other leftistextremistngroups in order to provoke anmilitary coup, because under a dictatorialnregime Spain would not be acceptedninto NATO and the European community.nThis is no wild, baseless accusation.nAs Miss Sterling relates in hernbook, Spanish intelligence has observedncontacts between ETA terrorists andnKGB agents since 1978, and in 1979nthe Soviet foreign minister offered hisnSpanish colleague a Soviet promise “tonhelp Spain fight ETA” in exchange forna Spanish pledge not to join NATO.nThis was, of course, a tacit admissionnthat Moscow had at least some measurenof control over the Basque terrorists.nOne may ask why Moscow shouldnconsider it important to prevent Spainnfrom joining NATO, since the Americannbases—the crucial element in militaryncooperation with the West—are alreadynthere and will remain there withnor without a formal alliance. And whatnpossible objection could Moscow havento economic cooperation between Spainnand Western Europe, or to the presencenof Spanish representatives in the EuropeannParliament.’ The answer is thatnany further consolidation of WesternnEurope is threatening to Moscow, becausenMoscow has failed to stabilizenand consolidate its own realm, the Europeannempire it acquired in the wake ofnWorld War II. The events in Polandnhave now made this startlingly clear.nThe Soviet leaders know that pro-Sovietncommunist leadership would not surviventhe withdrawal of the Soviet Armynanywhere in their European empire.nEast European populations are disaffected,nheld in check only by the proximitynof the Soviet Army and memoriesn